Reynoso v. DeJoy

• Docket Number: Civil No. 21-1566 (FAB)
• Decision Date: 27 February 2023
• Citation: Reynoso v. DeJoy, 658 F.Supp.3d 10 (D. P.R. 2023)
• Parties: Marcos A. REYNOSO, Plaintiff, v. Louis DEJOY, Postmaster General, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

658 F.Supp.3d 10

Marcos A. REYNOSO, Plaintiff, v. Louis DEJOY, Postmaster General, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 21-1566 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

Signed February 27, 2023

Humberto F. Cobo-Estrella, Cobo Estrella Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Dennise N. Longo-Quinones, Lisa E. Bhatia-Gautier, United States Attorneys Office, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Marcos A. Reynoso ("Reynoso") filed suit against defendants United States Postal Service ("USPS"), United States Department of Justice ("USDOJ"), and United States Postmaster General, Louis DeJoy ("DeJoy") (collectively, "defendants"), alleging age discrimination, racial discrimination, and workplace retaliation. (Docket No. 4.) The defendants move for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (Docket No. 10-1.) For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Factual Background

The USPS hired Reynoso in 2014 as a mail processing clerk. (Docket No. 4 at p. 3.) He then earned a promotion, serving as a sales service clerk. Id. On various occasions, Reynoso notified the USPS that he experienced disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. Id. at p. 4. For example, in January 2017, the USPS "failed to take corrective action" after Reynoso's supervisors neglected to provide a "required break-in service." Id.

On July 16, 2020, Reynoso filed a report, asserting that his supervisor Carlos Barreto ("Barreto") established an "unsafe and hostile work environment." Id. The USPS once again "[f]ailed to take immediate corrective action." Id. Less than a week after this report, Reynoso's colleagues "began a pattern of workplace harassment and selective prosecution of plaintiff." Id. This prompted Reynoso to file an "EEOC Charge of Discrimination based on Color and Retaliation" ("EEOC charge") against supervisors Noel Torres and Javier González. Id. Reynoso also asserts that Barreto engaged in three additional "incidents of hostile work harassment." Id.

Subsequently, USPS employee Carlos Ortiz ("Ortiz") physically assaulted Reynoso at work on January 20, 2021. Id. The USPS suspended both employees. Id. Ortiz returned to work two days earlier than Reynoso, however, demonstrating that the USPS engaged in disparate treatment based on age and skin color. Id.¹

II. Procedural Background

On November 28, 2021, Reynoso commenced this action, setting forth three causes of action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., as well as discrimination based on race and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Docket No. 4.) On April 13, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (Docket No. 10, Ex. 1.) They argue that Reynoso failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available both pursuant to Title VII and the ADEA. Id. Reynoso opposed the defendants' motion to dismiss on May 17, 2022. (Docket No. 15.)

III. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Destek Grp., Inc. v. State of N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court "must credit the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

Reynoso shoulders the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Failure to comply with the statute of limitations does not "implicate the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. [Courts construe] timeliness and presentment arguments as affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Montalvo-Figueroa v. DNA Auto Corp., 414 F.Supp.3d 213, 231 (D.P.R. 2019) (Besosa, J.) (citing Martínez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2016)). "Thus, all of the defendants' arguments [will be] considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Montalvo-Figueroa, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 231.

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that defendants may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A Court must decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In doing so, a court is "obligated to view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and to resolve any ambiguities in their favor." Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011). The Court must also consider "(a) 'implications from documents' attached to or fairly 'incorporated into the complaint,' (b) 'facts' susceptible to 'judicial note,' and (c) 'concessions' in plaintiff's 'response to the motion to dismiss.' " Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Committee, 669 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Arturet-Vélez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 429 F.3d 10, 13 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Although, "the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim," it is "not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case" in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). The prima facie analysis in a discrimination case is an evidentiary model, not a pleading standard. Id. at p. 51 ("[T]he prima facie case is not the appropriate benchmark for determining whether a complaint has crossed the plausibility threshold."). A complaint that adequately states a claim may still proceed even if "recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Assessing the adequacy of a complaint in this jurisdiction requires a two-step analysis. Zenón v. Guzmán, 924 F.3d 611, 615-16 (1st Cir. 2019). First, a court "isolate[s] and ignore[s] statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Id. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the court "take[s] the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor" to "see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Id. at 615-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. The Title VII Claim

The defendants contend that Reynoso's Title VII claim is time barred. (Docket No. 10, Ex. 1.) Reynoso argues, however, that he filed suit within the applicable statute of limitations. (Docket No. 15 at pp. 2 and 15.)

Pursuant to Title VII, an employer cannot "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Moreover, an employer cannot "limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Title VII is remedial, enacted by Congress "to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race . . . or national origin." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Franceschi v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Title VII is a vehicle through which an individual may seek recovery for employment discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.").

This statute "requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit in federal district court." Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976)).² See also Franceschi v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Aff., 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Nevertheless, '[j]udicial recourse under Title VII [. . .] is not a remedy of first resort. Before an employee may sue in federal court on a Title VII claim, he must first exhaust administrative remedies.' ") (citations omitted); Frederique-Alexandre v. Dept. of Nat. and Env't Res. of Puerto Rico, 478 F.3d 433, 440 (1st Cir. 2007) ("A plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies, including the EEOC procedures, before proceeding under Title VII in federal court."); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Title VII [. . .] require[s] an employee to file an administrative charge as a prerequisite to commencing a civil action for employment discrimination."). "The purpose of that requirement is to provide the employer with prompt notice of the claim and to create an opportunity for early conciliation." Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1990)); Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 464.

"The specific procedures for seeking agency relief [. . .] are set by the [EEOC] pursuant to its authority to ...