Reynolds v. Reynolds

Decision Date17 December 2019
Docket NumberNO. 2018-CA-00476-COA,2018-CA-00476-COA
Citation287 So.3d 1019
Parties Raymond Earl REYNOLDS, Appellant v. Elizabeth Kay Henry REYNOLDS, Appellee
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW ALLEN BALDRIDGE, MADISON

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH A. FERNALD JR., BROOKHAVEN, JAMIE NICOLE HARDISON-EDWARDS

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., TINDELL, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On January 29, 2018, the Lawrence County Chancery Court granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce to Raymond Reynolds and Elizabeth "Kay" Reynolds. In his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment of divorce, the chancellor made the following determinations: (1) Raymond was required to pay any outstanding debt on the couple's 2012 Ford Focus; (2) Kay was awarded $4,200, or half, of the marital equity in the couple's former marital home; and (3) Kay was awarded lump-sum alimony in the amount of $19,500. Raymond now appeals, arguing that the chancellor's foregoing determinations were erroneous. Finding no error, we affirm the chancellor's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Raymond and Kay were married on November 16, 2000, until their separation on or about May 24, 2013. On September 17, 2013, Kay filed her complaint for divorce and motion for temporary relief, and Raymond filed his answer and counterclaim for divorce on October 3, 2013. Both parties requested a fault-based divorce or, alternatively, an irreconcilable-differences divorce.

¶3. Raymond and Kay had two children during their marriage, one of whom died prior to the divorce proceedings. On May 20, 2014, the chancellor entered an order for temporary relief that granted temporary joint custody of the couple's surviving child, granted Raymond temporary use and possession of the marital home, and enjoined both parties from liquidating or transferring any assets during this time.

¶4. On January 4, 2015, upon a joint motion by the parties, the chancellor entered an order withdrawing the parties' fault-based divorce pleadings and allowing Raymond and Kay to proceed with an irreconcilable-differences divorce. That same day, Raymond and Kay filed a consent to divorce, wherein they agreed to allow the chancellor to decide the following issues: (1) child custody, (2) visitation, (3) child support, (4) equitable distribution of marital assets, (5) obligation to pay the remaining debt of the couple's 2012 Ford Focus, and (6) assessment of attorney's fees, if any.

¶5. Divorce proceedings took place over nine days in 2015 and 2016. On the final day of trial, Raymond and Kay came to an agreement as to custody and visitation of their surviving child, leaving all remaining issues for the chancellor's determination. On January 29, 2018, the chancellor entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment of divorce. In the final judgment, the chancellor granted Raymond and Kay an irreconcilable-differences divorce and made the following determinations pertinent to this appeal: (1) Kay was awarded use, ownership, and possession of the couple's 2012 Ford Focus; (2) Raymond was obligated to pay all outstanding debt on the 2012 Ford Focus; (3) Kay was awarded $19,500 in lump-sum alimony; and (4) Kay was awarded $4,200 as her equitable distribution of the couple's marital property. Aggrieved by the chancellor's determinations and final judgment, Raymond now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. We apply a limited standard of review when examining a chancellor's decision in domestic-relations matters. Williams v. Williams , 224 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). "Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic[-]relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Henderson v. Henderson , 757 So. 2d 285, 289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000). We review "the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the appellee," and unless the chancellor's judgment was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard, the judgment should stand. Fisher v. Fisher , 771 So. 2d 364, 367 (¶8) (Miss. 2000).

¶7. Specifically, we review a chancellor's judgment of property division "to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion." Wells v. Wells , 800 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). "Alimony awards are [also] within the sound discretion of the chancellor." Speed v. Speed , 757 So. 2d 221, 224 (¶6) (Miss. 2000) (citing McEachern v. McEachern , 605 So. 2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1992) ).

ANALYSIS

¶8. On appeal, Raymond takes issue with the chancellor's distribution of the couple's marital assets and marital debt and his decision to award alimony. "Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the marital estate during divorce proceedings." Griner v. Griner , 235 So. 3d 177, 184 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Owen v. Owen , 798 So. 2d 394, 399 (¶14) (Miss. 2001) ). "When the parties request that the chancellor resolve the issue of property division, the chancellor must do three things: (1) classify the parties' assets as marital or separate, (2) value those assets, and (3) divide the marital assets equitably." Burnham v. Burnham , 185 So. 3d 358, 361 (¶12) (Miss. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Before dividing the marital property, the chancellor must employ the factors set forth in Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994), keeping in mind the amount of nonmarital property belonging to the parties. See Burnham , 185 So. 3d at 361 (¶¶12-13).

