Reynolds v. Pope

Decision Date28 July 2020
Docket NumberA155406
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesGREG REYNOLDS, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CONNOR H. POPE, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV536328)

Connor H. Pope (Defendant) invited friends to his house for the express purpose of taking LSD. His neighbors, Greg and Megan Reynolds1 (collectively, Plaintiffs), were injured as a result of one of his guests' drug use. In this appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their negligence claim, we reverse an award of penalties for Defendant's refusal to accept a pretrial settlement offer and otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In January 2015, Defendant, then 18 years old, and a few friends decided to take LSD. Defendant offered his parents' home, where he thenlived, as the location. Around 11 a.m. on the designated day, the friends gathered at Defendant's house. One brought LSD and they all took some. After ingesting the LSD, Dominic Pintarelli became agitated and violent. Pintarelli attacked Defendant, destroyed property in Defendant's house, and then left.

Around 3 p.m., Greg heard a loud commotion outside his home and saw Pintarelli attempting to knock over a mailbox. When Greg went outside, Pintarelli was sitting on the ground taking off his clothes. Greg asked if he needed help. Pintarelli started attacking Greg and Greg returned inside his house and locked the door. Pintarelli ran at Plaintiffs' front door, cracking the frame in an apparent attempt to knock it down. Greg, worried that Pintarelli would succeed in knocking down the door, opened the door and punched Pintarelli. Police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.

At the time of the incident, Greg had been a professional baseball pitcher since 2006 and was preparing for the 2015 spring training. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Greg injured his hand when he hit Pintarelli, impairing his ability to pitch and substantially impacting his future income. Plaintiffs also submitted evidence about the emotional impact on both Greg and Megan.

A defense expert in drug recognition testified that the drug taken by Pintarelli was likely not LSD but instead PCP or a similar drug. PCP often causes users to become violent without provocation. The expert also testified that when people take illegal drugs, they do not know the quantity or type of drug they are taking and are therefore "rolling the dice with what [they are] consuming."

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs sued multiple parties on multiple causes of action. A jury trial was held on Plaintiffs' negligence claim against Defendant and Pintarelli, as well as a battery claim against Pintarelli.

On the negligence claim, the jury found Defendant, Pintarelli, and Greg all negligent, with Defendant 40 percent at fault, Pintarelli 55 percent at fault, and Greg 5 percent at fault. The jury found Plaintiffs' economic damages to be more than $1.5 million, plus additional noneconomic damages.

Following judgment, Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and other postjudgment motions, which were all denied.

DISCUSSION
I. Duty of Care

Defendant argues he did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care as a matter of law. We disagree.2

A. Legal Standards

"A plaintiff in a negligence suit must demonstrate ' "a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury." ' . . . . The existence of a duty is a question of law, which we review de novo." (Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko).)

"Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) 'establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.' . . . . '[I]n the absence of a statutory provision establishing anexception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts should create one only where "clearly supported by public policy." ' [Citation.] [¶] In determining whether policy considerations weigh in favor of such an exception, we have looked to" a number of factors relating to foreseeability and public policy, commonly referred to as the Rowland3 factors. (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1083, 1085.) "We do not ask whether these factors (the Rowland factors) 'support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.' " (Id. at p. 1083.)

B. Rowland Factors

The issue before us is whether a categorical exception to the general duty of care should be made exempting social hosts who knowingly invite others for the sole purpose of using illegal drugs from liability to third parties for harm caused by an invitee's drug use. (See Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1084 [" 'the [legal duty] issue is . . . properly stated as whether a categorical exception to [the general duty of care] should be made' exempting those who own, possess, or control premises abutting a public street from liability to invitees for placing a parking lot in a location that requires invitees to cross the public street"]; Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774 (Cabral) ["the [legal duty] issue is also properly stated as whether a categorical exception to [the general duty of care] should be made exempting drivers from potential liability to other freeway users for stopping alongside a freeway"].)

1. Foreseeability Factors

" 'Three [Rowland] factors—foreseeability, certainty, and the connection between the plaintiff and the defendant—address the foreseeability of the relevan[t] injury . . . .' " (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1085.)

a. Foreseeability

Defendant primarily argues Pintarelli's violent conduct was not foreseeable. He points to the lack of evidence "of any propensity by Pintarelli toward violent conduct or that Pintarelli committed any past violent behavior after ingesting drugs or that [Defendant] knew of any such violent behavior." This fact-specific argument is unavailing. When considering foreseeability for purposes of the legal duty analysis, a court's task " 'is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed . . . .' " (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.)

Thus, the question is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that knowingly inviting guests to one's residence for the sole purpose of using illegal drugs may result in harm to third parties from an invitee's drug use. A case relied on by Defendant, Sakiyama v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 398 (Sakiyama), indicates such harm is foreseeable.4 In that case, the defendant leased its facility for an all-night "rave" party and "took numerous steps to confiscate and remove both drugs and drug paraphernalia from the facility." (Id. at pp. 402-403.) Nonetheless, a group of fourteenagers bought and took ecstasy at the rave; when one of them drove the others home some hours later, their car crashed, killing two and severely injuring the other two. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found the injury foreseeable for purposes of the duty analysis, noting " 'the low threshold' " for foreseeability and reasoning: "It was foreseeable that attendees would attempt to sneak drugs into the facility. It was foreseeable that attendees might purchase and use drugs. It was foreseeable that the partygoers would attempt to drive home, either while impaired from drug use and/or from fatigue, if they stayed at the party all night long." (Id. at p. 407.) Here, where the sole purpose of the gathering was to use illegal drugs, it was foreseeable—indeed, nearly certain—that drugs would be used. It was also foreseeable that a third party might be harmed by an invitee's drug use. Defendant emphasizes the lack of evidence that LSD causes violent behavior, but as his own expert testified, it is foreseeable that an illegal drug may not be the one the user intended to take.

Defendant argues there must be evidence of prior similar incidents, citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 (Ann M.), disapproved of on another ground by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527, fn. 5. In Ann M., the issue was "whether the scope of the duty owed by the owner of a shopping center to maintain common areas within its possession and control in a reasonably safe condition includes providing security guards in those areas." (Id. at p. 670.) The Supreme Court based its holding on considerations specific to the hiring of security guards, including that "[t]he monetary costs of security guards is not insignificant" and "the social costs of imposing a duty on landowners to hire private police forces are also not insignificant." (Id. at p. 679.) Because of these considerations, the Supreme Court held "a high degree of foreseeability is required in order tofind that the scope of a landlord's duty of care includes the hiring of security guards" and "the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner's premises." (Id. at p. 679, fn. omitted.) Defendant cites no authority that this heightened foreseeability requirement applies to hosts of parties held for the sole purpose of taking illegal drugs. (See Melton v. Boustred (2010) ...

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