Reynolds v. Southcarolina
| Decision Date | 15 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-681-BHH-MGB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Nathanael L. Reynolds, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, et al., Defendants. |
This is a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at the Charleston County Detention Center located in Charleston, South Carolina.1 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the case and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. Upon careful review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed, with prejudice, and without issuance and service of process, for the following reasons:
I. Relevant Law
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, the Magistrate Judge has carefully reviewed this pro se prisoner complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time." Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319. The PLRA also provides for the screening of complaints "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
With respect to a failure to state a claim, "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Unless otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice." McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009).
Pro se pleadings are given liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., City of Baltimore., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.1990). Giving "liberal construction" does not mean that the Court can ignore a prisoner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. "Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Plaintiff is a prolific filer of meritless cases. A search on CM-ECF reveals that in this federal judicial district, Plaintiff has brought the following cases, all of which were dismissed:
1:14-cv-04430-MGL Reynolds v. Pressley et al., filed 11/17/14, closed 05/26/15
1:16-cv-01741-MGL Reynolds v. Johnson et al., filed 05/31/16, closed 06/22/16
4:15-cv-00695-MGL Reynolds v. Bartell et al., filed 02/24/15, closed 01/14/16
4:15-cv-00865-MGL Reynolds v. Brown et al., filed 02/26/15, closed 06/30/15
4:15-cv-02667-MGL Reynolds v. Brown et al., filed 07/06/15, closed 08/31/15
4:15-cv-03256-MGL Reynolds v. Driggers et al., filed 08/17/15, closed 09/30/15
1:15-cv-00388-MGL, Reynolds v. Johnson et al., (filed 01/28/15, closed 01/26/16)
4:15-cv-02350-MGL, Reynolds v. Johnson et al., (filed 06/10/15, closed 08/31/15)
4:15-cv-02722-MGL, Reynolds v. Shuler et al., (filed 07/09/15, closed 09/30/15).
In addition, Plaintiff has several other actions currently pending in this Court. See Case Nos. 2:16-cv-512-BHH-SVH/MGB, Reynolds v. Cannon et al.; 4:17-cv-298-BHH-MGB, Reynolds v. South Carolina. The latter case is a duplicate of the present action. The Court may properly take judicial notice of its own records. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989).
The PLRA, at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
See McLean, 566 F.3d at 404. "[I]f a prisoner has already had three cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, the prisoner generally may not proceed IFP but rather must pay up-front all filing fees for his subsequent suits." Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 609 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Oct. 22, 2013). This means that, after receiving three strikes, plaintiff will have to pay the full filing fee for almost any future non-habeas civil action he might wish to file. Id. at 610. Plaintiff is warned that if he continues to file pleadings that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted, he risks the accumulation of three strikes against him and the resulting denial of future requests for IFP status, absent exceptional circumstances.
II. Plaintiff's Allegations
On March 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a federal Complaint, alleging that the State of South Carolina and County of Charleston "failed to afford the Plaintiff a fair trial proceeding under 6th Amendment rights depriving him the right to a prelim (sic)." (DE# 1 at 5, ¶ IV "Statement of Claim"). Plaintiff complains that he "filed proper documentation" but never received a preliminary hearing. (Id.). He contends that "according to South Carolina Constitution 10 days after the date of filing for the preliminary hearing the Plaintiff was to be in court." (Id.). He contends that "Charleston County Solicitor Scarlet A. Wilson and subordinates failed to have [him] in court for a preliminary hearing." (Id.). He indicates that he filed "a grievance in the General Sessions Court of Charleston County 9th Circuit." (Id. at 8).
For relief, Plaintiff demands that this Court should "remove his state criminal prosecution" to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1455. (Id. at 6, ¶ VI "Relief").
III. Discussion
The Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief for multiple reasons. Plaintiff's allegation that his federal constitutional rights were violated because he was allegedly denied a preliminary hearing in state court is factually and legally baseless. As pointed out in previous cases, Plaintiff's argument arises from his own misunderstanding of the law.
A preliminary hearing is an informal procedure used to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed a felony. The United States Supreme Court has explained that at a preliminary hearing, the Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided with "the full panoply of adversary safeguards" afforded at trial, such as counsel and confrontation. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-121 (1975); see also United States v. Kabat, 586 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1978). In South Carolina, a preliminary hearing is not generally held if the defendant is indicted by the grand jury or waives indictment before a preliminary hearing is held. Rule 2(b), SCRCrim.P. "The indictment itself constitutes a finding of probable cause and thus avoids the need for a preliminary hearing." State v. McClure, 277 S.C. 432, 289 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1982); Law v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 629 S.E.2d 642, 649 (2006).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "[i]t has been a long-standing rule that the return of an indictment by the grand jury eliminates the requirement of holding a preliminary hearing." United States v. Soriano-Jar quin, 492 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1189 (2008). In other words, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied either by a preliminary hearing or by indictment by a grand jury. Id. at 504 ().
Public records indicate that Plaintiff was indicted for criminal charges of burglary first degree. See Williamsburg County, Court of Common Pleas, Indictment No. 2015-GS-45-0041. Although Plaintiff complains that he did not receive a preliminary hearing, the record reflects that he did in fact receive a...
To continue reading
Request your trial