Reynolds v. People of State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1876
• Citation: 1876 WL 10379,25 Am.Rep. 410,83 Ill. 479
• Parties: S. MARION REYNOLDSv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

83 Ill. 479

1876 WL 10379 (Ill.)

25 Am.Rep. 410

S. MARION REYNOLDS

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1876.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

At the June term, 1876, of the Knox county circuit court, S. Marion Reynolds, J. W. Mageors alias Bob Mageors and John Kibby were jointly indicted for the larceny of a steer, the property of James Thomas. Kibby was permitted to give evidence on behalf of the State against his co-defendants, and was not himself arraigned. On the trial Mageors was found guilty of larceny, and his punishment fixed at three years in the penitentiary, and Reynolds was found guilty as “an accessory after the fact,” with a recommendation he suffer the full penalty of the law. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were severally overruled and judgment pronounced on the verdict. Mageors was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of three years, and Reynolds to pay a fine of $500, and to be confined in the county jail for a period of two years. Reynolds brings the case to this court on error.

Messrs. WILLIAMS, MCKENZIE & CALKINS, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. J. J. TUNNICLIFFE, State's Attorney, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is very clear the conviction of Reynolds can not be sustained under the present indictment. Of the crime of larceny, for which he was indicted jointly with others, he was acquitted, but the principal being found guilty, he was found guilty as an “accessory after the fact.” This conviction is without warrant of law.

An accessory is defined in the statute to be one “who stands by and aids, abets or assists, or who, not being present aiding, abetting or assisting, hath advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the perpetration of crime.” One thus guilty is considered a principal and punished accordingly. An “accessory after the fact” is not punished, under our statute, as a principal. A less measure of punishment is provided. The definition given in the statute as well as at common law, makes a clear distinction in the offenses. Under our law, “every one not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or child, brother or sister to the offender, who knows the fact that a crime has been committed, and conceals it from the magistrate, or who harbors, conceals, maintains or assists any principal felon or accessory before the fact, knowing him to be such, shall be deemed an accessory after the fact.”

One offense defined is a felony, and the other is but a misdemeanor. Text writers record it from the old books, that “every treason includes a misprision of treason, and every felony a misprision of felony,” and such misprision is but a misdemeanor. It has been definitely declared in the decisions of this court, as in Carpenter v. The People, 4 Scam. 197, when a defendant is put upon his trial for a crime which includes an offense of an inferior degree, he may be acquitted of the higher offense and convicted of...