Rheb v. Bar Ass'n Of Baltimore City., No. 98.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Writing for the Court: HENDERSON, Judge.
• Citation: 46 A.2d 289
• Parties: RHEB v. BAR ASS'N OF BALTIMORE CITY.
• Docket Number: No. 98.
• Decision Date: 15 March 1946

46 A.2d 289

RHEB
v.
BAR ASS'N OF BALTIMORE CITY.

No. 98.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 15, 1946.

Appeal from Supreme Bench of Baltimore City; W. Conwell Smith, Chief Judge, and J. Abner Sayler, Emory H. Niles, John T. Tucker, Joseph Sherbow, and E. Paul Mason, Judges.

Proceeding by the Bar Association of Baltimore City against Charles Fulton Rheb. From an order of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City disbarring respondent, he appeals.

Order affirmed.

Hilary W. Gans, of Baltimore (Leo M. Alpert, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Nathan Patz and Clater W. Smith, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

46 A.2d 289

Before DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and HENDERSON, JJ.

46 A.2d 290

HENDERSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, passed July 10, 1945, disbarring the appellant, Charles Fulton Rheb, from the further practice of law. The appeal comes to this court under Section 17, Art. 10 of the Code, providing: ‘the Court of Appeals shall have the right to review the entire proceedings and affirm, modify, alter or reverse the order from which said appeal is taken as the substantial merits of the cause and the ends of justice may require.’

On May 4, 1944, the appellant plead guilty, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, to an indictment charging him with wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully failing to make income tax returns to the Federal Government for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942, and failing to keep records for the same periods, in violation of section 145(a), title 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code. He was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. On March 15, 1945, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City cited Rheb to show cause why he should not be disbarred for ‘the misconduct as shown in the records of the case of United States v. Charles Fulton Rheb.’ The appellant filed an answer admitting the conviction and sentence but contending that the Federal crime did not involve moral turpitude, was not based on any acts or omissions in his capacity as an attorney at law, did not involve such conduct as required or warranted disbarment under sections 12 to 21, inclusive, of Art. 10 of the Maryland Code, and that the citation was not in compliance with the Code.

Thereafter, on April 23, 1945, the Bar Association of Baltimore City, by the order and leave of the Supreme Bench, filed a petition for the disbarment of Appellant, alleging misconduct, in the evasion of income tax payments ‘wilfully and deliberately done for the purpose of deceiving the Government of the United States of America and for the purpose of defrauding it of his known income tax liability.’ An answer was duly filed to this petition. On June 2, 1945, the Bar Association filed a petition asking leave to amend its original petition, because of information received subsequent to its filing, setting up in detail misconduct of the appellant in connection with other transactions, notably, his organization of a Maryland corporation known as ‘Lloyds Acceptance & Discount Corporation,’ fraudulent sale of stock therein, and the fraudulent obtention of property and moneys from a Mrs. Beatrice A. Doing. Leave was granted by order of court, the appellant filed an answer to these additional charges, and the matter came to trial, resulting in the disbarment order from which this appeal is taken.

Section 16 of Art. 10 of the Code (as enacted by ch. 370 of the Acts of 1929) sets forth the statutory grounds of disbarment as follows: ‘professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.’ The appellant contends that (1) the power of the Supreme Bench to disbar attorneys is limited to these grounds, (2) the facts and circumstances upon which the appellant was convicted in the Federal Court do not establish his guilt of a crime involving moral turpitude, and (3) the facts and circumstances as to the Lloyds corporation and the separation of Mrs. Doing and her money, do not sufficiently connect the appellant with deceit or misrepresentation, and thereby establish grounds for his disbarment.

We need not consider the question whether, in the abstract, the power to disbar or discipline attorneys is inherent in the courts. The case comes here on appeal based only upon the statute. This Court pointed out in Re Williams, 1941, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7, that there was no right of appeal in disbarment cases prior to the Act of 1929. Since the adoption of the Constitutional amendment, Art. IV, Section 18A, effective January 1, 1945, conferring or confirming the power of this Court ‘to regulate and revise the practice and procedure in that Court and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law,’ it may be that matters relating to disbarment or discipline could be covered by rules. But it should be noted that regulation ‘otherwise by law’ is not excluded, and it appears that since the comprehensive and remedial Act of 1929, neither this Court nor the Supreme

46 A.2d 291

Bench of Baltimore City has adopted any rules upon the subject. Moreover, the action of the Supreme Bench was not predicated upon the assertion of powers independent of the statute above quoted, the for the purposes of this case we shall assume that the Court's action is sustainable only upon one or more of the broad grounds therein set forth. ‘The statute has done but little, if anything, more than enact the general rules upon which the courts of common law have always acted.’ Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 565.

The appellant contends that the crime for which he was convicted in the Federal Court involved private, per

sonal misconduct, and not misconduct as an attorney. It is true that the courts generally recognize that indulgence in what might be termed the minor vices, of a purely personal character, does not amount to professional misconduct. See note 36 Yale L.J. 875. We have no quarrel with this principle, but it can hardly be applied in the case at bar. The appellant testified that he had been practicing law since 1932, but that he had never filed an income tax return...