Rezendes v. Beaudette

• Decision Date: 22 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-365-Appeal.,2000-365-Appeal.
• Parties: Joyce REZENDES v. Daniel BEAUDETTE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

797 A.2d 474

Joyce REZENDES v. Daniel BEAUDETTE et al.

No. 2000-365-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 22, 2002.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Carolyn R. Barone, Warwick, David H. Stillman Braintree, MA, for Plaintiff.

Humberta M. Goncalves, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 9, 2002, pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by this appeal should be decided at this time. The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

I Facts and Travel

This appeal arises from a claim of malicious prosecution after plaintiff, Joyce Rezendes (plaintiff), was charged with larceny. The plaintiff was a long-time employee of Eagle Video, Inc., a corporation that owns several Blockbuster Video franchises. The defendants, Daniel and Russell Beaudette (Daniel and Russell respectively or collectively referred to as defendants) are co-owners of the video store, serving as president and vice president.¹ The plaintiff beganworking at the Seekonk, Massachusetts, video store in 1987 as a customer service representative (CSR) and, after several good performance evaluations, eventually became an assistant manager. As an assistant manager, plaintiff was responsible for issuing various customer credits, including goodwill credits and extended viewing credits. Only a manager or assistant manager could issue such credits, which required the employee to enter a password into the cash register. A manager or assistant manager could change his or her password at any time.

In March 1993, Laurine Brady (Brady), manager of the Seekonk store, noticed that the number of credits issued through plaintiff's password was inordinately high. Brady also testified that the credits issued for extended viewing did not coincide with late viewing fees, raising her suspicions. Consequently, Brady informed Daniel about the discrepancies. The defendants then checked employee work schedules and payroll records and compared them with the times that excessive credits were given. According to defendants, plaintiff's work schedule was the only one that coincided with the times that the credits were issued.

On March 10, 1993, defendants and Brady held a meeting with plaintiff, in a room in the back of the Seekonk store. At this meeting, plaintiff was questioned about the unusually high number of credits that had been issued with her password. The plaintiff explained that in December 1992, she had informed Brady that other CSRs had managers' passwords, including hers. Brady denied that plaintiff had ever reported such news to her. According to Daniel, plaintiff never gave a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancies in the credits. At the end of the meeting, therefore, Daniel took plaintiff's keys and put her on suspension. Daniel then told plaintiff that Eagle Video, Inc. was going to "investigate further and get back in touch with her."

Concerned that plaintiff did not have a satisfactory explanation when confronted with the discrepancies, Daniel contacted four customers who had received credits under plaintiff'spassword within that week. Although each of the fo ur customers reported that plaintiff, or a woman who fit her description, had waited on them, none of the customers reported actually receiving credits. Instead, they all reported that they had paid in full for their movie rentals.

According to Daniel, the total amount of credits issued to those four individuals totaled $31.20. Russell testified that he then calculated that plaintiff had issued $2,135 in excessive credits by comparing the average amount of credits issued by the manager and the other assistant manager with plaintiff's average from September 1992 to March 1993.

Shortly thereafter, defendants filed a complaint with the Seekonk Police Department (police), reporting an internal theft of $2,135. The defe ndants gave the police computer records indicating the number of credits issued, by type, and employee histories that kept track of all the activities of each employee's account for the preceding two-month period. The defendants left samples of the comput er records with the police.

The plaintiff testified that approximately one week after the meeting, the police contacted her. She subsequently was charged with larceny in violation of the criminal laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The charge later was dismissed. In March 1994, plaintiff filed a claim against defendants for malicious prosecution. The defendant s filed a counterclaim against plaintiff for negligent and/or intentional acts by plaintiff in the course of her employment at Eagle Video, Inc. A Superior Court jury trial began on May 8, 2000.

At trial, besides the facts stated above, Stephanie Kapstein (Stephanie), a CSR at the Seekonk store, testified for plaintiff. Stephanie testified that CSRs could see the passwords of the manager and assistant manager by simply standing behind them as they typed them into the cash register. Moreover, Stephanie testified that CSRs sometimes used these passwords withoutpermission to prevent delays in serving customers. Finally, Stephanie testified that she lived with her mother and plaintiff, who was her mother's best friend.

After Stephanie's testimony, her mother, Paula Kapstein (Paula), testified. Paula explained that she owned a hair salon and that Brady and Kheradi were her clients. Paula testified that Brady and Kheradi discussed problems they had at work "with people * * * jumping off and on each other's computers and using each other's codes."

In addition to her testimony about the investigation, Brady also testified about how an employee could have stolen money from the store. According to Brady, at the time a customer was renting a video, an assistant manager simply could put a credit command into the cash register and pocket the money paid by the customer. Consequently, the daily receipts would balance at the end of the day because the computer would believe that no payment was due on the sale.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendants made a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice denied the motion. The jury ultimately found in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $67,000. The jury also found in favor of plaintiff on defendants' counterclaim. The trial justice then denied defendant s' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendants also filed a motion for a new trial, which was granted by the trial justice.

The plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the trial justice's grant of defendants' motion for new trial. The defendants also filed a cross-appeal from the trial justice's denial of their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

II Motion for a New Trial

The plaintiff argues that the trial justice abused his discretion because he "summarily substituted" his judgment for that of the jurors by failing to believe plaintiff's testimony. We disagree.

It is well established that the trial justice acts as a "superjuror" in considering a motion for a new trial. English v. Green, 787 A.2d 1146, 1149 (R.I.2001) (quoting Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 254 (R.I.1996)). Therefore, if the trial justice "reviews the evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and exercises his * * * independent judgment, his * * * determination either granting or denying a motion for new trial will not be disturbed unless he * * * has overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong." Id. (quoting Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Association, Inc., 713 A.2d 766, 770 (R.I.1998)).

If the trial justice determines that the evidence is evenly balanced or that reasonable minds could differ on the verdict, he should not disturb the jury's decision. See Perkins v. City of Providence, 782 A.2d 655, 656 (R.I.2001)

(citing Kurczy, 713 A.2d at 770). However, if the trial justice determines that the verdict is against the preponderance of the evidence, and thus fails to do justice between the parties, he should grant the motion. See id.

In the instant case, the trial justice, in deciding the motion for new trial, properly considered the evidence and commented on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial justice specifically stated that he did not believe plaintiff's testimony that she had told defendants that others were using her password. The trial justice then determined that "the jury did not do substantial justice in this case" and that "the evidence preponderates against the verdict." He concluded that "[a]ssessing the evidence independently and exercising my function as a [superjuror], I find that...