Reynolds v. Wade

• Decision Date: 26 March 1956
• Docket Number: No. 7397-A.,7397-A.
• Citation: 139 F. Supp. 171
• Parties: Woodrow W. REYNOLDS, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Hugh WADE et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

139 F. Supp. 171

Woodrow W. REYNOLDS, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Hugh WADE et al., Defendants.

No. 7397-A.

District Court, Alaska First Division, Juneau.

March 26, 1956.

Henry C. Clausen, San Francisco, Cal., and Howard D. Stabler, Juneau, Alaska, for plaintiff.

J. Gerald Williams, Atty. Gen., and Edward A. Merdes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

HODGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff in this action as a resident taxpayer of Alaska seeks to enjoin the Treasurer, Director of Finance, Commissioner of Education and members of the Board of Education of the Territory of Alaska from an alleged illegal expenditure of public funds and from carrying into effect the provisions of Chap. 39, S.L.A.1955, being an Act entitled

"An Act to promote the public health, safety, and welfare by providing transportation for children attending schools in compliance with compulsory education laws";

and the provisions of Chap. 6, S.L.A. 1955, Extraordinary Session, appropriating money from the General Fund of said Territory for "transportation to schools," or such part thereof as appropriates public money for transportation of pupils to non-public or sectarian schools.

The Act in question provides that in those places in Alaska where transportation is provided under existing laws for children attending public schools, transportation shall likewise be provided for children who, in compliance with the compulsory education laws of Alaska, attend non-public schools,

"where such children, in order to reach such non-public schools, must travel distances comparable with and over routes the same as the distances and routes over which the children attending public schools are transported."

Plaintiff attacks the validity of such legislation upon three grounds: (1) That such legislation contravenes the limitations of the Organic Act of Alaska, 48 U.S.C.A. § 77, which prohibits the appropriation of any public money "for the support or benefit of any sectarian, denominational, or private school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the Government"; (2) That said legislation violates the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981-1983, in that it aids and supports sectarian and denominational education and constitutes a law respecting an establishment of religion, and therefore deprives plaintiff and other taxpayers of their property without due process of law; (3) It violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the Organic Act in that it denies to plaintiff and other taxpayers similarly situated the equal protection of law and is class legislation.

Defendants have moved for an order dismissing the complaint upon the grounds that (1) It fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief can be granted; and (2) It does not allege that plaintiff will suffer any injury that will not be suffered in common by the general public. The controlling question before the Court is whether or not the action presents a justiciable controversy and whether there is sufficient showing as to the plaintiff's right to maintain this action.

The following allegations of the complaint must be noticed as pertinent to this issue:

"The citizen, resident taxpayers of said Territory, number many thousands. Plaintiff and all of said persons are in the same class and are affected by all the matters and things mentioned hereinafter and are subject to like injury and damage as the injuries complained of in plaintiff's complaint."

"The funds so appropriated from said General Fund for transportation to schools are obtained in part from the regular and special taxes paid and required to be paid to said Territory by plaintiff and other taxpayers similarly situated as aforesaid."

(Under and by virtue of said Acts the defendants) "will, unless enjoined and restrained by an order of this Court, pay out and expend from the Territorial Treasury * * * during the school biennium * * * a substantial portion of said $1,250,000.00 for the transportation of pupils to non-public schools, including sectarian and denominational schools; and such sums will thereby be lost from the public funds of the Territory * * *; and the payment of said funds for said purpose will greatly increase the taxes which this plaintiff and the other taxpayers of said Territory are obliged to pay to maintain the Government thereof."

The rule is well settled that with respect to a taxpayer of the United States he cannot maintain an action to enjoin public officials from carrying out Acts of Congress upon the grounds of invalidity of the Act except where there is some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue; and he must show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with the general public. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham v. Mellon), 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478, 58 S.Ct. 300, 82 L.Ed. 374; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108; Elliott v. White, 57 App.D.C. 389, 23 F.2d 997 (in which the same issue of "promotion of religious views and establishment of religious and sectarian institutions" is involved); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 4 Cir., 91 F.2d 665, 676; Wheless v. Mellon, 56 App.D. C. 98, 10 F.2d 893, 894-895; Railway Express Agency v. Kennedy, 7 Cir., 189 F. 2d 801, 804.

An injury in a legal sense which may justify such an action is defined as follows:

"The principle that one who is threatened with direct and special injury may maintain such action is without application unless the right invaded is a legal right, — one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T. V. A., 306 U.S. 118, 137, 59 S.Ct. 366, 369, 83 L.Ed. 543; Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. v. District Court, 9 Cir., 202 F.2d 942.

This rule has been applied in Federal courts to a suit by a taxpayer to declare acts of state legislatures invalid as in conflict with the Federal or State constitution. Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 50 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed. 175; Columbus & G. R. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99, 51 S.Ct. 392, 75 L.Ed. 861; Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72 S.Ct. 394, 397, 96 L.Ed. 475, expressly holding that what the Court said of a Federal statute in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon case is "equally true when a state Act is assailed."

The rule is otherwise as to a taxpayer's suit against a municipality or county, as to which it is universally held that a taxpayer may maintain a suit in equity to restrain a city or county from unlawful expenditure of public funds, which distinction...