Reynolds v. State, C.A. No. 2018-0184-TMR

• Decision Date: 20 November 2019
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2018-0184-TMR
• Parties: WARREN E. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL; AUBURN VILLAGE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; MILL 6 REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants.
• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware

WARREN E. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES ANDENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL; AUBURN VILLAGE, LLC,a Delaware limited liability company;MILL 6 REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants.

C.A. No. 2018-0184-TMR

COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

November 20, 2019

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

WHEREAS, on March 14, 2018, Plaintiff Warren E. Reynolds filed a Verified Complaint;

WHEREAS, Defendant Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC") filed a timely answer and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the "Motion"), which the parties thereafter fully briefed;

WHEREAS, on September 10, 2019, the Court heard argument on the Motion;

NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

1. When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a trial court is required to view the facts pleaded and the inferences to be drawn from such facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The court must take the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as admitted. A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only when no material issue of fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1205 (Del. 1993) (internal citations omitted).

2. Warren E. Reynolds owns a property at 121 Gun Club Road in Hockessin, Delaware (the "Property"). Compl. ¶ 1. His 2002 deed to the Property granted a "right of way over other lands belonging to the National Vulcanized Fibre Company from his land to the public road." Id. at Ex. 1, at 2. For the majority of his ownership of the Property, Reynolds used Gun Club Road (the "Old Access Road") as his "right of way" to Yorklyn Road (the "Public Road"). Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.

3. DNREC purchased land near the Property that included the Old Access Road. Id. ¶ 2. DNREC then tore up the majority of the Old Access Road as part of a "hazardous waste remediation project," but not before paving a new road onneighboring property that connected the remaining portion of the Old Access Road to the Public Road (the "New Access Road"). DNREC Answer ¶¶ 12-13.

4. Reynolds subsequently filed suit claiming that DNREC violated his easement rights by removing and relocating the right of way without his permission. Compl. ¶¶ 20-34. He also asserts that DNREC and other Defendant landowners did not grant Reynolds an equivalent "permanent easement right" in the New Access Road, allegedly rendering Reynolds's property landlocked and devalued. Id. Reynolds seeks either a "[m]andatory [i]njunction requiring the reinstallation of the [Old Access Road] or for [q]uiet [t]itle establishing permanent easement rights" to the New Access Road. Id. ¶ 34.

5. DNREC responds that it was not obligated to "seek 'authorization' from Reynolds" to move the right of way. DNREC Answer ¶ 12. Instead, DNREC contends that it "constructed the new roadway segment as alleged as a significant improvement to the previous segment, thus providing better and safer access to Reynolds and other property owners." Id. ¶ 13. DNREC argues that Reynolds suffered no harm from the relocation because DNREC subsequently recorded a public easement to the New Access Road (the "Public Access Easement"). Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Accordingly, DNREC argues that the Public Access Easement guarantees Reynolds access to the Public Road, maintains Reynolds's rights under his deed, and renders his claims moot. Id. ¶¶ 23, 30.

6. Considering the Public Access Easement. In his opposition to the Motion, Reynolds argues that this Court may not consider the Public Access Easement. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 10-11. Citing Standard General L.P. v. Charney, 2017 WL 6498063 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2017), Reynolds argues that courts deciding a 12(c) motion may look only to the pleadings themselves and exhibits attached to the complaint. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 10. Because the Public Access Easement was attached as an exhibit to DNREC's Answer, but not the Complaint, Reynolds argues that this Court must ignore the Public Access Easement entirely when resolving this Motion. Id.

7. This Court recently addressed the scope of review under Rule 12(c) and determined that "[t]he pleadings to which this Court may look are not limited to complaints or counterclaims, but also include answers and affirmative defenses." Jimenez v. Palacios, 2019 WL 3526479, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2019). Further, "[t]he weight of authority, and the only Delaware decision addressing the issue, favors considering attachments to the answer . . . ." Mehta v. Mobile Posse, Inc., 2019 WL 2025231, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2019) (citing Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, 2015 WL 3540187, at *1 (Del. Super. June 3, 2015) (reviewing a document attached to the answer and finding that "[e]xhibits to pleadings are considered part of the pleadings")). Thus, this Court may review the pleadings and exhibits attached to both the Complaint and Answer when deciding this 12(c) Motion, not just thoseattached to the Complaint.¹ Because DNREC attached a copy of the Public Access Easement to its Answer, the Public Access Easement is part of the pleadings and the Court will consider it to resolve this Motion.

