Reynolds v. Quiros
| Decision Date | 03 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | August Term 2020,No. 20-1158,20-1158 |
| Citation | 25 F.4th 72 |
| Parties | Richard REYNOLDS, John Vivo, Kenya Brown, Dwight G. Pink, Andres R. Sosa, Akov Ortiz, Victor Smalls, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Angel QUIROS, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Correction, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Joseph K. Scully (Elizabeth P. Retersdorf, Rosendo Garza, Jr., Matthew J. Letten, Hartford, CT, Palak Sharma, Parsippany, NJ, on the brief), Day Pitney LLP, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Clare Kindall, Solicitor General (Madeline A. Melchionne, Steven R. Strom, Assistant Attorneys General, on the brief), for William Tong, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Kearse, Cabranes, and Bianco, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants are seven inmates in Connecticut state prison facilities who sued Connecticut Department of Correction officials in their official and individual capacities (collectively, "DOC"), alleging that the 2012 revised Administrative Directive 10.7 ("A.D. 10.7"),1 which limits access by inmates to pictorial sexually explicit materials, violates their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also assert that the prison regulation's exception for material that qualifies as "literary, artistic, educational or scientific in nature" is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide fair notice as to the scope of the prohibited materials and leads to arbitrary enforcement by DOC officials under a subjective standard.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Underhill, C.J. ) conducted a bench trial over five days, during which the court heard testimony from fifteen witnesses, and then issued its Memorandum of Decision on March 9, 2020, ruling in DOC's favor on the federal claims. In particular, the district court applied the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), and held that A.D. 10.7 does not violate the inmates’ First Amendment rights. The district court further found that A.D. 10.7 is not unconstitutionally vague. Judgment was entered for DOC on March 12, 2020, and plaintiffs’ appeal followed.2
We discern no clear error as to the district court's factual findings in light of the trial record. We further conclude that the district court, based upon its factual findings, properly held that A.D. 10.7 is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives—namely, promoting a non-hostile work environment for DOC staff, enhancing the safety and security of DOC facilities, and facilitating the rehabilitation of sex offender inmates—and passes constitutional muster under the Turner framework. In addition, the district court correctly determined that the regulation, including the exception, is neither unconstitutionally vague on its face, nor unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
The following facts are drawn from the district court's factual findings after the bench trial, which we accept unless clearly erroneous. See Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc ., 688 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2012).
Prior to 2012, when A.D. 10.7 came into effect, sexually explicit materials, especially pictorial depictions of nudity and sexual acts, were "ubiquitous" in DOC facilities. Special App'x at 4. Although existing administrative directives prohibited the display by inmates of sexually explicit pictorial depictions, possession of such materials was not strictly prohibited, and they were regularly found hanging on inmates’ cell walls and in their lockers. According to Deputy Commissioner Monica Rinaldi, the widespread possession and display of these materials created a "very sexually charged environment" in DOC facilities. Special App'x at 5. In that environment, acts of public indecency by inmates, such as masturbating in front of (typically female) staff, a practice known as "gunning," were commonplace and, according to former Warden Anne Cournoyer, contributed to a "very threatening environment" for staff.3 Special App'x at 6.
In August 2010, then-DOC Commissioner Leo Arnone ordered a review of DOC's existing directives regarding inmate possession of sexually explicit materials. He convened a committee of six DOC personnel to consider whether DOC could implement a dual-tiered system to allow inmates to possess pictorial depictions of nudity ("softcore" pornography) but ban possession of depictions of explicit sexual activity ("hardcore" pornography). Over the course of six months, the committee reviewed DOC's existing policy, which banned certain categories of sexually explicit materials, such as those involving sadomasochism, bestiality, children, and non-consensual sexual activity, but otherwise permitted the possession of sexually explicit material.4 In addition to reviewing DOC's existing policy, the committee examined policies adopted by other states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons and reviewed case law on this issue from other states and the federal courts.
As part of its review, the committee considered two types of partial bans of pictorial depictions of sexually explicit material. The first, as referenced above, would ban hardcore pornography, but allow softcore pornography. The committee rejected this option because its implementation would require subjective standards and ongoing monitoring, which would be difficult to codify into objective criteria and would be both expensive and labor-intensive to implement. The second partial ban the committee considered was a two-tiered approach that would impose different standards for inmates depending upon whether or not they were sex offenders. This two-tiered approach was ultimately rejected because the sex offender inmates and non-sex offender inmates were all housed in the general inmate population, thereby making enforcement almost impossible, particularly given that materials within the prisons are bartered by inmates, and thus sex offender inmates would still be able to obtain them. Accordingly, the committee decided that a total ban of pictorial depictions of sexual activity and nudity (except for a limited Artistic Exception discussed below) was necessary, from a practical standpoint, to achieve DOC's objectives of (1) enhancing the "safety, security, and order" of prison facilities, (2) supporting the rehabilitation of the inmate population, and (3) "reduc[ing] the exposure of [DOC] staff to displays of sexually explicit materials while in the workplace," thereby seeking to avoid "a hostile work environment, particularly for female staff." Joint App'x at 99.
The result of the committee's recommendation was A.D. 10.7, which updates the prior directive's definition of sexually explicit material to include "[a]ny pictorial depiction of sexual activity or nudity." Joint App'x at 172. A.D. 10.7 also defines a non-exhaustive list of banned pictorial depictions of sexual activity including:
Joint App'x at 179. The regulation further defines "[p]ictorial depictions of nudity" as "the visual depiction or display of genitalia, pubic region, buttock, or female breast at a point below the top of the areola that is not completely and opaquely covered." Joint App'x at 179. Shortly after the revised regulation came into effect, however, DOC determined that the above-referenced definition of nudity was too restrictive because, for example, magazines such as US Weekly that included photographs of female actors in cocktail dresses were banned under the definition. Therefore, DOC amended A.D. 10.7 to narrow the definition of nudity to "the visual depiction or display of genitalia, pubic region, anus or female breast where the areola is visible and not completely and opaquely covered." Joint App'x at 187.
As relevant here, A.D. 10.7 contains several additional limitations. First, A.D. 10.7 includes what the district court referred to as an "Artistic Exception" whereby material "taken as a whole" that is "literary, artistic, educational or scientific in nature" is excepted from the ban. Joint App'x at 179. Second, the regulation states that a publication may not be rejected "solely because its content is ... sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant." Joint App'x at 178. Third, although broadly banning pictorial depictions of sexual activity, AD 10.7's prohibition on sexually explicit written material largely mirrors that of the prior version of the directive, banning only written material that "by its nature or content, poses a threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the facility, or facilitates criminal activity." Joint App'x at 179. More specifically, A.D. 10.7 states that "[a] Unit Administrator or designee shall determine that written sexually explicit material of the following types is to be excluded: 1. sado-masochistic; 2. bestiality; 3. involving minors; or 4. materials depicting sexual activity which involves the use of force or without the consent of one or more parties," Joint App'x at 179–80, an essentially similar prohibition to the one contained in the prior version of the directive, see Joint App'x at 97. Therefore, as relevant here, under A.D. 10.7, written materials of a sexually-explicit nature outside of these categories can still be possessed by inmates.
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