Reynolds v. Singh

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal,North Carolina
• Parties: KRYSTAL D. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. M.M. SINGH, individually and in his official capacity as Officer of Raleigh Police Department; RICHARD A. GERGANOUS, individually and in his official capacity as Officer of Raleigh Police Department; and CITY OF RALEIGH, Defendants.
• Citation: Reynolds v. Singh, 5:23-CV-207-FL (E.D. N.C. Mar 27, 2024)
• Decision Date: 27 March 2024
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Docket Number: 5:23-CV-207-FL

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KRYSTAL D. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. M.M. SINGH, individually and in his official capacity as Officer of Raleigh Police Department; RICHARD A. GERGANOUS, individually and in his official capacity as Officer of Raleigh Police Department; and CITY OF RALEIGH, Defendants.

No. 5:23-CV-207-FL

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

March 27, 2024

ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN United States District Judge.

Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action by complaint filed April 18, 2023, against defendants M.M. Singh (“Singh”), Richard A. Gerganous (“Gerganous”), and the City of Raleigh (“Raleigh”). Defendants Raleigh, and Singh and Gerganous in their official capacities (collectively, the “city defendants”) and defendants Singh and Gerganous in their individual capacities, bring separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (DE 17, DE 20). Also pending is defendants Singh and Gerganous's motion to seal state magistrate's orders submitted in support of their motion to dismiss. (DE 25). For the following reasons, the city defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Motion to dismiss separately made by defendants Singh and Gerganous similarly is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants Singh and Gerganous's motion to seal is dismissed as moot.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff asserts in the operative amended complaint, filed June 8 2023, constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, illegal search, and use of excessive force (Counts I, II, and III) against defendants Singh and Gerganous and claims under the North Carolina State Constitution (Count IV) against city defendants. Plaintiff brings a claim for false imprisonment against defendant Singh (Count V), and trespass to land against both defendants Singh and Gerganous (Count VI). Plaintiff claims for battery by defendant Singh and other officers (Count VII), assault against defendants Singh and Gerganous (Count VIII), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IX). Plaintiff seeks also to recover against defendant Raleigh under § 1983 on account of its own constitutional violations accruing from illegal policies and practices (Count X), and on the theory of respondeat superior for the assault, battery, and false imprisonment variously pleaded against defendants Singh and Gerganous (Count XI). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees interest, and costs.

City defendants argue that plaintiff has failed sufficiently to allege any § 1983 claim against them, and her claims under North Carolina's Constitution must fail because she has adequate state remedies. Plaintiff's claim based on respondeat superior fails with reference to defendants Singh and Gerganous's motion to dismiss directed against her claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against them, individually.

In defense, defendants Singh and Gerganous raise the shield of immunity with respect to the § 1983 claims and underlying state law claims. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims and state law claims for false imprisonment, trespass battery, and assault also should be dismissed for substantive reasons where, it is contended, probable cause existed reasonable force was necessary to be used, and plaintiff voluntarily consented to search. Defendants Singh and Gerganous rely on certain orders entered by a state magistrate judge finding probable cause for her arrest for resisting a public officer, and three counts of assault on a government official, which are the subject of the pending motion to seal. Reliance also is placed upon corresponding judgment in that criminal case where plaintiff pleaded guilty to three counts of assault.

Plaintiff seeks in responses to the motions before the court to distinguish between defendants' actions towards her before she entered into any physical altercation with police, and those associated with that altercation. She contends her § 1983 claims all arose before any altercation. Any consent she gave, plaintiff contends, was not free and voluntary but, rather, the result of coercion. Immunity does not apply under the facts of this case, plaintiff argues, to the § 1983 claims or underlying state law claims. Plaintiff argues the doctrine of respondeat superior liability remains viable.

Defendants Singh and Gerganous, with consent of plaintiff, were allowed to file under seal a video exhibit containing clips from defendant Singh's body worn camera (“BWC”) capturing the encounter with plaintiff (“video”), to which reference is made in their reply.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The relevant facts alleged in the complaint^[1] may be summarized as follows. On the evening of February 15, 2022, defendants Singh and Gerganous, officers with the Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”), (compl. ¶ 8), responded to “a tip that two persons suspected of felony drug possession entered plaintiff's residence.” (Id. ¶ 9). The officers' body-worn cameras captured “[t]he majority of the dialogue between” defendants Singh and Gerganous and plaintiff, (id. ¶ 10), and plaintiff's “doorbell camera [also captured a] portion of the encounter.” (Id. ¶ 11).

