Reynolds v. Quiros
| Decision Date | 11 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-2858-pr,August Term 2019,19-2858-pr |
| Citation | 990 F.3d 286 |
| Parties | Richard REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angel QUIROS, Leo Arnone, Edward Maldonado, Gerard Gagne, Mark Frayne, Scott Semple, William Faneuff, in their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Brett Dignam (Sarah Hong Lin, Caleb King, and Mary Marshall, Law Students appearing under Local Rule 46.1(e), on the brief), Morningside Heights Legal Services Inc., New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Steven R. Strom, Assistant Attorney General (Clare Kindall, Solicitor General, and Madeline A. Melchionne, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief) for William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Kearse and Cabranes, Circuit Judges.†
Judge Kearse concurs fully in the opinion and judgment of the Court and also files a separate opinion.
Defendants-Appellants Angel Quiros, Leo Arnone, Edward Maldonado, Gerard Gagne, Mark Frayne, Scott Semple, and William Faneuff (jointly, "Defendants"), who are current and former Connecticut Department of Correction officials, appeal from an August 27, 2019 judgment and permanent injunction entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Chief Judge ) principally granting Plaintiff-Appellee Richard Reynolds’ ("Reynolds") motion for summary judgment, and denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Reynolds, a prisoner serving a life sentence since 1999, latterly in Connecticut's Northern Correctional Institution ("NCI"), brought the underlying action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement violate his constitutional rights under Article I, Section 10 (the Bill of Attainder Clause) of the United States Constitution,1 as well as the Eighth2 and Fourteenth3 Amendments of the Constitution.
On appeal, Defendants challenge the District Court's grant of summary judgment, arguing that the District Court: (1) improperly made credibility determinations and decided triable issues of material facts that the parties dispute; (2) erred in concluding as a matter of law that Reynolds’ conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Connecticut statute governing Reynolds’ conditions of confinement is an unconstitutional "Bill of Attainder" under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Defendants also argue that the permanent injunction entered by the District Court is overly broad in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,4 and that the District Court erred in holding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
We hold that the District Court erred by deciding disputed issues of material facts in granting summary judgment in Reynolds’ favor. We affirm, however, the judgment of the District Court insofar as it concluded that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and that Defendants violated Reynolds’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We draw the facts, which are largely undisputed except as specified below, from the District Court's August 27, 2019 Memorandum of Decision5 ("MOD") and from the record before us.
Reynolds was convicted of the aggravated murder of Waterbury Police Officer Walter Williams and was sentenced to death in 1995. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld Reynolds’ sentence in 2003.6 In 2012, the Connecticut Legislature adopted Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b (" Section 18-10b"),7 which abolished the death penalty prospectively and provided the terms and conditions of imprisonment to replace the death penalty for convictions for capital felonies, including confinement in a Special Circumstances Unit ("Special Circumstances Unit").8 In 2015, in a 4-3 decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the state constitution as applied to capital sentences already imposed.9 Subsequently, in 2016, Reynolds was re-sentenced under Section 18-10b to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, and subject to the conditions of confinement prescribed by that statute.10
Reynolds filed a pro se complaint in the District Court on October 4, 2013. Discovery was conducted and later reopened after counsel for Reynolds was appointed. On June 29, 2017, Reynolds filed a Second Amended Complaint (the "SAC"), which was followed by additional discovery. Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment on November 9, 2018, seeking judgment as a matter of law on all issues and claims presented by the pleadings.
On August 27, 2019, the District Court issued its MOD granting Reynolds’ motion for summary judgment and denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity and exhaustion grounds. The District Court concluded, inter alia , that the prison officials at NCI "were aware of the mental health risks associated with prolonged isolation."11 Accordingly, the District Court held that the officials "knew or reasonably should have known of the serious risks of harm to Reynolds from his conditions of confinement; [and] their failure to ameliorate those conditions reflects deliberate indifference" to such risks in violation of Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.12
The District Court also entered judgment in Reynolds’ favor on his due process claim regarding the so-called "classification hearings"—which prison officials conduct to make an individualized assessment of risks and needs of prisoners. In doing so, the District Court found that Defendants failed to provide even minimal due process protections, and that there was "no evidence in the record to suggest that Reynolds was provided any advance notice or an opportunity to be heard during his reclassification process pursuant to Section 18-10b."13
The District Court also held that Reynolds had prevailed on his equal protection claims, concluding that, with respect to classifications that determine conditions of confinement, Reynolds was similarly situated to two other inmates, Terry Johnson ("Johnson") and Eduardo Santiago ("Santiago"), both convicted murderers formerly sentenced to death and now serving mandatory life sentences.14 The District Court concluded that, with respect to his "Risk Level" and the conditions of the prison facility, Reynolds "arbitrarily" received a classification score of "5,"15 whereas Johnson and Santiago received a "Level 4 Risk Level, which enables [Johnson and Santiago] to live among the general population at [MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution]16 and avoid the harsh conditions that Reynolds endures [at NCI]."17
Finally, the District Court ruled that Section 18-10b constitutes an unlawful bill of attainder because, inter alia , "Reynolds was not afforded a judicial trial regarding the punishment inflicted by Section 18-10b."18 The District Court did not reach Reynolds’ ex post facto claim,19 and denied Defendants’ claims that they are entitled to qualified immunity.20
As a remedy, the District Court entered a Permanent Injunction Order ("PIO") enjoining Department of Correction officials:
In timely appealing, Defendants requested a stay of the PIO pending appeal. Judge Bianco granted a temporary stay on November 1, 2019, pending the decision on the stay motion by a three-judge motions panel, which granted the stay on January 7, 2020.22
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.23
A district court may grant summary judgment only where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."24 In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations, or weigh evidence.25
We agree with Defendants that, in granting summary judgment to Reynolds, the District Court impermissibly decided disputed issues of material facts. Specifically, the parties vigorously disagree as to the precise conditions imposed in the Special Circumstances Unit in which Reynolds is housed, which in turn has bearing on whether the conditions may be properly characterized as "solitary confinement." This is relevant because if the imposed conditions did constitute solitary confinement, Reynolds could arguably prevail on his claims alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its decision, the District Court focused on four "core" facts that it characterized as "undisputed":
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