Reynolds v. Reynolds
Decision Date | 26 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 03-01-00212-CV.,03-01-00212-CV. |
Citation | 86 S.W.3d 272 |
Parties | Gretchen Ann Hazard REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. Charles Wilson REYNOLDS, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
John B. Schorsch, Jr., Jeffrey Richard Erler, Mastrogiovanni Schorsch & Mersky, P.C., Dallas, for Appellant.
Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., Law Offices Of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., Austin, for Appellee.
Before Justices KIDD, YEAKEL, and PATTERSON.
The district court granted appellee Charles Wilson Reynolds ("Charles") summary judgment declaring that he and appellant Gretchen Ann Hazard Reynolds ("Gretchen") are not common law, or informally, married pursuant to Texas law. See Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex. Civ. Prat. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.001-.011 (West 1997 & Supp.2002). By two issues, Gretchen contends that the district court erred because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding (1) when the statute of limitations began to run on her claim to establish an informal marriage, and (2) her affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. Because we hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant Charles the relief he sought, we reverse the district-court judgment and dismiss the cause.
Although the parties disagree as to the circumstances of their relationship, they do agree that, before March 11, 1979, they had been living together in Texas. Gretchen alleges that on that date, in Austin, she and Charles "announced to friends and family members who were present that we were married and were going to live the rest of our lives as husband and wife."1 In May they left Texas and in January 1980, settled in Virginia, where both currently reside. Two children were born to Charles and Gretchen. According to Charles, the parties ceased cohabiting in June 1992, when Gretchen moved out of their home and never returned; Gretchen asserts that they stopped living together and were last intimate in October 1992. Charles asserts that in December 1992, Gretchen began cohabiting with another man, an assertion Gretchen denies. In May 1997, Charles told Gretchen that their separate living arrangements were permanent and that they "should" each marry others. On June 20, 1999, Charles married another. The next day, Gretchen threatened to sue Charles for divorce. She made a "final settlement offer" in January 2000, and on March 23, Charles filed this declaratory-judgment action in the Texas district court, alleging that "any assertion or claim that the parties were informally married in Texas prior to their departure from the state in 1979, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations"; and he asked the court to "render a declaratory judgment establishing, as a matter of law, that [the parties] are not married."2 Gretchen responded on April 5 by suing Charles for divorce in Virginia. Her "Bill of Complaint" alleges that she and Charles "were married on the 10th day of March, 1979, in Austin, Texas ... [and f]rom the wedding ceremony on March 10, 1979 until the parties separated in June of 1997, they cohabited together as husband and wife and represented to the world that they were husband and wife." However, Gretchen's affidavit in opposition to Charles's motion for summary judgment avers that they "separated" in 1992.
On March 26, 2001, following a hearing, the Texas district court granted summary judgment for Charles in this cause, declaring that Charles and Gretchen "are not husband and wife under the laws of the state of Texas."
Neither party has raised the question of whether the district court possessed jurisdiction over Charles's suit for declaratory judgment. We may consider the district court's jurisdiction sua sponte. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998) ( ); see also W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 St. Mary's L.J. 351, 373 n. 85 (1998) ( ). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928; Paulsen, v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 23 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) ().
The purpose of a declaratory judgment is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered." Tex. Civ. Prat. & Rem.Code Ann. 37.002(b) (West 1997). However, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not confer jurisdiction on a trial court, but rather makes declaratory judgment available as a remedy for a cause of action already within the court's jurisdiction. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.1996) ( ); State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.1994) (); Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (); accord Frasier v. Yanes, 9 S.W.3d 422, 427 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (claimant seeking declaratory judgment must already have separate, valid cause of action) that . "[T]he marital status of parties is a proper subject for declaratory relief, but only where an actual, justiciable controversy exists." Georgiades v. Di Ferrante, 871 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). This Court must determine whether Charles's request for declaratory relief is germane to a justiciable controversy already within the district court's jurisdiction.
A justiciable controversy need not be "a fully ripened cause of action." Texas Dep't of Public Safety v. Moore, 985 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (citing Ainsworth v. Oil City Brass Works, 271 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1954, no writ)). However, the fact situation must manifest the "`ripening seeds of a controversy' ... even though the differences between the parties as to their legal rights have not reached the state of an actual controversy." Ainsworth, 271 S.W.2d at 761 (cited in Moore, 985 S.W.2d at 154). In other words, there must either be a pending cause of action between the parties or such a clear indication of the extent of the parties' differences that a court may presume one is imminent.
Here, there is neither a pending action in Texas nor seeds that could ripen into a Texas controversy, because, under the facts presented by the Reynoldses, any controversy between them exists in Virginia. Charles seeks to establish that he and Gretchen did not have an informal marriage under the laws of Texas, a matter that he may assert in Virginia, but may not assert in Texas, because a Texas court could not divorce the Reynoldses and their dispute arose in Virginia.
We begin by observing that neither party has requested a divorce from a Texas court. In fact, at the time Charles filed this action, there was no suit for divorce pending between the parties in any jurisdiction.3 Texas law contains a residency requirement that a party must satisfy before a court may grant a divorce:
A suit for divorce may not be maintained in this state unless at the time suit is filed either the petitioner or the respondent has been:
(1) a domiciliary of this state for the preceding six-month period; and
(2) a resident of the county in which the suit is filed for the preceding 90-day period.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 6.301 (West 1998). Section 6.301, although not itself jurisdictional, is akin to a jurisdictional provision in that it controls a party's right to maintain a suit for divorce and is a mandatory requirement that the parties cannot waive. Oak v. Oak, 814 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) () (citations omitted)4; Berry v. Berry, 612 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1980, writ dism'd) ( ); In re Marriage of Earin, 519 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) ( that residency requirement is mandatory). The public policy behind the domiciliary requirement is to prevent forum shopping by divorce litigants. Kopecinski v. Kopecinski, 627 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.) ( ); Berry, 612 S.W.2d at 214 ().
The failure of a divorce petition to properly allege residency renders the suit subject to abatement. Oak, 814 S.W.2d at 837 ( ); Kopecinski, 627 S.W.2d at 473 (...
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