Reynolds v. United States
| Decision Date | 05 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-00262-NJR |
| Parties | KENYON G. REYNOLDS #64861-097, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIP DELANEY, STEPHANIE HALL, and DOES 1-50, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Kenyon Reynolds. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff originally filed this action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80. (Doc. 1). In his original complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he was viciously attacked by another inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (USP-Marion), on September 4, 2013. He sued the BOP under the FTCA for failing to protect him from the assault and for failing to provide him with adequate medical care for his resulting injuries. Plaintiff requested monetary damages and immediate release from prison. (Id.).
Plaintiff commenced the action on March 9, 2015. (Doc. 1). In anticipation of an impending prison transfer, however, he also filed a motion to stay all proceedings. (Doc. 2). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion and stayed this matter for sixty days (i.e., until May 11, 2015). (Doc. 5). When his transfer was delayed, Plaintiff requested an extension of the stay. (Doc. 6). The Court granted his request for an extension (i.e., until June 10, 2015), but indicated that no further requests would be granted. (Doc. 7). The stay was lifted on June 24, 2015. (Doc. 9).
On the same date, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's original complaint for failure to state any claim for relief. He was granted leave to file an amended complaint by July 29, 2015. (Id.). The Court received the amended pleading after this deadline, but it is considered timely.1 The amended complaint is now ripe for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was brutally beaten by another inmate at USP-Marion on September 4, 2013. (Doc. 12 at 5). On that date, Inmate Delaney "'sucker' punched" Plaintiff, as he studied the Bible in the prison cafeteria. (Id. at 9). The blow caused Plaintiff to fall to the floor, hit his head, and lose consciousness. Inmate Delaney then "repeatedly kicked" and "severely beat" Plaintiff in the head. (Id.). Other inmates begged Inmate Delaney to stop, but he ignored their pleas. Plaintiff lay bleeding from his eyes, ears, and head.
By the time prison officials arrived in the cafeteria, they found Plaintiff in serious condition. He was airlifted to Barnes-Jewish Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri, where he was diagnosed with injuries that included a subarachnoid hemorrhage and multiple facial fractures.(Id. at 10, 12). Plaintiff's jaw was surgically reconstructed; a "permanent plate [was] implanted in his left jawbone." (Id. at 9). He now suffers from permanent injuries that include dizziness, extreme vertigo, frequent headaches, pain, and mental anguish. (Id. at 9, 13).
Plaintiff blames the attack on the negligence and deliberate indifference of numerous prison officials. (Id. at 9-10). He claims that these officials failed to supervise the area where he was attacked. No guards were physically present. Control officers failed to observe video monitors. This delayed their response.
Plaintiff describes his attack as a hate crime. (Id. at 11-12). According to the amended complaint, prison officials at USP-Marion have created a divisive atmosphere between sex offenders and their "haters." At least one prison official, Officer Stephanie Hall, was allegedly disciplined or fired for making derogatory comments about "Cho Mos," a term used to refer to child molesters. During Plaintiff's attack, numerous witnesses overheard her say, "Too bad we didn't wait longer as the 'Cho Mo' would have died." (Id. at 11). Inmate Delaney also was overheard stating that he would "go all out" if he ever assaulted a sex offender because it would likely be considered a hate crime and result in an increased prison sentence. (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff now sues the United States of America, Inmate Philip Delaney, Officer Stephanie Hall, and fifty unknown defendants ("Does 1-50") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80. He maintains that USP-Marion officials failed to protect him from the assault and failed to secure adequate medical care for his resulting injuries. He seeks monetary damages, physical therapy, and pain medication.2 (Id. at 6).
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court has organized the claims in Plaintiff's pro se amended complaint into the following enumerated counts:
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an opinion as to the merits of each claim.
As discussed in detail below, Plaintiff's FTCA claim (Count 1) and one of his Bivens claims (Count 2) shall receive further review; however, his deliberate indifference to medical needs claim (Count 3) shall be dismissed.
As the Court previously explained (Doc. 9 at 4), a federal prisoner who seeks relief for the misconduct of federal agents has three options for obtaining relief in federal court. He may bring a suit against the United States under the FTCA for misconduct of federal agents that is considered tortious under state law. Sisk v. United States, 756 F.2d 497, 500 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(6), 2680). He may bring a suit against the agent for a violation of hisconstitutional rights under the theory set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id. Or, he may bring both types of claims in the same suit. See, e.g., Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff's amended complaint raises both types of claims.
The Court will allow the FTCA claim (Count 1) to proceed against Defendant United States. The FTCA allows "civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for . . . personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Pursuant to the FTCA, "federal inmates may bring suit for injuries they sustain in custody as a consequence of the negligence of prison officials." Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
FTCA claims are governed by the law of the state where the tort occurred. Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). See also Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 2003). In this case, Illinois law applies. To state a negligence claim under Illinois law, a complaint must demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2011) (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)). In the amended complaint, Plaintiff names the United States in connection with the assault that occurred on September 4, 2013. He blames the assault on the negligence of USP-Marion officials, who were not present during the assault and failed to intervene and protect him in a timely manner. The amended complaint supports an FTCA claim at this early stage.
But Plaintiff cannot proceed with this claim against all of the defendants, because "[t]he only proper defendant in an FTCA action is the United States." Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2008); Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982). See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). Count 1 shall proceed against Defendant United States and be dismissed against all other defendants with prejudice.
Plaintiff's failure to protect claim (Count 2) shall receive further review against Defendant Hall only. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that the defendants failed to protect him from a known risk of assault by "haters," those inmates who target convicted sex offenders for mistreatment. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to Bivens, which is the federal counterpart to a § 1983 claim against a state official. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983). "[B]ecause actions brought under [§ 1983] and those of the Bivens-type are conceptually identical and further the same policies, courts have frequently looked to [§ 1983] and [its] decisional gloss for guidance in" construing the scope of the Bivens remedy. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978). Both Bivens and § 1983 "create[ ] a cause of action...
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