Reynolds v. State
| Decision Date | 06 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 50A04-9409-CR-378,50A04-9409-CR-378 |
| Citation | 651 N.E.2d 313 |
| Parties | Donald REYNOLDS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Donald Reynolds appeals his convictions by jury of two counts of burglary 1, one as a class B felony and one as a class C felony, and five counts of class D felony theft. 2 We affirm.
I. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of Reynolds' prior uncharged misconduct?
II. Did the trial court err in sentencing Reynolds?
III. Is there sufficient evidence to support Reynolds' convictions?
In early March 1993, Plymouth Police Department Officer Clyde Avery responded to a call from Ludwig Marathon Station. Owner Paul Ludwig, who operated a trading card business in one of the station's buildings, reported that the building's doors had been pried open and that more than four thousand dollars worth of trading cards had been stolen. On March 9, 1993, Marshall County Sheriff's Department Patrol Sergeant Rex Gilliland responded to a residential burglary call at Denise Atkins' house on 9th Road. The house's occupants reported that they had returned home and discovered that several items, including jewelry, a television, a VCR, compact disks and a camera, had been stolen. 3
On March 20, 1993, Gilliland received a call from his neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Miller. The Millers told Gilliland that they had found some items in their daughter Angie Powers' car which they suspected had been stolen. Gilliland advised Powers of her rights, and Powers consented to a video-taped statement. Two days later, the Powers family contacted Gilliland and advised him that their daughter wanted to speak with him about several other thefts in which she had been involved.
Powers told Gilliland that she had dated Ron Reynolds, Donald Reynolds' twin brother. According to Powers, the three of them had participated in several thefts to support their crack cocaine habit. One evening, the Reynolds brothers discussed breaking into Ludwig's card shop. Powers, Reynolds and Ron went to the shop in separate cars--Powers and Ron in one, and Reynolds in another. When Powers and Ron arrived, Reynolds had already broken down the back door of Ludwig's and left the premises. Powers and Ron found Reynolds at Mike and Teresa Cummins' trailer, and they helped him carry trading cards into the trailer. 4 Powers, Reynolds and Ron returned to Ludwig's because Reynolds had left the lug wrench that he had used to pry open the door in the store. Reynolds and Ron carried out additional boxes of trading cards, and took them to the Cummins' trailer. Teresa Cummins bought the cards. She gave Powers a check for $200.00, and she sent a $700.00 check to Reynolds' parents so that the money would be used to get Reynolds' car out of impoundment.
Powers further stated that, several days later, after she, Reynolds and Ron had spent the $200.00 which she had received from Cummins, they went to a house on 9th Road. Reynolds kicked in the door, and he and Powers entered the house and took a television, a VCR, and a pillowcase filled with items including jewelry, a camera and compact disks. Ron waited outside in Powers' white Capri.
As a result of Powers' statements, the police obtained a search warrant and searched Cummins' trailer. Police officers found "thousands" of sports cards, many still in their original packaging. (R. 160). Ludwig identified some of the cards as those which had been stolen from his shop.
Powers testified at Reynolds' trial, and a jury convicted him of two counts of burglary and five counts of theft. Reynolds was sentenced to twenty years for the class B felony burglary, and eight years for the class C burglary, sentences to run consecutively. In addition, Reynolds received three years for each class D felony theft, sentences to run concurrently with the class B felony burglary sentence. Further, the court suspended ten years of the twenty year sentence, the entire eight year sentence, and three years of each class D felony theft sentence.
Reynolds argues that the trial court erred in permitting Teresa Cummins to testify that she had returned a stolen answering machine to K-Mart for Reynolds in exchange for cash. Specifically, Reynolds argues that Cummins' testimony was inadmissible uncharged misconduct evidence. The State contends that the trial court did not err because the evidence was introduced to show Reynolds' motive. Specifically, the State argues that the evidence was "introduced to support the State's theory that the defendant was engaged in a crime-spree, stealing whatever he could, to support his cocaine habit." State's Brief, p. 9. We agree with Reynolds.
Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
Further, the exceptions listed in Evid.R. 404(b) are available only when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged crime and affirmatively presents a claim contrary to the charge. Bolin v. State (1994), Ind.App., 634 N.E.2d 546, 550. The State may then respond by offering evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts to the extent relevant to prove an issue of genuine dispute. Id.
In Bolin, the defendant was charged with arson for hire. The trial court permitted witness Hendrick to testify that Bolin had hired him for an uncharged arson. This court found that the trial court had erred in admitting testimony about the uncharged arson because none of the Evid.R. 404(b) exceptions were in dispute.
Here, at trial, the State argued that Cummins' testimony was admissible to "show motive among other things and motive here is to obtain cash to trade in for drugs." (R. 228-29). The trial court overruled Reynolds' objection to the uncharged misconduct testimony, and allowed Cummins to testify. However, our review of the record reveals that none of the exceptions of Evid.R. 404(b) were in genuine dispute, and Reynolds had not gone beyond merely denying the charged crimes so as to place his motive in dispute. Accordingly, the admission of Reynolds' prior uncharged misconduct was error.
We must now determine whether reversal is required. See, Bolin, at 550. The erroneous admission of evidence will result in reversal only if there was prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. Id. We must determine whether the "record as a whole reveals that the erroneously admitted evidence was likely to have had a prejudicial impact upon the mind of the average juror thereby contributing to the verdict." Id.
In Bolin, we observed that:
The only evidence which connected Bolin to a crime came from Hendrick. He connected Bolin to the instant arson for hire and to the uncharged arson for hire. Other witnesses corroborated Hendrick's involvement with the [uncharged arson] but did not connect Bolin to the charged fire with anything other than statements Hendrick would have made at or near the time of the [uncharged] fire. Also, three factors present here increase the likelihood that the jury could have drawn the 'forbidden inference.' The similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime was great; the evidence of the uncharged crime was more abundant and more extensive than that for the charged crime; and the State relied upon the uncharged crime, in part, in its final argument.
Id. Our review of the Bolin record led us to the conclusion that the erroneous admission of evidence was likely to have had a prejudicial impact so as to have contributed to the guilty verdict.
Reynolds attempts to analogize his case to Bolin. However, our review of the record reveals that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Bolin. In Bolin, the only evidence connecting Bolin to the charged fire was Hendrick's testimony and statements that Hendrick would have made at or near the time of the uncharged fire. However, here, both Powers' testimony and corroborating evidence connected Reynolds to the burglaries and thefts.
Powers testified that Reynolds broke into Ludwig's, removed boxes of sports trading cards, and took them to Cummins' trailer. Cummins confirmed that Reynolds had brought boxes of sports trading cards to her home. Powers further testified that Reynolds and his brother, Ron, made a second trip to the store later that evening to retrieve the lug wrench which Reynolds had left behind and to obtain more trading cards. Cummins confirmed that Reynolds returned to her trailer with additional cards. Powers testified that she received a $200.00 check from Cummins for the trading cards, and that Cummins sent a $700 check to Reynolds' parents. Again, Cummins confirmed Powers' testimony. The police's search of Cummins' trailer, where Reynolds was found sleeping, revealed "thousands" of trading cards, many of which Ludwig identified as those stolen from his store.
Powers further testified that on March 9, she and Reynolds broke into a house on 9th Road during the daylight hours. They took, among other things, a television, a VCR, and a pillowcase full of jewelry while Ron waited outside in Powers' white Capri. Another witness testified that he saw a dark haired man sitting in a white Mustang or Capri outside the 9th Road residence. The four occupants of the home reported numerous items missing, including a television, a VCR, jewelry, and a pillowcase taken from one of the beds.
Further, the three factors in Bolin which increased the likelihood that the jury could have drawn the "forbidden inference" are...
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