“[A]t approximately 9:11pm,” defendant “Singh questioned . . . plaintiff in the street” in front of her house, “asking [plaintiff] what she was doing and whether two people entered her home.” (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff told defendants Singh and Gerganous “that she was replacing her Ring camera battery . . . on her front porch, that no one entered her home, and . . . she was the only one who resided in the residence with her pets.” (Id. ¶ 13).

“[A]t approximately 9:28pm,” two officers with the RPD, including defendant Singh, returned to “[plaintiff's home and knocked on her door.” (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff answered her door and “primarily [defendant] Singh . . . began questioning” her. (Id. ¶ 15). Defendant Singh said to plaintiff, “[w]ho were the two guys that came in here?” and “[w]e know two guys came in here.” (Id.). Plaintiff “answered the officers and told them no one had entered her home.” (Id. ¶ 16). The officers “then asked to enter the home,” and plaintiff asked whether she was “supposed to do that[.]” (Id. ¶ 17). Defendant Singh replied, “it's up to you, I'm not saying you do, I'm not saying you don't[.]” (Id.).

Plaintiff “then told the officers that they could look around outside but that [plaintiff] was not comfortable with them entering her house.” (Id. ¶ 18). Defendant Singh “then repeatedly demanded” for plaintiff to “step outside her house.” (Id. ¶ 19). “Plaintiff refused,” (id. ¶ 20), and defendant Singh “reached into the house, breaking the threshold, and forcibly grabbed . . . [p]laintiff by the arm.” (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff “repeatedly told [defendant Singh] not to touch her or grab her and asked” defendant Singh “to let her go.” (Id. ¶ 22). Defendant Singh “refused . . . and, while grasping and pulling on [plaintiff's] arm, continually demanded that she step outside[.]” (Id. ¶ 23). Defendant Singh “then stated that [the officers] were getting a search warrant and that no one was allowed in the house[.]” (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff “continued to ask [defendant Singh] to let her go,” but defendant Singh “forcibly pull[ed] plaintiff out of her house.” (Id. ¶ 25).

Once on the front porch, “the officers continue[d] demanding that . . . [p]laintiff allow the officers to search the house,” (id. ¶ 27), “bombard[ing]” her until eventually she “acquiesce[d] and allow[ed] them entry.” (Id. ¶ 32). While conducting their search, “the [RPD] officers found two individuals in the house.” (Id. ¶ 33). “After discovering the individuals, [defendant] Singh then told . . . [p]laintiff that she was going over to his police car, either in cuffs or out of cuffs.” (Id.). Plaintiff refused defendant Singh's directions, “an altercation between the parties erupted,” (id.), and “[p]laintiff . . . attempt[ed] to prevent the officers from handcuffing her.” (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff told the officers “to leave her alone, to not touch her, and repeatedly ask[ed] . . . why she was being arrested.” (Id.). The RPD officers stated that “[p]laintiff was . . . being arrested for assaulting an officer and delaying an investigation by not voluntarily interacting with the officers.” (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff responded that “she only fought the officers because they had no right to arrest her and were assaulting her.” (Id. ¶ 36).

After being arrested, plaintiff “informed the officers that they were hurting her, pressing the handcuffs into her wrists, and . . . injuring her by kneeling on and pressing into her knee and pulling on her neck.” (Id.). Plaintiff sustained “severe bruises on her left arm and wrists . . . cuts [on] her wrist[,] and a black eye,” and eventually sought medical treatment for these injuries and mental health issues stemming from the encounter. (Id. ¶ 37).

Hearings in North Carolina state court ensued, and defendant Singh “testified that [plaintiff] ha[d] no legal obligation to tell [him] if the men were in her home, to interact with the officers, [or to] allow the officers to search her home.” (Id. ¶ 38). A finding that defendant Singh lacked sufficient grounds to enter plaintiff's home was made, and associated resist, delay, and obstruct charges against plaintiff were dismissed. (See Id. ¶ 26).

COURT'S DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Seal

Filing of this motion engendered the clerk who acted August 2, 2023 in regular docket review, to bring to the attention of defendants Singh and Gerganous the fact that repetitive filings made by them through counsel the prior month contained prohibited information, with reference to Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The form notice stated that a temporary seal of information on the public...