Reynolds v. Reynolds

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FERRISS, J.
• Citation: Reynolds v. Reynolds, 234 Mo. 144, 136 S.W. 411 (Mo. 1911)
• Decision Date: 11 April 1911
• Parties: PHIDELIA REYNOLDS et al. v. EDWIN E. REYNOLDS, Appellant

136 S.W. 411

234 Mo. 144

PHIDELIA REYNOLDS et al. v. EDWIN E. REYNOLDS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

April 11, 1911

Appeal from Linn Circuit Court. -- Hon. John P. Butler, Judge.

Affirmed.

A. W Mullins for appellant.

(1) The deed was sufficient to and did convey the title to the land in question to the defendant. The consideration of five hundred dollars, recited in the deed to be paid in maintenance, and the separate contract from the grantee to the grantors to support and provide for them during their lives, were both a good and valuable consideration for the conveyance. Anderson v. Gaines, 156 Mo. 664. Taking the most favorable view of the plaintiffs' evidence there was, at most, only a part failure by the defendant to fully perform and fulfill the contract -- certainly no default by him in that regard for the first two years next after the contract was entered into. But a failure, if any to comply with the terms of the contract by defendant did not render the deed void. The remedy is by an action at law for damages on the contract, and that remedy is ample because of the deed of trust on the land. McAnaw v. Tiffin, 143 Mo. 667; Anderson v. Gaines, 156 Mo. 664. (2) There is no condition of forfeiture in the deed to the defendant, nor has the contract made by him to support and provide for his father and mother any condition whatever in it to forfeit the title. And even if there had been in the deed or in the contract a condition to forfeit, the right to enforce forfeiture exists only at law; a court of equity never lends its aid to enforce a forfeiture. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 22 Mo. 369; Towne v. Bowers, 81 Mo. 497; Studdard v. Wells, 120 Mo. 25; Lasar v. Baldridge, 32 Mo.App. 362; Moberly v. Trenton, 181 Mo. 637. The so-called finding of the court is absolutely unsupported by the evidence in the case both on the part of the plaintiffs and on the part of the defendant, but contrary thereto. The contract made by defendant is valid and still subsisting and that was and is a good and sufficient consideration for the deed of conveyance to him. And by what mysterious way or manner the title to the land conveyed to defendant was divested out of him and reinvested in said Daniel E. Reynolds prior to his death, is, I think, impossible to understand.

Bresnehen & West for respondents.

(1) Daniel E. Reynolds and the plaintiff in this case have been in the actual, open, notorious and adverse possession of the land in controversy, claiming to own the same continuously since about the time of the defendant's marriage in 1887, when his father let him have the other eighty-acre farm. This being true, the plaintiffs have acquired title to said land by adverse possession. Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114 Mo. 245; Scruggs v. Scruggs, 43 Mo. 142; Ekey v. Inge, 87 Mo. 493. (2) The trial court has found the issue of title by adverse possession in favor of the plaintiffs, and, there being substantial evidence upon which to base that finding, its action in that regard is not open to review by this court. Rice v. Arnold, 58 Mo.App. 97; Corrigan v. Kansas City, 93 Mo.App. 173; Baumhoff v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 120. The case has been fairly tried, all the issues have been determined by the court below in favor of the plaintiffs, and if the court could properly find for them on any ground its finding and judgment should be affirmed. We insist that the finding is for the right party on every issue, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

FERRISS, J. Kennish, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

OPINION

FERRISS, J.

Suit to set aside a warranty deed to forty acres of land in Linn county, Missouri.

Plaintiff Phidelia Reynolds is the widow of Daniel E. Reynolds, who died intestate in 1893. All the other parties plaintiff and defendant are the children and heirs of said Daniel E. and Phidelia Reynolds. The land in controversy was owned by Daniel E. Reynolds, deceased, he having purchased the same from the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company in 1883. Defendant, his eldest son, became of age in 1881, and for several years before and after reaching his majority was the mainstay of the family.

