Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs
| Decision Date | 19 February 1942 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. PASSAIC VALLEY SEWERAGE COM'RS. |
| Court | New Jersey Court of Common Pleas |
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by James Reynolds, claimant, opposed by the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, employer. From an award of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau denying compensation, the claimant appeals.
Compensation awarded claimant.
George W. Wolin, of Elizabeth (Samuel J. Marantz, of Elizabeth, of counsel), for appellant.
McCarter, English & Egner, of Newark (Verling G Enteman, of Newark, of counsel), for appellee.
The issues here are both of fact and of law, the former whether petitioner's fall, resulting in the injuries for which he seeks compensation, was due to his tripping over a chair, or to an epileptic fit, the latter whether, even if the cause of the fall were epilepsy, it is none the less compensable, due to the contributing causal effect of the conditions of his employment. This issue of law has not been expressly settled in this state, and is one as to which the courts of other jurisdictions differ.
We turn to the facts: On February 1, 1940, petitioner was a watchman for respondent, and as such used a small shanty, furnished him by respondent, to keep warm in winter, where there were an arm chair, a pot stove, and one or two stools and pails of coal. Previously thereto, petitioner had had certain fainting spells, had suffered one or more paralytic strokes, affecting his entire right side, and had also suffered several epileptic fits, one on August 20, 1938, another on October 11, 1938, a third, after the fall, on March 25, 1940, and possibly others. On the day in question he was seated in the arm chair in the shanty, when he claims he got up, or started to get up therefrom, to look outside, and was thereafter found by his superior, Callery, lying on his right side with his face pressed against the stove, which was searing his entire forehead and right cheek, while his left hand was waving the air. In fact, due to the cramped quarters of this small shanty, but five by six feet over all, petitioner seems to have become wedged in his fall, with the upper part of his body between the stove and the wall, which were but a foot apart, his legs, alone movable, in addition to his left arm, being pressed against the door. Record, pp. 102, 115, 116. Despite this constant searing of his face, there is nothing to show he made a single outcry. In fact, the only reason he was found at all by Callery was due to the barking of a dog outside the shanty, the dog being evidently startled by the noise of the man's fall inside.
Petitioner himself offers the only direct testimony as to the cause of his fall. He says he had his left foot, his good one, hooked around the chair leg, and thus tripped when he started to get up. Record, pp. 151, 157. But not only was the chair found undisturbed by Callery, as it probably would not have been had he thus tripped, but petitioner's physical demonstration before the Bureau, as indicated in the record, and as found by the Commissioner, does not show a tripping, but that he was upright on both feet before he fell. Indeed, it would seem improbable that a man with one good leg, his left, and one bad one, his right, would have sought to rise on the bad one rather than on the good one. In addition, not only is there substantial medical evidence, opinion to be sure, to the effect that it was petitioner's physical condition, specifically an epileptic fit, which caused his fall, but while petitioner's witnesses are unfortunately somewhat vague as to his physical condition following the accident, the fact that he made no outcry whatever, while this hot stove was burning into his face, would certainly seem to indicate he was in a fit, as the doctors say. For while his speech was affected by his paralysis, he certainly could use his voice to make a noise. Somewhat to the same effect is the fact that he remained constantly on his right side, with his face pressed against the stove, despite this burning of his flesh. Though here it must be remembered that he could move only with difficulty, due to the paralysis of his right side. In short, with these inconsistencies, both in his own words and actions, as well as his physical demonstration before the Bureau as to how the accident occurred, this Court must concur with the Bureau in finding that petitioner has not borne the necessary burden of proof that the accident was due to his tripping over the chair in the performance of his duties, rather than to an epileptic fit.
But even so, petitioner claims compensation on the ground that, though the immediate cause of the fall itself was one personal to him, the injuries were contributed to by the conditions of his employment. For not only was the hot stove dangerous in itself to anyone who might fall against it, but stationed as it was, in this tiny shanty, but five by six feet over all, with but a foot on either side between the stove and the wall, it is small wonder that petitioner, when he fell, had his head practically wedged against the stove, with his feet against the door. And though petitioner's paralytic and epileptic condition of course rendered him less able to extricate himself, this wedging, which increased the severity of his burns, might well have occurred to anyone who fell there. Thus even assuming, for the sake of argument, that petitioner might have been in the same room with such a stove while out of his employment, a purely supposititious situation, nevertheless the cramped quarters which caused the wedging were peculiar to his employment, rendering the conditions of his employment, with the stove, peculiarly dangerous to him or any other employee.
Hence it is claimed that the "employment was one of the contributing causes without which the [injuries] would not have happened." Ciecwirz v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., N.J.Sup., 24 A.2d 394, decided January 31, 1942, opinion as yet unreported [in State Reports]. Similarly, the test has been stated to be whether "the employment contributed to the injury or death." Ciocca v. National Sugar Refining Co., Err. & App., 124 N.J.L. 329, 335, 12 A.2d 130, 133. And again, "The injury or death, is related to or affected by the employment, that is to say, if but for the employment it would not have occurred. * * *" "The work and the disease together contributed to the death." Bollinger v. Wagaraw Building Supply Co., Err. & App., 122 N.J.L. 512, 520, 6 A.2d 396, 401; Molnar v. American Smelting & Refining Co., Sup., 127 N.J.L. 118, 21 A.2d 213, 215, affirmed January 29, 1942, Err. & App., 24 A.2d 392, opinion as yet unreported [in State Reports].
By the above, and many other cases, our courts have firmly established the principle that the test of compensability is the causal relationship, in whole or in part, between the employment and the injuries or death. While possibly in most cases it is the character of the work done, as distinguished from the conditions of the employment, which is in fact the causative compensable factor, this is by no means always the case. For instance, in the very last opinion rendered by our courts on this entire subject matter (Ciecwirz v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., supra) while the workman's preexisting weak heart, a cause personal to him, was one of the factors contributing to the injury, the award was upheld because his employment, "shoveling up soil from a deep trench in an atmosphere of escaping gas," also contributed to his death. And while it was expressly found there, due to other evidence, that the workman was not overcome by gas, but by the strain of his exertions on his weakened heart, it would appear clear that had he, with this weak heart, been overcome by gas, compensation undoubtedly would have been awarded. Manziano v. Public Service Gas Co., 92 N.J.L. 322, 105 A. 484; Ridgeway v. Real Estate Operating Co., 192 A. 392, 15 N.J.Misc. 477; Id., 121 N.J.L. 585, 3 A.2d 584; Pierce v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 127 N. J.L. 71, 21 A.2d 311. If such were the case, the situation would then be on all fours with the case at bar, i.e., where one of the contributory causes was personal to the workman, but the other, the conditions of his employment, rendered the case compensable. And while the courts in the other cases above cited do not specifically speak of the compensation cause as involving the conditions of employment, as distinguished from the character of the work done, it is nevertheless clear that in some, at least, the conditions of employment were the causative compensable factor. For instance, the contributing cause was sunstroke in the Ciocca case, supra, and in the Bollinger case, supra, the sand and ashes constantly under foot. Thus in both cases, the sun overhead and the sand under foot were simply dangerous conditions of employment, which constituted the causative compensable factor.
In addition, in several earlier cases, involving a somewhat different state of facts to be sure, the courts of this state have expressly held the conditions of employment to be a compensable factor. In Zabriskie v. Erie R. Co., 86 N.J.L. 266, 270, 92 A. 385, 386, L.R.A.1916A, 315, our Court of Errors and Appeals held, In the Zabriskie case, in order to obtain toilet facilities,...
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