Reynolds v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 May 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 734,734 |
| Citation | 54 S.Ct. 800,292 U.S. 443,78 L.Ed. 1353 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Francis W. Hill, Jr., and David A. Pine, both of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
The Attorney General and Mr. H. Brian Holland, of Philadelphia, Pa., for the United States.
This suit was brought in the Court of Claims by petitioner, an honorably discharged veteran of the Spanish-American War, to recover judgment against the United States for money deducted from his pension on account of board furnished him while he was an inmate of St. Elizabeths Hospital. He was committed to the hospital as an insane person on June 19, 1911, and remained there until April 25, 1930, when he was discharged in the custody of his brother. Thereafter, petitioner regained his sanity and was of sound mind when this suit was prosecuted. During the entire period of his confinement he suffered from a neuropsychiatric ailment. Preceding the time of his discharge from the hospital there had been placed to his credit on the books of the institution, under the certificate of the Bureau of Pensions, $ ,036, representing funds paid to the institution by the Bureau of Pensions on his behalf. Upon his discharge the hospital deducted from these pension funds a sum which had been advanced to him for clothing and cash, and applied the remaining $3,259.17 on account of board furnished during the period of his confinement. Petitioner, at the time, protested against the application thus made and against the refusal of the hospital to pay over to him the amount so withheld.
Shortly after his discharge from the hospital application was made on his behalf to the Director of the Veterans' Bureau for an order authorizing and directing his hospitalization at St. Elizabeths Hospital from the effec- tive date of the World War Veterans' Act of June 7, 1924, to the date of his discharge, April 25, 1930. The director held that since no application had been made by petitioner or by any one acting in his behalf until after his discharge, the question was moot, and the director was without authority of law to issue a retroactive order authorizing hospitalization in such a case. Following this ruling, however, the bureau issued a certificate recognizing petitioner as a veteran entitled to hospitalization under section 202(10) of the World War Veterans' Act of 1924, as amended.
Petitioner, by three successive enlistments, served in the army of the United States from November 30, 1897, until January 25, 1907, at which time he was honorably discharged by reason of the expiration of his term of service.
The Court of Claims denied petitioner's right to recover and dismissed his petition.
Section 202(10) of the World War Veterans' Act, as amended (U.S.C.A., title 38, § 484 (38 USCA § 484)), directs that all hospital facilities under the control and jurisdiction of the Veterans' Bureau shall be available 'for every honorably discharged veteran of the Spanish-American War * * * suffering from neuropsychiatric * * * ailments,' with the following proviso: 'That the pension of a veteran entitled to hospitalization under this section shall not be subject to deduction, while such veteran is hospitalized in any Government hospital, for board, maintenance, or any other purpose incident to hospitalization.' This proviso appeared for the first time in the Act of July 2, 1926, c. 723, § 9, 44 Stat. 794.
The Veterans' Bureau had and exercised the right to make use of St. Elizabeths Hospital for insane veterans; and this, we think, satisfied the requirement contemplated by the statute that the hospital facilities (not the hospi- tal) shall be under the control and jurisdiction of that bureau.
The court below, in ruling against petitioner, proceeded upon the theory that a court is without jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding for the determination of the question whether a veteran is entitled to hospital facilities, to order his hospitalization, or to certify his right thereto—those being matters, the court said within the sole authority of the director of the bureau. Granting the correctness of this view, we are of opinion that it does not apply in this case. The undisputed and indisputable facts bring the veteran within the requirements of the statute. Undoubtedly, therefore, as matter of law, he was entitled to the hospital facilities of St. Elizabeths, and if timely application had been made to the director of the bureau,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. SOLVENTS RECOVERY SERV., ETC.
...its subsequent action depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent to the enactment." Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 449, 54 S.Ct. 800, 803, 78 L.Ed. 1353 (1934); see also Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 504 n.21, 70 S.Ct. 292, 299 n.21, 94 L.Ed. 287 (1950)......
-
Prescott v. United States, Civil LV 80-143 RDF.
...the facts upon which its subsequent action depends are drawn from a time antecedent to its enactment. Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 54 S.Ct. 800, 78 L.Ed. 1353 (1934); Benjamin v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1949). The result would be to the contrary if plaintiff's cause of a......
-
US v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.
...have retroactive effects that are subject to due process limitations.9 As noted by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 54 S.Ct. 800, 78 L.Ed. 1353 (1934), "A statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action......
-
National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co.
...Act require the employer to bargain with employees who had ceased to be such when the act was passed? In Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 54 S.Ct. 800, 78 L.Ed. 1353, it is pointed out that a "statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the facts or requisites upon which its ......