Reynolds v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. CR-18-555,CR-18-555
• Citation: 599 S.W.3d 120,2020 Ark. 174
• Parties: Edward Joseph REYNOLDS, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2020 Ark. 174

599 S.W.3d 120

Edward Joseph REYNOLDS, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-18-555

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: April 30, 2020

Edward Joseph Reynolds, pro se appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Rachel Kemp, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Associate Justice

Appellant Edward Joseph Reynolds brings this pro se appeal from the denial by the trial court of his claims for postconviction relief that were raised pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2019). The trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief on the bases that Reynolds (1) failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and (2) failed to provide sufficient supporting evidence to establish that the alleged deficiencies of counsel had prejudiced him under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The trial court concluded that the alleged deficient actions of trial counsel were based on reasonable legal and strategic grounds and that counsel’s alleged errors would not have changed the outcome of the trial. We affirm.

I. Standard of Review

A trial court’s denial of a Rule 37.1 petition will not be reversed unless the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Williams v. State , 2019 Ark. 129, 571 S.W.3d 921. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

II. Background

A jury found Reynolds guilty of kidnapping and aggravated assault, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and 180 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed. Reynolds v. State , 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491.

A review of the trial record reveals¹ that the evidence and testimony adduced at trial demonstrated that the victim, Rachel Wake, was Reynolds’s girlfriend and lived with him along with Mike Watters, who was a friend of Reynolds’s. An altercation between Wake and Reynolds occurred at Reynolds’s workplace, causing Reynolds to lose his job. Reynolds blamed Wake for the loss of his job and told her she was going to lose her life. To that end, Reynolds bound Wake’s arms and feet together behind her back and secured the restraints with padlocks. In addition, Reynolds wrapped a cable around Wake’s neck and attached it to the cables that secured her arms and legs so that Wake was forced to hold her head up to keep from choking. Reynolds then placed a gag in Wake’s mouth and beat her until her eyes were swollen shut. During the course of the assault, Reynolds discussed with Watters how he would dispose of Wake’s body and threatened to kill and behead Wake’s son.

Eventually, Reynolds released Wake and helped her bathe and wash off the blood. Two days after the assault, Reynolds brought Wake with him to the home of a third party to purchase drugs. While she was at this house, she surreptitiously asked the third party to contact her mother. Shortly thereafter, Wake’s mother arrived and picked up Wake. While at her mother’s house, Wake called the police and was taken to the hospital where she was treated for a concussion, fractures to her fingers

, and contusions to her neck, throat, and chest. A search warrant was obtained for Reynolds’s home where police retrieved several cables and locks that resembled the restraints described by Wake. Blood samples from the carpet near the foot of the bed matched Wake’s DNA. Wake testified that for the two days she remained with Reynolds, her eyes were swollen shut, and she was unable to see. She further testified on cross-examination that Reynolds had threatened to kill her if she left him.

Watters was charged as an accomplice in the kidnapping and assault and entered into a plea agreement. As part of the agreement, Watters testified against Reynolds and corroborated Wake’s testimony that Reynolds had beaten, gagged, and bound with cables. The torture continued for hours, and during this period, Reynolds discussed with Watters how and where to dispose of Wake’s body.

III. Strickland Standard

Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland . Williams , 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148. Under the Strickland standard, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, the allegations do not meet the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim of ineffective assistance. Id.

Counsel is presumed effective, and allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Henington v. State , 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55. Petitioner has the burden of overcoming the presumption by identifying specific acts and omissions that, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id.

A court need not address both components of the inquiry if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. Williams , 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Id.

IV. Reynolds’s Claims for Relief

Reynolds raised eight ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in his Rule 37.1 petition and reasserts those claims at various points in his brief on appeal, contending that his trial counsel’s decisions were unreasonable and prejudicial. Reynolds challenged counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of testimony and other evidence, failure to preserve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and failure to call a witness who would have provided beneficial testimony.

It is not ineffective assistance if counsel fails to file a motion that would not be meritorious. Rea v. State , 2016 Ark. 368, 501 S.W.3d 357 (per curiam). So too, failure to make a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Dennis v. State , 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646. To demonstrate error in the preservation of issues on appeal, a petitioner must demonstrate that the issue would have merited appellate relief and resulted in a finding of reversible error. Thompson v. State , 2019 Ark. 312, 586 S.W.3d 615. Finally, the fact that there was a witness that could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not in itself proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Hinton v. State , 2019 Ark. 136, 572 S.W.3d 381.

A. Failure to Challenge Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Purposeful Intent

In his first claim for relief, Reynolds contended that counsel failed to preserve a sufficiency argument with respect to the evidence supporting his intent. Specifically, Reynolds argued that because he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the assault, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he acted with purposeful intent.

It is well established that voluntary intoxication does not negate criminal intent. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-207 (Repl. 2013); see also True v. State , 2017 Ark. 323, 532 S.W.3d 70. Moreover, intent can be inferred from the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries. Id. Here, the evidence demonstrated that Wake suffered severe injuries to her head

, neck, chest, ankles, and wrists as a result of Reynolds’s assault. A challenge to the evidence supporting Reynolds’s intent on the basis that he was under the influence of drugs would have been futile, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a directed-verdict motion on this point.

B. Failure to Suppress Photographs

In his second claim for relief, Reynolds argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress photographs depicting the victim’s injuries. This court has stated that the mere fact that photos are inflammatory will not render them inadmissible. Booker v. State , 335 Ark. 316, 984 S.W.2d 16 (1998). Even the most gruesome photos may be relevant if they tend to shed some light on a material issue, corroborate testimony, are useful to enable a witness to testify more effectively, or enable the jury to better understand testimony. Id. Photos may also be admitted to show the nature, extent, and location of the trauma suffered by the victim. Id.

Trial counsel testified at the Rule 37.1 hearing that there was no legal basis for an objection to the introduction of the photographs. Here, an objection to the photographs’ introduction would have been without merit. The photographs of Wake depicting bruising injuries to her face, neck, wrists, and ankles were not particularly gruesome or overtly inflammatory. Moreover, the photographs were clearly relevant to corroborate her testimony and Watters’s testimony with respect to the extent of Wake’s injuries. The photographs were also relevant to the charge of aggravated assault because they demonstrated that Reynolds had engaged in conduct that posed a serious risk of injury to Wake. Finally, the photographs were relevant to establish Reynolds’s purposeful intent. Halford v. State , 342 Ark. 80, 27 S.W.3d 346 (2000) (photographs relevant to demonstrate intent). The relevancy of the photographs outweighed any prejudicial effect; thus, counsel’s failure to move for their suppression was not ineffective. See Williams v. State , 2017 Ark. 287, 528 S.W.3d 839 (relevance of gruesome photographs of victim’s body outweighed prejudice).

C. Failure to Preserve Objection to Wake’s Testimony

In his third claim for relief, Reynolds asserted that counsel was...