Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines

• Citation: 279 So.2d 293
• Decision Date: 13 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43166,43166
• Parties: Kenneth R. REYNOLDS, Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, v. WHITNEY TANK LINES and Continental Insurance Company, Respondents and Cross-Petitioners, and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 293

279 So.2d 293

Kenneth R. REYNOLDS, Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, v. WHITNEY TANK LINES and Continental Insurance Company, Respondents and Cross-Petitioners, and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 43166.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 13, 1973.

Joseph E. Melendi, of Barrs, Melendi & Williamson, Tampa, for petitioner, cross-respondent.

W. S. Crumbley, of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for Michigan Mutual Ins. Co., respondents, and Whitney Tank Lines, respondent and cross-petitioner.

Richard G. Davis, of Rose & Davis, Tampa, for Continental Ins. Co., respondent and cross-petitioner.

McCAIN, Justice.

This case is before us on claimant's petition and the employer carrier's cross-petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the Industrial Relations Commission reversing the compensation award of the Judge of Industrial Claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., Article V, Section 3(b)(3) (1973), F.S.A.

Claimant Reynolds, a 45 year-old truck driver, was injured on December 23, 1969 when he fell off his tractor trailer, landing on his left side and rupturing his spleen. Surgery involving spleen removal was performed and claimant was discharged from the hospital on December 31, 1969. He returned to work on February 2, 1970 and continued working on a regular basis until his second accident on December 12, 1970.

On the latter date claimant again fell out of his truck, landing on his left side and suffering bruises. He continued working intermittently for a three week period, complaining of pain and shortness of breath, until he was admitted to the hospital on February 3, 1971. Shortly after entering the hospital claimant suffered a myocardial infarction.

The basic dispute in the case concerns the question of causal relationship between the second accident and the heart attack. There was some testimony (primarily that of claimant and his wife) that after the first accident claimant became nervous and third and had trouble performing his tasks at work with his former efficiency. Claimant also testified that during the period between the accidents his left side was painful and disturbing to him. After the second accident, he became increasingly nervous, began to suffer shortness of breach and eventually suffered the myocardial infarction described above.

The JIC determined that the infarction was causally related to the second accident and awarded compensation. In so doing, he relied primarily on the testimony and medical report of Dr. Armstrong, an internist with a specialty in pulmonary diseases, who treated claimant after the second accident and recommended his admission to the hospital. In his report Dr. Armstrong stated:

'In summary, we have here a 45 year old man who suffered a work related injury requiring surgery of a major nature. He continued to have pain and discomfort, and missed work on several occasions because of it. The second fall in December, 1970 was additional trauma to him and I feel that there is absolute medical certainty that this triggered the acute phase of his respiratory disease as it is a well known fact that the wheezing associated with obstructive pulmonary disease is frequently emotionally induced. It is equally well known that heart attacks are stress related. The time of his myocardial infarct would put it somewhere in the first 24 hours of his hospitalization.'

Dr. Armstrong also testified at the hearing before the JIC. Inter alia, he said at that time:

'Q All right. Do you have an opinion, sir, as to whether or not the industrial accident of 1969 and the industrial accident of 1970, and their sequelae, contributed to any extent to the manifestation of the obstructive pulmonary disorder you found and diagnosed in January and/or February of 1971?

'A I felt that there was a connection between these accidents and his problem.

'Q In reference to the pulmonary disorder, would you tell the Court the reasons why you concluded that there is a connection.

'A The patient had many, many months of difficulty with pain, and the anxiety and stress therefrom. I felt that the second accident in particular--I'll go back to the other in a moment--the second accident, in particular, triggered the great deal of this problem in that he began to have wheezing which is an outward evidence to you, me, or anyone in the room, that a person is having obstructive problems with his lungs; that is, the bronchial tubes are closing down. These bronchial tubes were closing down because of various things: infection, emotion, smoking, an allergy, to complete the picture there. So that I felt that the stress that this man had come under, particularly in his second fall, triggered more of these wheezing responses, and that this is what tipped him over into having overt manifestations of the obstructive disease.'

The Full Commission reversed the award of compensation concluding that the causal relationship between the accident and the heart attack was not established by competent, substantial evidence. In pertinent part, the Commission held:

'We are compelled to agree with the appellant . . . that the evidence is neither competent, substantial nor in accordance with logic and reason to support a causal relation, particularly in light of the testimony of Dr. Armstrong who based his opinion upon a multitude of factors. He did not unequivocably testify that within a reasonable medical probability that either of the accidents caused the myocardial infarction.

'The only evidence in support of the Judge of Industrial Claims' ruling in the instant case was that of Dr. Armstrong who merely attributed claimant's myocardial infarction to both his prior accidents and named other causative factors. This is contrary to the ruling in the above cited cases. (The cases referred to are a series of Supreme Court decisions in workmen's compensation cases discussing proximate cause and reasonable medical probability.)'

We disagree. At least two kinds of compensable heart attack situations appear in the case law interpreting Chapter 440. First are those situations in which the claimant is injured in an identifiable accident which results, either immediately or subsequently, in a heart attack. In those situations there is no requirement that claimant have been under unusual strain or over-exertion at the time of the heart attack; the only question (aside from compensability of the initial accident) is whether the heart attack is causally related to the accident. Representative cases include Herrin Transportation Company v. Cothren, 180 So.2d 338 (Fla.1965) and Sosenko v. American Airmotive Corporation, 156 So.2d...