Reynolds v. State

Decision Date23 February 1899
Citation78 N.W. 483,58 Neb. 49
PartiesREYNOLDS v. STATE.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A married person will not be absolved from the bonds of matrimony by believing, even upon information apparently reliable, that the marriage has been dissolved by death or divorce. Public policy forbids that the permanence of the marriage relation should depend upon anything so precarious as the mental state of one of the parties.

2. Whether, in a prosecution for bigamy, an honest and reasonably grounded belief entertained by the defendant in the death of an absent spouse is of itself a complete defense, quære.

3. In a prosecution for bigamy it is prejudicial error to permit the state to re-enforce a disputable presumption in regard to the capacity of one of the parties to contract a valid marriage by the introduction of incompetent evidence directly bearing upon the question.

4. To prove a divorce, the record of the decree or a duly-authenticated copy thereof, is the appropriate and only competent evidence.

5. In the absence of an exception, a ruling made by the district court during the progress of the trial cannot be reviewed.

6. When a rebuttable presumption, possessing no inherent probative force, is met by opposing evidence, it is entirely destroyed, and ceases to be a factor in the trial, unless it be required to turn an evenly balanced scale.

Error to district court, Hayes county; Norris, Judge.

Frederick D. Reynolds was convicted of bigamy, and he brings error. Reversed.J. L. McPheely and E. E. Ferris, for plaintiff in error.

C. J. Smyth, Atty. Gen., and W. D. Oldham, Dep. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SULLIVAN, J.

The defendant, Frederick D. Reynolds, was convicted of bigamy, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of seven years. He was found guilty in the first count of the information,which charges a first marriage with Jennie Ford in Beaverhead county, in the state of Montana, in February, 1895, and a second marriage with Lizzie J. Caulk, in Hayes county, Neb., in July, 1897. The solemnization of both marriages, as alleged in the information, was shown by competent evidence, and was admitted by the defendant while testifying as a witness in his own behalf. The hypothesis upon which the defense was conducted was that the Montana marriage was void, for the reason that both the contracting parties were at the time bound by prior matrimonial alliances, and so lacking in legal capacity to marry, or live in lawful wedlock. Jennie Ford, being produced as a witness for the state, on cross-examination gave testimony from which it appears that she, as well as the defendant, was incorrigibly addicted to matrimony. She testified that she married J. J. Jordon at Vinton, Iowa, in 1883; that she married Frank Ford in Chicago, in 1884; and that, at Dillon, Mont., in August, 1892, she was wedded to Mack S. Purman. At the conclusion of the cross-examination she was dismissed by the state, but was subsequently recalled, and, over defendant's objection, testified that at the time she married Reynolds all of his predecessors in marital right were dead. She also testified that she had obtained a divorce from Purman in 1893. During the course of a further cross-examination it was developed that the only information the witness possessed in regard to the death of Purman was derived from a letter written to her by some one in Kansas City, whereupon the defendant moved to strike out the testimony. The motion was denied for the reason suggested by the following remark of the judge who presided at the trial: “An honest belief of the death of a husband or a wife, together with some reasonable ground for their believing it, would be a good excuse. I believe on that ground it ought to be overruled.” The motion should have been sustained. The mere reception of the letter did not render the witness an eligible candidate for matrimony. Neither reason nor authority sustains the position of the trial court upon this question. There are, it is true, cases which hold that an honest belief in the death of a former husband or wife, when such belief is reasonably grounded, is a defense to a prosecution for bigamy; but, if the doctrine of these cases is sound,--which we do not concede,--it has no application whatever to the facts of this case. The witness was not on trial. Her intent, whether criminal or innocent, was not in issue, and therefore her belief touching the contents of the letter was wholly immaterial. A married person cannot become absolved from the bonds of matrimony by believing,...

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10 cases
  • State v. Creech
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1983
    ...may be reasonably construed as a condonation of such unlawful acts. The language of the supreme court of Nebraska, in Reynolds v. State, 58 Neb. 49, 78 N.W. 483, seems to me peculiarly appropriate to the situation here, wherein it is " 'It has been suggested, and is doubtless true, that in ......
  • State v. Smailes, 5760
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1931
    ...496, 56 P. 81; State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 609, 144 P. 784; State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 17 A. L. R. 902, 199 P. 647; Reynolds v. State, 58 Neb. 49, 78 N.W. 483; People v. Baldwin, 117 Cal. 244, 49 P. 186.) Fred J. Babcock, Attorney General, and Z. Reed Millar, Assistant Attorney General,......
  • State v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • August 2, 1924
    ...may be reasonably construed as a condonation of such unlawful acts. The language of the supreme court of Nebraska, in Reynolds v. State, 58 Neb. 49, 78 N.W. 483, seems me peculiarly appropriate to the situation here, wherein it is said: "It has been suggested, and is doubtless true, that in......
  • Campbell v. Nelson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1928
    ...the marriage relation should not depend upon anything so precarious and elusive as the mental state of one of the parties. Reynolds v. State, 58 Neb. 49, 78 N. W. 483. The presumption of death is considered in Goodier v. Insurance Co., 158 Minn. 1, 196 N. W. 662, 34 A. L. R. 1383. See, also......
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