Rhea v. State

• Citation: 100 Ala. 119,14 So. 853
• Parties: RHEA v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 08 February 1894
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

14 So. 853

100 Ala. 119

RHEA v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, Calhoun county; Leroy F. Box, Judge.

Samuel Rhea was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Reversed.

The testimony for the state tended to show that the defendant and the deceased, Allen Daniel, got into a quarrel at the house of one Lou Morgan, about a woman by the name of Annie Talbot that, on said Annie Talbot refusing to leave the deceased the defendant said he would kill the deceased, and, as he backed away from where the deceased and the woman were sitting, deceased following him, he shot three times, killing deceased. The testimony for the defendant tended to show that the said Allen Daniel was advancing upon the defendant with his hand on his hip pocket, in the act of drawing a pistol when the defendant shot him. The court, among others, gave the following charges: (8) "Unless the jury believe beyond all reasonable doubt, that Rhea killed Daniel with a wickedness or depravity of heart towards the deceased, or mankind in general, there is no murder in this case." (10) "Unless the jury believe from the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that Rhea is guilty, they should return a verdict of not guilty." (11) "Unless the jury believe from the evidence, to a moral certainty, that the defendant, Rhea, was not acting in self-defense, then they should let the defendant go free." (12) "Unless the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the defendant, the jury should find the defendant not guilty." (15) "The court charges the jury that the defendant is presumed to be innocent until he is proven, beyond all reasonable doubt, to be guilty." The defendant requested the court to give the following written charges, and separately excepted to the refusal to give each of them as asked: (17) "The court charges the jury that they should consider the testimony of the defendant the same as they do the testimony of any other witness; and because he is the defendant is no reason, of itself, why they should discredit him." (18) "In considering whether Rhea or Daniel was the aggressor in bringing on the difficulty in which Daniel was killed, the jury should consider whether or not Daniel's character was that of a quarrelsome and fighting man; for the law says that Rhea was justified in taking more prompt and decisive measures of defense if Daniel was the assailant, and was a man of known violent and fighting nature." (20) "The court charges the jury that in weighing the evidence of Lou Morgan and Hattie Ables, and in determining what credit the jury will give their testimony, the jury may consider their character for chastity and virtue."

J. H. Caldwell, W. J. Brock, A. P. Agee, and D. D. McLeod, for appellant.

Wm. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

STONE C.J.

Charges 8, 10, 11, 12, and 15, given by the court in this case, each properly stated the law as to reasonable doubt; and each declared, in substance, that defendant was entitled to acquittal unless the testimony convinced the jury, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was guilty. These charges are so varied in phraseology and presentation as to meet every phase and tendency of the testimony, and every hypothesis it justified counsel in assuming. They seem to have covered the entire field. Yet the court, at the instance of the prosecution, charged the jury "that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant formed the design to kill Allen Daniel unlawfully, and that in pursuance of such formed design did kill Allen Daniel, in this county, and before the finding of this indictment, then the defendant is guilty of murder." This was excepted to. It will be observed that this charge, considered by itself, is faulty in not stating the proper measure of conviction the testimony must produce on the minds of the jury, to justify a verdict of guilty. Believing from the testimony that the facts exist is not enough. The belief must be so strong as to leave no reasonable doubt of its truth. Such is the rule in criminal cases. Pierson v. State (Ala.) 13 So. 550; Heath v. State, Id. 689. The law is tenderly regardful of human life and of human liberty. Hence, the rule which requires a higher measure of proof in criminal prosecutions than in civil suits. Charges, if given separately, and separately excepted to, must, as a...