8. Unilaterally Moving the Right of Way. Next, Reynolds argues that DNREC violated his easement rights when it unilaterally demolished the Old Access Road and created the New Access Road. Compl. ¶ 23. Reynolds contends that "an easement may not be relocated without the consent of both the dominant and servient estates." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 16. Here, because "no consent from Reynolds was ever sought or obtained," Reynolds states that his right of way is "legally fixed, determined, and immovable as a matter of law." Id.

9. DNREC does not contest that it moved the right of way without permission. Instead, DNREC responds that it "had no legal obligation to seek authorization from Reynolds to undertake the improvements, and did not seek it." DNREC Answer ¶ 12. DNREC further points out that Reynolds's deed does not"mention . . . the concrete paved road or a specific alignment to access [the Public Road]." Id. ¶ 7.

10. "Generally speaking, the owners of a servient estate burdened by an easement in favor of a dominant estate may use the premises as they choose, but 'may not interfere with the proper and reasonable use by the [dominant estate owner] of their dominant right.'" Vandeleigh Indus., Inc. v. Storage P'rs of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d 91, 96 (Del. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Consistent with the above principle, "[t]he general rule is well established that an easement may not be relocated without the consent of the owners of both the dominant and servient estates [and] '[a] way once located cannot be changed by either party without the consent of the other.'" Edgell v. Divver, 402 A.2d 395, 398 (Del. Ch. 1979) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Smith v. Reserves Dev. Corp., 2008 WL 3522433, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2008) (a servient estate owner "cannot unilaterally relocate the position of the 15 foot easement in the disputed road."). Stated differently, "[w]hen the right of way has once been exercised in a fixed and definite course, with full acquiescence and consent of both parties, it cannot be changed at the pleasure of either of them." Edgell, 402 A.2d at 398 (quoting Sibbel v. Fitch, 182 Md. 323, 34 A.2d 773 (Md. 1943)). Thus, if the dominant estate owners "consistently refuse[] to agree to a relocation of theeasements . . . there can be no relocation regardless of the inconvenience to the plaintiffs." Id.

11. Here, the Old Access Road was fixed for decades. Compl. ¶ 10. While DNREC is correct that Reynolds's deed does not describe the right of way's exact location, Reynolds consistently used the Old Access Road as his sole right of way to the Public Road. Id. Consistent, long-term use as a right of way evidences that the Old Access Road was "exercised in a fixed and definite course, with the full acquiescence and consent" of both servient and dominant estate owners. Edgell, 402 A.2d at 398. Applying the general rule, Reynolds's consent was necessary to relocate the right of way. DNREC has not challenged the applicability of this authority; nor has DNREC identified any other authority that would allow it to relocate the easement. Thus, I assume the general rule articulated in Edgell controls.

12. Two Potential Remedies. When an easement is improperly moved without the consent of both the dominant and the servient estate owner, the Court may either (1) require reconstruction of the original road, or (2) if reconstruction is inequitable, require the servient estate to create a replacement road. Acierno v. Goldstein, 2005 WL 3111993, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2005) ("Where, as here, the servient landowner (Acierno) has blocked the dominant landowners' (Counterclaimants) express easement, the Court may either order restoration of the easement or relocate it.").

13. This Court specifically addressed inequitable reconstruction scenarios in Acierno. In Acierno, the dominant estate owners claimed that the servient estate owner blocked their right of way by building a stormwater management basin. Id. at *7. This Court, after affirming the dominant estate owners' right to their easement, reasoned that "[r]estoration of the express easement according to its original terms is not practicable in this case because it likely would require the destruction or modification of the stormwater management basin, regrading of the land between the Disputed Parcel and Neury's Lane, regulatory approval and significant expense." Id. at *11. Instead, the Court ordered the servient estate owner to construct a serviceable replacement route at its expense. Id. at *11-12. The Court noted that a replacement road was particularly equitable in Acierno because the dominant estate owners had constructive knowledge of the...