Reynolds v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co.
| Decision Date | 28 October 1904 |
| Citation | 26 R.I. 457,59 A. 393 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. NARRAGANSETT ELECTRIC LIGHTING CO. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Action by Avis C. Reynolds against the Narragansett Electric Lighting Company for death by wrongful act. Heard on defendant's petition for a new trial. Petition grant ed for assessment of damages.
Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DUBOIS, JJ.
David S. Baker and Lewis A. Waterman, for plaintiff.
Walter B. Vincent, for defendant.
This is an action of the case, brought by the widow and next of kin of Nathaniel T. Reynolds, deceased, to recover damages for his death, which is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act, neglect, and default of the defendant. The deceased was killed in the cellar of the Masonic building, in East Greenwich, R. I., while attempting to turn on an incandescent electric light, by an electric current furnished by the defendant, who caused it to enter a transformer, outside of the building, in an alternating current of about 2,000 volts, for the purpose of being there transformed into a current of about 104 volts before entering the building. The accident occurred through a burning out, breaking down, or other weakened condition of the transformer, which incapacitated it from doing its work, with the result that, instead of the intended current of 104 volts, the alternating current of 2,000 volts was received into the lighting system of the building, and, through that, into the body of the deceased, as lie stood grounded upon the cellar bottom. The transformer was an apparatus wholly under the control of the defendant, and its breaking down, or functual derangement, is inferentially evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, thus making out a prints facie case for the plaintiff, and casts upon the defendant the burden of rebutting the same to the satisfaction of the jury. As the verdict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff, it is manifest that, in their opinion, the burden was not so sustained. Is the verdict against the evidence? The defendant attempted to meet the presumption of negligence by proof that the transformer which failed was made by a reputable manufacturer. But the questions: Who purchased it, and when? How long was it in service, and what was its service? What was its condition at the time of its installation at the place where it gave out? Was it worn out, or suddenly disabled? Was it over inspected after its last installation?— and others as pertinent remain unanswered. We are led to the conclusion that the jury were right.
As to the alleged errors of the court:
The defendant requested the court to charge: "The defendant was not responsible for any accident occurring from defects in the interior wiring or arrangement of lamps, if that work was not done by defendant, and the defendant had no control over it." The court so charged, but added: "Unless the defendant was also guilty of negligence in the outside wiring, or in its connection with the inside wiring." We see no error. Interior wiring for and arrangement of incandescent lamps sufficient to safely carry 104 volts of electricity cannot be considered defective simply because they could not control nearly 20 times that force or amount. It is not necessary, in the ordinary wiring of a building for incandescent electric lighting, and in the arrangement of lamps therein for that purpose, to anticipate and prepare for the access of dangerous or deadly currents of electricity through its wires subsequent upon the failure of apparatus wholly under the control of an electric lighting company. The installer of an interior electric lighting incandescent plant is not an insurer against accidents caused by the imposition upon it of burdens beyond its control, and far in excess of its normal capacity. There was no evidence tending to show that the accident occurred in consequence of defects in the interior wiring or arrangement of lamps, and so the request could well have been refused; but, as given, there is no valid objection to the modification.
The second request to charge, as modified, is substantially similar to the first, and for the same reasons we find no error.
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