Reynolds v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 14 November 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3-74-91B.
• Citation: 404 F. Supp. 1004
• Parties: Perry Wayne REYNOLDS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Dr. Robert SHELDON, Superintendent, Rusk State Hospital.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

404 F. Supp. 1004

Perry Wayne REYNOLDS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Dr. Robert SHELDON, Superintendent, Rusk State Hospital.

Civ. A. No. 3-74-91B.

United States District Court, N. D. Texas, Dallas Division.

November 14, 1975.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Professor Neil H. Cogan, Professor Walter W. Steele, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for petitioner.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen. for the State of Texas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. Elizabeth Levatino, Austin, Tex., for respondent.

Before GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, and HUGHES and MAHON, District Judges.

OPINION

MAHON, District Judge.

This action came originally to be heard by this three-judge court in Reynolds v. Neill, 381 F.Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex.1974). The factual background of the action is fully set out in that opinion and need not be repeated here in detail.

Briefly, Perry Wayne Reynolds was indicted by a grand jury in Dallas County on the charge of murder with malice on March 29, 1968. In May of that year, Reynolds entered an affidavit alleging insanity at the time of the commission of the offense, and further stated that he was insane at the time of trial. The affidavit was accompanied by a motion to try the issue of Reynolds' sanity prior to the trial on the merits. With the approval of the State's attorney this was done, and the jury found that the defendant was both insane at the time the criminal act was committed, and that he was insane at the time of trial. The jury recommended his commitment to a mental hospital until he became sane.

Since that time, Reynolds has been confined at Rusk State Mental Hospital, the only place in the state of Texas where persons acquitted of crimes are placed upon determination of present mental insanity. It is stated by Petitioner, and not disputed by Respondent, that Reynolds has little chance of making substantial progress in reaching a level of sanity as prescribed by the jury to be the condition for his release.

At issue in this case are the standards set out under old article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.¹ This statute provided for a procedure by which a defendant in a criminal case could have his present sanity tried either in advance of a trial on the merits, or during such trial. The defense in bar of insanity at the time of offense could also be tried under this statute. Petitioner represents the class of the "insane-insane" — that is, those who had been found insane both at the time of trial and at the time of the offense under old article 46.02.

In our original determination of this action, Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the standards for commitment, treatment, and release under old article 46.02. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of these provisions, both for lack of due process and lack of equal protection, comparing criminal commitment under old article 46.02 with civil commitment under article 5547-1 et seq. of the Texas Mental Health Code.² We held with Petitioner that the provisions of old article 46.02 denied him equal protection of law insofar as treatment and release were concerned, but held that the provisions relating to commitment were constitutionally valid and withstood attack on both due process and equal protection grounds. In holding that the release procedures of old article 46.02 denied Petitioner equal protection, we did not reach a consideration of the standard for release, since it was identical with the standard for release from civil commitment. Nor did we detail in our opinion our consideration of the standard for commitment and release as it relates to due process of law.

While our prior decision was on appeal to the Supreme Court, two significant legal developments occurred: the Supreme Court decided O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), and the Texas Legislature substantially amended old article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure³ and article 5547-1 et seq. of the Texas Mental Health Code⁴ to conform with our prior decision.

The Supreme Court, evidently unaware of the Texas Legislature's amendments to the old statutes,⁵ subsequently vacated and remanded our earlier decision "for further consideration in light of O'Connor v. Donaldson."⁶ This is the present stance of the case.

I. THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT ON REMAND

Petitioner requests the Court on remand: (1) to declare the commitment and release standards of old article 46.02 unconstitutional; (2) to enjoin Respondent State of Texas from committing or releasing the class pursuant to old article 46.02 or any statute containing the "welfare and protection" standard of old article 46.02; and (3) to continue this Court's injunction of August 28, 1974, against the treatment and release standards of old article 46.02.

Since O'Connor v. Donaldson dealt only with the due process rights of an individual confined by the state, no equal protection arguments are considered on remand. Similarly, it is agreed that the constitutionality of the new Texas statutes is not in issue.

Under new articles 46.02 and 46.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner's class has ceased to grow. Under the new articles, a defendant will no longer be found both insane at the time of trial and insane at time of commission of the crime. Instead, a defendant will first receive a hearing to see if he is competent to stand trial. If he is found incompetent to stand trial and there is found no substantial probability that he will become competent in the foreseeable future, the defendant is transferred to the appropriate court for civil commitment proceedings. If the criminal court finds that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future, the defendant is held for at most one year, by which time if he does not become competent, he is transferred for civil commitment. If a defendant is found competent to stand trial, and at the criminal trial is found not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense, and it appears to the court that the defendant requires observation or treatment for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others, the criminal court may transfer the defendant to the appropriate court for civil commitment proceedings. All commitment proceedings are carried out under the same civil procedure.

Nevertheless, at present there are still a substantial number in Petitioner's class, the "insane-insane" committed under old article 46.02.⁷ Petitioner argues that since there is no provision for his class in the new statutes, they will continue to be treated and released under the old statutes. Respondent argues that there is no provision in the new statutes excluding Petitioner's class, and as the old statutes are no longer in force, they must be treated under the new statutes. In any event, Petitioner's class was originally committed under old article 46.02, and Petitioner now asks this Court to reconsider its previous decision and, in light of O'Connor v. Donaldson, hold the commitment procedure of old article 46.02 unconstitutional as violative of the due process guarantees of the Constitution.

It should be noted here, that even though the question of the constitutionality of the new Texas statutes is not now before this Court, our decision will necessarily affect the new legislation, since it adopted the "welfare and protection" test used by the old statutes.

II. THE STANDARD FOR CONFINEMENT

Petitioner claims that the procedure under old article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional in requiring a determination that the defendant needed "hospitalization in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others," instead of the determination Petitioner claims is required by O'Connor v. Donaldson, that the defendant is "dangerous either to himself or to others."

O'Connor v. Donaldson was a suit for damages in which the Supreme Court approved the following jury instructions given by the district court:

Now the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional standpoint for continued confinement unless you should also find that Donaldson was dangerous either to himself or others.

Id. 422 at 570, 95 S.Ct. at 2491, 45 L. Ed.2d at 404.

In discussing the ability of the state to confine a person against his will, the Court held that a finding of "mental illness" is not enough, that a person afflicted with mental illness may still prefer his home to an institution, and that mere public animosity or intolerance could not justify deprivation of a person's liberty.

No place in O'Connor v. Donaldson does the Supreme Court adopt the term "dangerous either to himself or to others." Indeed, it would appear that the Supreme Court preferred to limit the application of the term "dangerous" to only those situations involving danger to the public. In referring to the district court's instructions, the Supreme Court noted:

The judge's instructions used the phrase "dangerous to himself." Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally "dangerous to himself" if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it might be argued that the judge's instructions could have been more detailed on this point, O'Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not "dangerous to himself" however broadly that phrase might be defined.

Id. at 574 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. at 2493 n. 9, 45 L.Ed.2d at 406 n. 9.

And in summarizing its discussion of the constitutional limitations on a state to involuntarily institutionalize the mentally ill, the...