Reynolds v. U.S., R.R. Retirement Bd.
| Decision Date | 25 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-4064,86-4064 |
| Citation | 829 F.2d 1126 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Donald M. REYNOLDS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before NATHANIEL R. JONES, WELLFORD and RALPH B. GUY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner, Donald Reynolds, appeals the denial of a disability annuity under section 2(a)(1)(v) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231a(a)(1)(v) (1983). Reynolds, who is now 55 years of age, was employed as a railroad brakeman from 1972 until 1981. He claims that coronary artery disease has rendered him unable to sit, stand or walk for any length of time, and that he is therefore totally disabled or, at the very least, able to perform only sedentary work. Because we find that the Board's decision to deny benefits is based on substantial evidence in the record, we affirm.
Reynolds filed his application for an annuity on June 16, 1983. Lacking the 20 years of railroad service needed to qualify for a disability annuity based on disability for work in his last railroad occupation, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231a(a)(1)(iv), appellant had to be rated under the stricter requirement that he be disabled from all work. Id. Sec. 231a(a)(1)(v).
On March 30, 1984, the Bureau of Retirement Claims, the initial adjudicating unit of the Board denied appellant's application for benefits. The notice of denial stated in pertinent part:
You said you were unable to work because of coronary artery disease and peripheral vascular disease. The medical evidence shows that you had coronary bypass surgery in 1981 and bilateral bypass surgery in 1982 to restore circulation to your legs. It appears you have had good results from your surgeries. The pulses in your legs appear intact. There is no evidence of heart failure or rhythma disturbances. We have determined that your condition is not sufficiently severe to prevent all regular work.
J. App. at 30. Appellant requested reconsideration of the initial denial, and upon reconsideration the Bureau of Retirement Claims reaffirmed its decision that Mr. Reynolds was not disabled for all regular substantial gainful work. Further, appellant was found to have the residual functional capacity for medium work activity.
On November 20, 1984, Mr. Reynolds appealed the denial of benefits to the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, the Board's intermediate appellate unit. A hearing was held and on March 26, 1986 the appeals referee issued his decision denying the appellant disability benefits. In arriving at his decision, the appeals referee followed the steps for evaluating disability promulgated by the Social Security Administration and used by the Railroad Retirement Board in making disability determinations. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(a) (1987). Pursuant to the framework provided by these regulations, and in light of the available medical evidence, the referee concluded that 'appellant has a severe impairment which prevents him from performing his past relevant work of brakeman,' but that the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment in the regulations. Accordingly, the referee concluded that under the regulations a finding of 'disabled' could not be made without first considering 'other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity . . . to determine if other work can be performed.' J. App. at 6. Upon consideration of these factors the referee concluded that despite appellant's severe impairment he nevertheless retained the residual functional capacity to perform 'light work' as that term is defined in the administrative regulations. See id. Sec. 404.1567(b). Therefore, because appellant remained able to perform light work, the referee concluded that the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found in appendix 2 of the regulations and the corresponding grid-table compelled a finding of 'not disabled' for a person of appellant's age ('closely approaching advanced age'), education ('limited or less'), and previous work experience ('skilled or semiskilled'). See id. Sec. 404.1569 & Subpart P, App. 2 (Table No. 2, Rule 202.11).
On May 19, 1986, Mr. Reynolds appealed to the three-member Board itself, and on August 26, 1986, the Board notified appellant that it unanimously affirmed and adopted the decision of the appeals referee. That determination became the final decision of the Board. This appeal followed.
This court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Railroad Retirement Board under section 8 of the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231g, which incorporates the judicial review provisions of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 355(f). The standard a review this court uses in reviewing a decision of the Board is a 'substantial evidence' standard. That is, if the Board's decision is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, its decision will not be disturbed by this court on appeal. See Coker v. Gielow, 806 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2483 (1987); Chandler v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 713 F.2d 188, 189 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
Therefore, the sole issue presented on this appeal is whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's decision denying appellant disability benefits. Appellant makes three arguments in support of his contention that the denial of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. First, appellant contends that the appeals referee did not give sufficient weight to the medical opinions of his treating physicians. Second, appellant argues that his own testimony as to the severity of his pain was sufficient by itself to establish disability. Finally, appellant argues that even if the evidence does not establish that he is permanently disabled, he is nevertheless entitled to benefits under the applicable regulations because he can perform only 'sedentary' work. As will be discussed below, these arguments are not persuasive and do not require us to set aside the Board's decision.
Appellant's first argument is that the appeals referee did not accord proper weight to the uncontradicted medical opinion of his two doctors, Drs. Rogers and Grimaudo, as well as the opinion of the chief medical officer of the railroad for which he had worked, Dr. Gallant. Specifically, appellant places a lot of emphasis on the form submitted to the Board by Dr. Grimaudo on June 13, 1983 in which the doctor stated that appellant was a 'cardiac cripple' and unable to undertake gainful employment. J. App. at 119. Appellant also relies on the assessment of his cardiologist, Dr. Rogers, that appellant's poor exercise tolerance and functional aerobic impairment 'probably justify total and permanent disability for him.' J. App. at 137. Finally, appellant points to a short letter from Dr. Gallant, the chief medical officer of appellant's employer, stating that upon review of appellant's medical records it was his opinion that appellant was 'unable to work at this time because of a medical condition.' J. App. at 125.
Normally, in determining disability, a treating physician's report is entitled to deference. See Duncan v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 1986). However, Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1981). Congress has made the determination of disability the prerogative of the Board, not the treating physician, and accordingly the Board is not bound by a physician's conclusory statements. See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984); Peppers v. Railroad Retirement Board, 728 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1983).
In this case, in addition to the statements referred to above, the referee had available the medical reports of Dr. Harry Mack, an internist who examined the appellant twice at the request of the Board. According to Dr. Mack, appellant had good results from his bypass surgery and should be capable of work requiring minimal to moderate exertion. Further, the referee had available two letters from appellant's cardiologist, Dr. Rogers, and two medical assessments made by Dr. Rogers, on dates seven months apart, of appellant's ability to do work-related activities. While Dr. Rogers stated in one of the letters that appellant 'probably' was permanently disabled, he also stated that appellant's blood pressure was under control with medication. Moreover, in the second assessment of appellant's ability to work, Dr. Rogers found that appellant could lift up to 10-15 pounds without restriction and occasionally up to 20 pounds, and further that he could stand or walk 4 hours out of an 8 hour day and do so for 2 hours without...
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