On April 24, 1885, defendant's father and mother, the said Daniel E. and Phidelia Reynolds, conveyed to him, by warranty deed, the land in question, the consideration named in the deed being "the sum of five hundred dollars, to be paid by the said party of the second part in maintenance." On the same day defendant executed a deed of trust on said land, as follows:

"This deed, made and entered into this 24th day of April, eighteen hundred and eighty-five, by and between Edwin E. Reynolds, of the county of Linn and State of Missouri, party of the first part, and Ben Wade, the present acting sheriff, and his successor in office, of the county of Linn, State of Missouri, party of the second part, and Daniel E. Reynolds and Phidelia Reynolds, his wife, during their natural life, of the county of Linn, State of Missouri, parties of the third part:

"Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part, in consideration of the debt and trust hereinafter mentioned and created, and of the sum of one dollar to him paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, doth by these presents grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, the following described real estate: Southwest quarter of section 2, township 58, range 18, situate, lying and being in the county of Linn, State of Missouri, to-wit: being the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 2, township 58, range 18, being forty acres.

"To have and to hold the same, with the appurtenances, to the party of the second part, and to his successor or successors in this trust, and to them and their grantees and assigns forever.

"In trust, however, for the following purposes: Whereas Edwin E. Reynolds, the said party of the first part, has this day made, executed and entered into an agreement, which is hereby witnessed by this agreement, that he will faithfully support and maintain Daniel E. Reynolds and Phidelia Reynolds, during their natural lives, with the necessaries of this life, in sickness or health, the consideration for this agreement is that Daniel E. Reynolds and Phidelia Reynolds have this day executed and delivered to Edwin E. Reynolds a good and sufficient deed of warranty to the forty acres described in this instrument, the consideration for said deed of warranty being the agreement of Edwin E. Reynolds to support them during their natural lives. Now, therefore, if the said party of the first part shall faithfully perform and fulfill said contract hereby entered into by him, then this deed shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Witness my hand and seal this 23d day of April, 1885.

"Edwin Reynolds. (Seal.)"

The warranty deed, duly acknowledged, was filed for record February 7, 1887, and the trust deed on December 20, 1905, in the office of the recorder of deeds of Linn county.

According to the testimony of Mrs. Reynolds, her son, the defendant was twenty-five years of age when the land in suit was conveyed to him. Two years thereafter he married, removed from the homestead, and dwelt with his wife on an eighty-acre tract of land, near by, which was given him by his father, Daniel E. Reynolds. Whether this eighty acres was ever deeded to defendant witness could not remember. She further testified as to the land in dispute: "We always claimed the land as ours, and paid the taxes on it. Since Mr. Reynolds died I have improved it and built buildings on it. There isn't anything there now that was there when he deeded it to Ed., only a few old apple trees. I put all the improvements on it. Ed never said anything about claiming any right to the land. We supposed it was ours, and we thought he took the other eighty. He did nothing to support us after he got married. I couldn't tell exactly what, if anything, he did towards supporting us before he got married. Of course he helped about the work, and he paid money I suppose. I don't remember; I have never charged my mind with it. He paid no board, and lived there as a member of the family. He and the other boy worked there together. I didn't see any difference between them." She stated that her husband, who was an old soldier, received a pension of six or eight dollars a month in 1887, which was gradually increased to seventeen dollars a month, and that he also received a lump sum of eleven or twelve hundred dollars as back pay; that this money was used to pay debts previously contracted and for family support; that her husband died in 1893, and her son, defendant, two years afterwards, went to Minnesota, where he resided eight years. Upon his return to Missouri he made his home in Johnson county, where he was residing at the time of the trial. Witness could not say that defendant paid any debts contracted by her husband, after he received his pension, but that he used to pay debts before that time. In 1895 defendant deeded to her forty acres of land which he had purchased from a railroad company in 1888, and upon which he had placed a mortgage for $ 250. At the time defendant conveyed this land to her he was indebted to her husband on a note for about $ 480, which note she surrendered to defendant, and he tore it up. The land so deeded to her adjoined the forty acres in controversy. Mrs. Reynolds further testified that, after her husband died, it required her pension and the use of the two forty-acre tracts of land to support herself and her three young daughters. She did not know, nor was it ever mentioned by defendant, that the land conveyed to her was intended as a means of support. The use and rents of the two pieces of...