Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n Of Va.
Decision Date | 29 March 1935 |
Citation | 179 S.E. 507 |
Parties | REYNOLDS et al. v. MILK COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Appeal from Law and Equity Court of City of Richmond, Part 2.
Suit by the Milk Commission of Virginia against R. J. Reynolds and others. From an adverse decree defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Superseding opinion in 177 S. E. 44.
Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, HTJDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, CHINN, and EGGLESTON, JJ.
S. D. Timberlake, Jr., of Staunton, Va., for appellants.
The Attorney General, for appellee.
The appellants were perpetually enjoined and restrained from distributing milk in the city of Staunton until they shall have re ceived a license from the Milk Commission, and from selling milk in the Staunton Waynesboro Market area at any other price than that fixed by the commission. They were also required to pay any and all assessments levied upon them under the authority of the commission. It is of the decree carrying the injunction into effect that the appellants complain.
The pleadings in the case consist of the bill of complaint filed by the Milk Commission and the answer thereto filed by the appellants. The cause was heard upon an agreed statement of facts.
In the bill of complaint it was alleged that the complainant the Milk Commission was created by the provisions of chapter 357, p. 558, of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1934; that said act grants authority to the complainant to regulate and control the milk industry in Virginia, and to make, adopt, and enforce all rules, regulations, and orders necessary to carry out the purposes of the act; that the complainant was given power to define and create natural market areas within which milk shall be produced to supply such area; that the commission may require all distributors to obtain a license and that licenses may be classified; that complying with the provisions of the act, the commission established the Staunton-Waynesboro Market area, fixed the price of milk, and adopted rules and regulations for the industry; that 75 per cent. of the producers and distributorsin that area were desirous of having the commission exercise its power there; that previously, milk was being sold in Staunton at prices ranging from 8 cents to 12 cents per quart; that all efforts to stabilize the price had failed because a few producers and distributors declared their purpose and intention to market milk below the cOst of milk produced in compliance with the health laws of the state.
The commission finds and alleges that milk is an essential item of diet; that the production and distribution thereof is a major industry and represents more than 25 per cent. of all agricultural income of the state; that it is of greater value than the combined income from corn, wheat, tobacco, and apples; and that it represents an investment of many millions of dollars.
It is alleged:
Complainant then alleges that Reynolds Miller, and Montgomery, the appellants here, are selling milk in Staunton without a licens as is required by the act; that they are sell ing below the prices fixed by the commission for that market; that they have declared their intention to continue to sell below th market price and they refuse to pay the assessments provided for in the act and rules promulgated thereunder. It is then alleged that the success of the purpose of the General Assembly will fail if they are permitted to continue to violate the regulations and the act.
The defendants filed their answer in the court below. They denied none of the allegations above set forth, but admitted that they were violating the act, in that they were selling milk in Staunton without first secur-ing a license; that they were not complying with the price regulations; and that they were selling below the prices fixed by the commission.
They give as their reason for their admitted violation of the act that it is unconstitutional and void; that it contravenes section 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of Virginia; and that it contravenes the Fourteenth Amend ment to the Constitution of the United States.
After hearing the cause upon the bill, answer, and an agreed statement of facts, the chancellor perpetuated an injunction, which had been previously awarded, restraining the defendants from violating the act or the regulations, and in an able opinion gave his reasons for so doing.
In the main there are just two questions to be decided. Does the act contravene the Virginia Constitution? Does it contravene the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution?
It is conceded that if the Virginia act is no broader than a somewhat similar act which was recently enacted by the Legislature of New York, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469, where the New York act was upheld as not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, is binding here and decisive of that question. However, section 1, art. 1, of the Virginia Constitution is relied upon here as having been violated by the Virginia Act. The challenged provisions of the Virginia and Federal Constitutions are quite similar. Both guarantee to the citizens certain inherent rights, and, in my opinion, if the act violates the Federal Constitution it also will violate the Virginia Constitution. On the other hand, if it does not offend the Federal Constitution then it will not offend the Virginia Constitution.
On March 29, 1934, the General Assembly enacted as an emergency measure the act in question which provides for the supervision, regulation, and control of the milk industry in Virginia (chapter 357, Acts 1934, p. 558). The preamble to the act sets forth the legislative determination and declaration of certain facts. Briefly, those facts are that the production and distribution of milk and cream is an industry upon which, to a substantial degree, the prosperity and health of the commonwealth depend; "and the present economic emergency is in part the result of the disparity between the prices of milk and cream and other commodities, which disparity has diminished the power of milk producers to purchase industrial products, has broken down the orderly production and marketing of milk and cream, and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the credit structure of the Commonwealth and local political sub-divisions thereof"; that unfair, unhealthful, unjust, destructive, and demoralizing trade practices exist and are carried on in the dairy industry which impair the industry and the constant supply of pure wholesome milk to the inhabitants of the state and constitute a menace to the health and welfare of the people.
To protect the well-being of the people of the state and to promote the public welfare, public health, and public peace, the production, distribution, and sale of milk is declared by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew
...in the determination of the pending case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Reynolds v. Milk Commission of Virginia, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507, in which the constitutionality of the Virginia Milk Control Act was upheld by a divided court. It was held that there a......
-
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. St. Louis., 34280.
...305 Mo. 488; City of Washington v. Reed, 70 S.W. (2d) 121; Star Square Auto Sup. Co. v. Gerk, 325 Mo. 968, 30 S.W. (2d) 447; Reynolds v. Milk Comm., 179 S.E. 507. (b) The tax levied is prohibitory and confiscatory and in reality a protective tariff for the benefit of single store owners, in......
-
State v. Auclair
...Nebbia Case the question of delegation was not considered. See Ferretti v. Jackson, supra, page 480 of 188 A. In Reynolds v. Milk Commission, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507, 514, the entire act, including the provision concerning the designation of natural marketing areas, was sustained on the g......
-
State v. Old Tavern Farm, Inc.
...and its conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable." Reynolds v. Milk Commission of Virginia (Va.) 179 S. E. 507, 510. Should we judicially notice facts, if such exist, that would tend to show there was no such exigency as would warr......