Reznick v. Home Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 February 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 62730,62730 |
| Citation | 45 Ill.App.3d 1058,360 N.E.2d 461,4 Ill.Dec. 525 |
| Parties | , 4 Ill.Dec. 525 Joel REZNICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William J. Stevens, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago (Stanley J. Davidson, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Joel Reznick (plaintiff) brought suit on a comprehensive coverage insurance policy issued by Home Insurance Company (defendant) to recover for the loss of his Ford LTD station wagon which he claimed was covered by this policy. Summary judgment was entered the defendant, and on appeal plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) did plaintiff have an insurable interest in the vehicle; and (2) did the comprehensive coverage provision of plaintiff's policy cover loss of an automobile caused by confiscation due to the fact the vehicle had been stolen when the insured was a good faith purchaser.
The relevant facts underlying this cause of action are as follows. In October 1965, plaintiff entered into an insurance agreement with defendant for plaintiff's 1961 Chevrolet. In February 1973, this insurance agreement was amended to include coverage of a 1971 Ford LTD station wagon purchased, as described below, by plaintiff in February of that year. The insurance agreement included comprehensive coverage which, amongst other things, provided that:
Plaintiff purchased the Ford LTD station wagon in response to a newspaper advertisement and paid $2,600 for that car. Plaintiff received a notarized bill of sale for the vehicle and a certificate of title from the Illinois Secretary of State. The title was revoked several months after the vehicle was confiscated, on November 20, 1973, as a stolen vehicle by agents from the Secretary of State's office and the Chicago Police Department.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging he had entered an insurance agreement with defendant for which he had paid consideration and which promised to compensate him for any loss of the Ford, except that caused by collision. He further alleged defendant had been given proper notice of plaintiff's claim. Defendant answered admitting the insurance agreement but denying that plaintiff had an insurable interest in that Ford. Affirmatively defendant pleaded that the Ford was not an 'owned automobile' 1 as defined in plaintiff's policy; and that plaintiff did not have an insurable interest in the Ford.
The parties entered into a stipulation as to the following pertinent facts: (1) the Ford was stolen from Affiliates Steam Equipment Co. on January 10, 1973; (2) plaintiff purchased on February 9, 1973, the Ford from a person holding himself out to be James Miterko and paid $2,600 for that car; (3) plaintiff requested that this insurance policy be amended to include the Ford; (4) on February 17, 1973 the policy was so amended to include that Ford; (5) on November 20, 1973, the Ford was identified as the stolen vehicle and confiscated by agents from the Secretary of State's office and the Chicago Police Department; (6) the title previously issued by the Secretary of State to plaintiff was revoked on April 11, 1974; (7) the policy attached to the pleadings was a true and correct copy of the agreement between the parties; and (8) the fair market value of the Ford at the time it was confiscated was $2,300.
Neither by way of pleadings, stipulations, nor in the briefs do the parties indicate whether the premiums were paid, unpaid, or whether the insurance company had retained the premiums (if) paid by plaintiff or tendered these premiums back to plaintiff after claiming plaintiff had no insurable interest in the vehicle.
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and on July 30, 1975, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion and granted judgment for defendant, specifying the following reasons for its decision:
'The definition of 'owned auto' necessarily includes the meaning inherent in the words 'owned auto;' the Court finds that the insured had an insurable interest against all persons except the true owner and none as against the true owner.'
First we consider whether plaintiff had an insurable interest in the Ford. It is well settled that in order to collect under an insurance agreement, one must have an insurable interest in the insured item. (Couch on Insurance 2d § 24:1.) Insurable interest is not necessarily equated with clear title, and the meaning of the term 'insurable interest' is not without dispute. See Ernie Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co. (Okl.1975), 534 P.2d 1; Treit v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co. (1972), 262 Or. 549, 499 P.2d 335; Skaff v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fla.App.1968), 215 So.2d 35, 33 A.L.R.3d 1417; Lieberman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38.
While some states have statutes defining insurable interest, in Illinois we do not have the guidance of such a statutory definition. In discussing 'insurable interest', Lieberman cites Couch on Insurance 2d § 24:13 which states:
'Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer loss or disadvantage by its destruction.'
In Lieberman, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was in any way injured by the destruction of a building for which he was attempting to recover under a fire insurance policy. In the case at bar, plaintiff has shown through his pleadings and deposition that he has suffered the loss of the advantage of the use of the car as well as the economic loss of $2,600 which he paid as a good faith purchaser of that Ford. While some jurisdictions hold a good faith purchaser of a stolen automobile has no insurable interest in such vehicle (Ernie Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., s...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
National Discount Shoes, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.
...or conflicting provisions, must be construed in favor of granting coverage to the insured. (Reznick v. Home Insurance Co. (1977), 45 Ill.App.3d 1058, 4 Ill.Dec. 525, 360 N.E.2d 461; Leakakos Construction Co., Inc. v. American Surety Co. of New York (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 842, 291 N.E.2d 176, ......
-
Valentino v. Hilquist
... ... " at plaintiff in person, before and after meetings, and over both plaintiff's office and home telephones. Plaintiff testified Hilquist would call him at home, often after midnight, and "scream" ... N.E.I. Corp., 81 Ill. App.3d 1031, 1034, 37 Ill.Dec. 462, 402 N.E.2d 352 (1980) ; Reznick v. Home Insurance Co., 45 Ill.App.3d 1058, 1059, 4 Ill.Dec. 525, 360 N.E.2d 461 (1977) ... The ... ...
-
Cedric Spring & Associates, Inc. v. N.E.I. Corp.
... ... order denying a motion for summary judgment is neither appealable nor reviewable upon appeal (Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & Co. (1962), 38 Ill.App.2d 358, 367, 187 N.E.2d 274; Sears, Roebuck & o. v. Employers Mutual Ins. (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 10, 12, 284 N.E.2d 386; Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. v. Kurek (1975), 27 ... However, in Reznick [81 Ill.App.3d 1034] v. Home Insurance Co. (1977), 45 Ill.App.3d 1058, 4 Ill.Dec. 525, 360 N.E.2d ... ...
-
Goldstein v. Scott
...interest in the property, both when the insurance was obtained and at the time of the loss. (Reznick v. Home Insurance Co. (1977), 45 Ill.App.3d 1058, 4 Ill.Dec. 525, 360 N.E.2d 461; Patterson v. Durand Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1940), 303 Ill.App. 128, 24 N.E.2d 740; 4 Appleman Insurance......
-
CHAPTER 2
...of these cases to be persuasive here. In Illinois, there is no statutory definition for “insurable interest.”Reznick v. Home Ins. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1061 (1977). Most Illinois courts have adhered to the definition providing that a “person has a insurable interest in the property whe......