Rheem Metalurgica S/a v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 22 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | Slip Op. 97-119.,Court No. 92-06-00380. |
| Citation | 978 F.Supp. 333 |
| Parties | RHEEM METALURGICA S/A, formerly Rheem Empreendimentos Industriais E Comerciais S.A., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
David P. Schulingkamp, New Orleans, LA, for plaintiff.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Joseph I. Liebman, Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (James A. Curley); Edward N. Maurer, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Customs Service, of Counsel, for defendant.
Defendant moves this Court pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 59(e) and 60(a) and (b) to amend the Judgment Order issued in Rheem Metalurgica S/A, formerly Rheem Empreendimentos Industriais E Comerciais S.A. v. United States, 951 F.Supp. 241 (CIT 1996) ("Rheem") to include interest, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (1988), from a date beginning fifteen days after each of the nine entries at issue was deemed liquidated by operation of law until the date plaintiff is notified of the amount of duties, if any, that are due. Alternatively, defendant moves this Court to exercise its equitable powers to amend the Judgment Order to include prejudgment interest from October 29, 1993, the date the defendant filed its counterclaim in this matter.
Plaintiff opposes defendant's motion, and moves this Court to withdraw the Judgment Order entered in Rheem. In the alternative, plaintiff argues 19 U.S.C. § 1677g (1988) is the statutory provision this Court should examine in determining whether the defendant is entitled to receive interest in connection with this Court's Judgment Order.
Initially, the Court notes it has jurisdiction to decide the government's motion, which was filed on January 17, 1997, despite the fact plaintiff has filed an appeal on this matter with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Rheem Metalurgica S/A, formerly Rheem Empreendimentos Industriais E Comerciais S.A. v. United States, 951 F.Supp. 241 (CIT 1996), appeal docketed, No. 97-1256 (Fed.Cir. Mar. 6, 1997). Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) provides
(4) If any party files a timely motion of a type specified immediately below, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. This provision applies to a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
....
(C) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59.
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). In construing Fed. R.App.P. 4(a), the United States Supreme Court noted the filing of a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 "render[s] the underlying judgment nonfinal both when filed before an appeal is taken (thus tolling the time for taking an appeal), and when filed after the notice of appeal (thus divesting the appellate court of jurisdiction)." Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 402-03, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1548, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). See also Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 177-79, 109 S.Ct. 987, 990-92, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (); cf. Acosta v. Louisiana Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2876, 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 192 (1986) (). Based on this authority, the Court determines it has jurisdiction to decide defendant's motion made pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 59(e) to amend this Court's Judgment Order to include interest.
In evaluating the alternative statutory provisions advanced by the parties, the Court concludes it would be inappropriate to amend the Judgment Order to include interest because neither the provision advanced by the government nor the provision advanced by plaintiff addresses the precise circumstances of the situation at issue in this matter. The statutory provision advanced by the defendant provides
(c) Duties due upon liquidation or reliquidation; delinquency; interest
Duties determined to be due upon liquidation or reliquidation shall be due 15 days after the date of that liquidation or reliquidation, and unless payment of the duties is received by the appropriate customs officer within 30 days after that date, shall be considered delinquent and bear interest from the 15th day after the date of liquidation or reliquidation at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.
19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (1988).
In analyzing whether 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) is applicable in this matter, the Court makes several observations. The plain language of 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) entitles the government to interest if the goods at issue are liquidated or reliquidated and the assessed duties are not paid within thirty days of liquidation or reliquidation. That situation has not occurred with respect to either Customs' liquidations of the nine entries at issue in 1989 or the liquidation of the nine entries by operation of law on the fourth anniversary of their entry into the United States.
First, as the Court noted in Rheem, the Customs Service liquidated the nine entries at issue in 1989. See Rheem, 951 F.Supp. at 244. Indeed, the parties do not dispute the entries in issue were liquidated by the Customs Service in 1989. Following the denial of its protest, plaintiff paid the duties assessed by the Customs Service and any interest due. This payment was required before the Court could exercise its jurisdiction in this matter over plaintiff's challenge of Customs' denial of its protest. See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (1988) (). The parties do not dispute the plaintiff has paid those duties assessed and any interest due in connection with Customs' liquidation of the entries at issue in 1989. See Compl. ¶ 4 (); Answer ¶ 4 ("Admits."). Because plaintiff has paid the duties assessed and any interest that was due following Customs' 1989 liquidation of the entries at issue, the Court determines the defendant is not entitled to interest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) in connection with Customs' liquidation of the entries in 1989.
Additionally, 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) is implicated by this Court's holding that the nine entries became liquidated by operation of law on the fourth anniversary of their entry into the United States. See Rheem, 951 F.Supp. at 251 (). In order to effectuate the determination the nine entries at issue became liquidated by operation of law, this Court ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at a rate equal to the duties declared by the importer on the entry documents submitted to the Customs Service when the goods entered into the United States. See id. at 252. Through reliquidation of the entries, the duties which were due when the nine entries at issue became liquidated by operation of law will be collected and Customs' 1989 liquidation will be superceded and nullified.
While 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) entitles the government to interest when merchandise is reliquidated and the assessed duties are not paid within thirty days of reliquidation, that situation is not present in this matter because the reliquidation has yet to occur. While the government may be entitled to receive interest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) at some future date following Customs' reliquidation of the nine entries at issue, in order for that to occur, the nine entries at issue must be reliquidated and thirty days must pass without the plaintiff paying the duties assessed at reliquidation. Because those facts have not occurred in this matter, defendant is not entitled to receive interest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c).
In the alternative, the government requests this Court exercise its equitable powers and award the government prejudgment interest from October 29, 1993, the date the government filed its counterclaim in this matter. (See Def.'s Mot. to Amend J. Order at 3 .) The Court declines to exercise its equitable powers in this matter because neither party was aware the entries became liquidated by operation of law prior to Customs' attempted liquidation in 1989. Because plaintiff paid the assessed duties following Customs' then apparently proper liquidation of the entries in 1989, the Court does not believe it would be equitable to assess prejudgment interest against plaintiff.
In response to the government's motion for interest penalties, plaintiff contends the Court should withdraw its Judgment Order. The Court does not find the arguments made in plaintiff's motion papers persuasive. The Court remains convinced that the plaintiff had notice of the preliminary and final determinations in Commerce's countervailing...
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