¶9. The Ferguson factors are:

(1) contribution to the accumulation of property;
(2) dissipation of assets;
(3) the market or emotional value of the assets subject to distribution;
(4) the value of assets not subject to distribution;
(5) the tax and economic consequences of the distribution;
(6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for alimony;
(7) the financial security needs of the parties; and
(8) any other factor that in equity should be considered.

Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 928. "[E]quitable distribution of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property." Carter v. Carter , 98 So. 3d. 1109, 1113 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, "fairness is the prevailing guideline in marital division." Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 929. In reviewing a chancellor's judgment this Court only analyzes the chancellor's findings in applying the Ferguson factors; "we do not conduct the Ferguson analysis anew." Carter , 98 So. 3d at 1112 (¶9). As long as the chancellor properly applies Ferguson , we must allow the distribution to stand. Id. at 1113 (¶12). Finally, "after equitable division, an equitable deficit exists, the chancellor then should consider alimony." Carney v. Carney , 201 So. 3d 432, 440 (¶28) (Miss. 2016).

¶10. In his forty-three-page findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment, the chancellor provided a detailed analysis of each Ferguson factor before determining the distribution of the couple's marital assets. The chancellor determined that both Raymond and Kay had significantly contributed to the accumulation of the marital property. During the marriage, Raymond primarily worked offshore while Kay primarily tended to the marital home and cared for the couple's two children. Kay later received education and training as a licensed practical nurse (LPN), allowing her to contribute economically to the marriage.

¶11. The chancellor determined that, at the time of the trial, Raymond and Kay both had similar incomes and had incurred very limited amounts of debt during the marriage. The chancellor also found that no unreasonable dissipation or waste of assets occurred by either party.

¶12. Regarding the valuation of the real and personal property, the chancellor noted that neither party provided the court with specific values of the couple's personal property other than the vehicles. The chancellor also acknowledged that Raymond purchased the marital home and surrounding property prior to the marriage and that the nonmarital equity totaled $40,200. The parties stipulated, however, that the property had marital equity of $8,400. Also, the chancellor determined that the emotional value of the real property and most of the vehicles was attributable to Raymond.

¶13. With regard to tax and economic consequences, the chancellor found that neither party should be significantly impacted. However, the chancellor did acknowledge a need to divide retirement accounts equally to cure the foreseeable deficit to Kay's separate estate by not receiving any real property and receiving limited personal property. The chancellor finally determined that both Raymond and Kay possessed similar earning potential and ability to maintain their separate estates moving forward.

¶14. The chancellor ultimately awarded Raymond $40,200 of nonmarital equity in the marital home. The chancellor equally divided the remaining marital equity in the home, awarding Raymond and Kay $4,200 each, or half, of the marital equity. While Raymond was awarded possession and exclusive use of the marital home, the chancellor determined that Kay's portion of the marital equity would be paid through lump-sum alimony. The chancellor equally divided the total value of all retirement accounts, awarding both Raymond and Kay with $71,401.40 in retirement assets.

¶15. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the chancellor awarded Kay the couple's 2012 Ford Focus, valued at $16,000. Raymond was awarded the remaining seven vehicles, which possessed a total value of $26,350. Raymond was also awarded all personal assets identified to the chancellor, including furniture, appliances, televisions, and computers, which totaled $3,500. Any other unidentified personal assets were awarded to the spouse in possession of those items.

¶16. The chancellor noted that,...

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5 cases
  • Brown v. Brown
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • November 15, 2022
    ...1987).Discussion ¶30. "Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the marital estate during divorce proceedings." Reynolds v. Reynolds , 287 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Griner v. Griner , 235 So. 3d 177, 184 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ). To divide and distr......
  • Brown v. Brown
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • November 15, 2022
    ... ... Reynolds ... v. Reynolds , 287 So.3d 1019, 1023 (¶8) (Miss. Ct ... App. 2019) (quoting Griner v. Griner , 235 So.3d 177, ... 184 (¶9) ... ...
  • Case v. Case
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 2022
    ...part of the chancellor. "Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the marital estate during divorce proceedings." Reynolds v. Reynolds , 287 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Griner v. Griner , 235 So. 3d 177, 184 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ). "When the parties......
  • Coleman v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • July 20, 2021
    ...Bowen , 982 So. 2d 385, 393-94 (¶32) (Miss. 2008) ). "Alimony awards are also within the sound discretion of the chancellor." Reynolds v. Reynolds , 287 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Speed v. Speed , 757 So. 2d 221, 224 (¶6) (Miss. 2000) ). "A trial judge's award of a......
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