Reynoso v. Aviles

• Decision Date: 05 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14 Civ. 9482PAE.,14 Civ. 9482PAE.
• Citation: 87 F.Supp.3d 549
• Parties: Jose Aristedes Holguin REYNOSO, Petitioner, v. Oscar AVILES, in his official capacity as Director of Hudson County Department of Corrections; Christopher Shanahan, in his official capacity as New York Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jeh Johnson, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; Eric Holder, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States; and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

87 F.Supp.3d 549

Jose Aristedes Holguin REYNOSO, Petitioner

v.Oscar AVILES, in his official capacity as Director of Hudson County Department of Corrections; Christopher Shanahan, in his official capacity as New York Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jeh Johnson, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; Eric Holder, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States; and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Respondents.

No. 14 Civ. 9482PAE.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed Feb. 5, 2015.

Amy Valor Meselson, Legal Aid Society, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Brandon Matthew Waterman, Christopher Kendrick Connolly, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Respondents.

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:

Jose Aristedes Holguin Reynoso (“Holguin”), an alien, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Holguin is detained in prison in New York, pursuant to a detainer issued by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) while proceedings to remove him from the United States are underway. Holguin claims that he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing to determine whether he presents a danger to the community or a risk of flight. He argues that DHS lacked authority under the mandatory detention statute, § 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),¹ to detain him without such a hearing. For the reasons that follow, the Court rejects Holguin's claim.

I. Background²

A. Holguin's Citizenship and Immigration Status

Holguin was born in 1977 in the Dominican Republic. Pet. ¶ 18; id. Ex. D. In 2000, he married Arelis Altagracia Ventura Rodriguez (“Ventura”), who is also from the Dominican Republic. Id. ¶ 18; id. Ex. A. They have one child, a son born in 2000 in New Jersey. Id. ¶ 18. In 2007, Holguin entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Id.; id. Ex. D. In 2010, Ventura became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. ¶ 18. Since Holguin's arrival in the United States, he has lived with his wife and son in New Jersey (except when he has been in custody) and has typically maintained employment. Id. ¶ 19.

B. Holguin's Criminal History

In January 2013, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) began investigating a drug trafficking organization that was distributing significant quantities of heroin in the New York City area. Based on intercepted phone calls and physical surveillance, agents concluded that members of the organization would be preparing packages of heroin for redistribution at an apartment in the Bronx. See id. Exs. E, F.

On May 13, 2013, agents entered that apartment, where they came upon an active heroin mill. Id. Ex. E. When the agents entered, Holguin and several others tried to flee via the fire escape, but were caught. Id. During the ensuing search of the apartment, agents recovered multiple packages of heroin, packaging materials, coffee grinders used to grind heroin, loose heroin that had not yet been packaged, and glassine envelopes. Id. Holguin and others were arrested that day on narcotics charges. Id.³

On December 3, 2013, Holguin pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. On July 22, 2014, he was sentenced to time served, amounting to approximately 14 months imprisonment. See Gov't Response, Ex. 2; see also United States v. Holguin, 13 Cr. 438(KPF), Dkt. 218. Holguin was released from custody on or about July 22, 2014, after which he remained subject to supervision by the U.S. Probation Office. See Dkt. 8 (“Holguin Br.”), Ex. L; Pet. Ex. I; see also 13 Cr. 438, Dkt. 218.

C. The Removal Proceedings

On October 9, 2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested Holguin and initiated removal proceedings against him by issuing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). Pet. ¶ 2; id. Ex. H.

As the basis for removal, ICE contended that Holguin was removable on two statutory grounds, both triggered by his narcotics conviction: (1) INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides for removal following a conviction for a controlled substance violation after being admitted; and (2) INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for removal following a conviction for an aggravated felony after being admitted. Id. Ex. H.

Significant here, ICE also determined that Holguin is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and therefore was not entitled to an individualized bond hearing. On that basis, Holguin has been detained since October 9, 2014, without such a hearing. Pet. ¶ 2. Holguin's next removal hearing is scheduled for February 13, 2015. Gov't Response, Ex. 5

D. Holguin's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

On December 2, 2014, Holguin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Dkt. 1. His argument is that the mandatory detention statute, § 1226(c), does not apply to him, because he was taken into ICE custody two-and-a-half months after his release from criminal custody, whereas the statute provides for mandatory detention only for covered aliens whom DHS detains “when ... released” from criminal custody. On that basis, he seeks a bond hearing.

On January 5, 2015, the parties proposed, and the Court approved, an expedited briefing schedule. Dkt. 4–5. On January 8, 2015, Holguin filed a memorandum of law in support of his petition. Holguin Br. On January 20, 2015, respondents filed an opposition. Dkt. 11 (“Gov't Br.”). On January 23, 2015, Holguin replied. Dkt. 12 (“Holguin Reply Br.”).

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Holguin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

The Court is not deprived of jurisdiction by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), which prohibits judicial review of “[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment” regarding “the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” That is because Holguin's petition challenges not a discretionary decision whether to grant release, but DHS's construction of the mandatory detention statute. See, e.g., Garcia v. Shanahan, 615 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“While the Immigration and Nationality Act ... precludes review of the ‘Attorney General's discretionary judgment’ with regard to ‘detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), the United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that § 1226(e) deprives courts of jurisdiction to consider challenges to the interpretation of the mandatory detention statute.”) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) ); Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F.Supp.2d 453, 456 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“[A] district court may review challenges to removal detention based on questions of statutory interpretation or constitutional challenges to the statutory framework.”); see also Henderson v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 106, 119–22 (2d Cir.1998) (habeas review extends to statutory questions in context of removal).

III. Discussion

Holguin's claim turns on the proper construction of a single clause within 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Court refers to this clause, which reads “when the alien is released,” as the “when released” clause.

By way of background, federal law contains two distinct provisions governing an alien's detention while removal proceedings are pending. Section 1226(a) allows federal immigration authorities to detain an alien during removal proceedings, subject to a bond hearing.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1226(c), entitled “Detention of criminal aliens,” however, provides for mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens. Immigration authorities may not provide such aliens with a bond hearing. They may release such aliens only for limited purposes not relevant here, relating to the alien's service as a testifying or cooperating witness. Id. § 1226(c)(2).

Section 1226(c) —with the “when released” clause emphasized—reads in full:

(c) Detention of criminal aliens

(1) Custody

The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in § 1182(a)(2) of this title,

(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

(C) is deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under § 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,

when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

(2) Release

The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to § 3521 of Title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien.

Id. (emphasis added).⁴

Holguin does not dispute that he is removable under grounds set forth in the mandatory removal statute. Two grounds listed in § 1226(c)(1)(B) clearly apply: INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides for removal following a conviction for a controlled substance violation after being admitted; and § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for removal after a conviction for an aggravated felony after...