Rhem v. Malcolm

Citation371 F. Supp. 594
Decision Date07 January 1974
Docket NumberNo. 70 Civ. 3962.,70 Civ. 3962.
PartiesJames RHEM et al., Plaintiffs, v. Benjamin J. MALCOLM, Commissioner of Correction for the City of New York, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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The Legal Aid Society, New York City, for plaintiffs; William E. Hellerstein, Joel Berger, Barbara A. Shapiro, Steven Herman, New York City, of counsel.

Norman Redlich, Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendants Benjamin J. Malcolm, Peter Schaefer and Abraham D. Beame; John Nachazel, New York City, of counsel.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, New York City, for defendants Peter Preiser, Malcolm Wilson and Owen McGivern; David Berman, New York City, of counsel.

LASKER, District Judge.

Sixty-two years ago, Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary of Great Britain, observed with characteristic eloquence that "the mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country". This suit raises most serious issues relating to one element of the criminal process — the constitutionality of the conditions under which persons are held in pre-trial custody by the City of New York.

Plaintiffs are unconvicted detainees housed in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men (MHD), popularly but forbiddingly known as the "Tombs". They bring this civil rights action claiming that numerous practices and physical conditions at MHD deprive them of rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 on behalf of all persons confined at MHD originally complained of overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, lack of light and air, excessive noise, mistreatment by guards, arbitrary disciplinary procedures, inadequate medical care, lack of recreation, and restrictions on visiting and mail.

On October 26, 1970, the case was declared a class action. On March 17, 1971, Judge Mansfield denied the City's motion to dismiss, and granted a preliminary injunction against the City ordering the Department of Correction to adopt, publish and distribute to all inmates rules governing inmate behavior and other aspects of inmate life and prohibiting the Department from interfering with private consultations between inmates and their attorneys in cases in which the Commissioner or his staff were parties.

On December 16, 1971, a motion by defendants Rockefeller, Oswald and Stevens (the State defendants) to dismiss as to them was denied.

In the latter months of 1972 and January, 1973, constructive negotiations took place between the parties, as the result of which the plaintiffs and the City entered into a stipulation of settlement as to the issues relating to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate medical care. A consent decree enforcing the stipulation was entered August 2, 1973. The remaining issues were tried to the court during several trial weeks.

Plaintiffs' witnesses included four plaintiff detainees; John Anderson, Warden of Northumberland County Prison in Sunbury, Pennsylvania; Donald Goff, General Secretary of the Correctional Association of New York; William vanden Heuvel, then Chairman of the New York City Board of Correction; Dr. Karl Menninger, Chairman of the Board of the Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas; Dr. Augustus F. Kinzel, formerly staff psychiatrist at the United States Medical Center for Federal prisoners at Springfield, Missouri; Dr. Stephen Teich, Director of Mental Health at MHD, and Richard Botshon, photographer.1

Defense witnesses included: Hon. Benjamin J. Malcolm, Commissioner, New York City Department of Correction; Joseph D'Elia, Director of Operations of the City Department of Corrections; Peter M. Schaefer, then Deputy Warden-In-Command of MHD; Professor Hyman H. A. Cooper, Deputy Director of the Criminal Law Education & Research Center of the New York University School of Law and (by deposition) Louis S. Aytch, Superintendent of Prisons for the City of Philadelphia.2

The court toured MHD on August 2, 1973 and February 26, 1973 in the company of counsel, some members of the plaintiff class, and officials of MHD. The court also visited the Federal Detention Center in New York City on February 8, 1973, in the company of counsel. On that occasion Warden Louis Gengler of the Federal Detention Center testified as a witness called by the court.

I.

MHD is a twelve floor structure forming part of a complex that includes the Criminal Courts of the City of New York and the offices of the District Attorney of New York County. The complex is located on Centre Street in the heart of Manhattan's Civic Center, heavily populated in the daytime and deserted at night. It consumes all of the city block on which it is built, leaving no open space or outdoor area.

The official capacity of MHD (effective August, 1971) is 902. As of October 6, 1972, its population was 1301. (Stipulation of Facts # 8 and 9.) Pursuant to the consent decree, the Department is now housing only one detainee to a cell (of which there are 808). There are approximately 100 convicted misdemeants housed on a dormitory floor, for a total authorized population of something over 900.

Although all the plaintiff class and 80% of persons housed at MHD are unconvicted detainees, (the remainder being sentenced misdemeanants who have jobs at MHD) the building is a maximum security institution in every sense. One may surmise that its fortress-like character is the result partly of the penological philosophy in vogue at the time of its construction and partly of concern that its location was believed to provide an easy opportunity for an escapee to melt into the city population during the daytime, or evaporate into the dark of city streets at night. In fact, only one escape has occurred since the institution opened for business some forty years ago. There is no evidence whether this is the result of its maximum security features, or whether it proves that they are not necessary.

The character of the structure is of more than passing narrative interest, since many of the conditions which form the issues of this case flow from that character; and the claimed need for a maximum security institution as well as the given fact of the building's character form the basis of defendants' justification of those conditions.

Prisoners are housed in two-storied units of rectangular tiers of cells, each tier surrounding an unwindowed central "lock-out" area. The lock-out area derives its name from the fact that when inmates are allowed to leave their cells, they are prevented, or "locked out" from returning to the cells. Each cell is, of course, only one floor high. But the lockout area rises the full two stories from the bottom of the lower to the ceiling of the higher cells. A catwalk-gallery, used by prison guards, runs along the inside of the lock-out area, at the floor level of the upper deck of cells, allowing guards to see both the upper and lower decks. Each housing floor contains two such units (four cell tiers in all) divided by a hallway which gives access to the units on east and west, and to the elevators on the south. Except for the exterior walls of the building, constructed exclusively of masonry, some spaces of translucent (but not transparent) glass block and occasional high-set transparent windows, partitions on the housing floors consist solely of steel doors or gates. That is, each cell is secured by a steel barred door as is every access to the lock-out area.

Some critical issues presented flow from the maximum security nature of the institution. These include allegations of excessive "lock-in" (in cells), undue restrictions on the length, conditions and number of visits, grossly inadequate opportunity for exercise and recreation and limitations on correspondence and access to reading matter. Others, such as intolerable noise, inadequate ventilation, severe heat in summer and cold in winter and an absence of transparent windows are largely functions of the building's architectural structure (although to some extent they are the result of its maximum security features). Still others are unrelated either to considerations of security or the nature of the building, such as mistreatment by officers — said to be caused by overworking the guards: a fiscal question—and a disciplinary procedure which is claimed to violate due process and which is the child of administrative policy only.

To understand the significance of the facts, and the necessity of reviewing them quite fully, it is worthwhile sketching the major legal arguments at this point, although they are treated in detail later in this opinion. Plaintiffs argue that their incarceration at MHD (1) violates due process because, as unconvicted detainees, they are entitled to but are not being held under the least restrictive conditions necessary to assure the sole justification of their imprisonment: appearance at trial; (2) violates the equal protection clause because, although they are unconvicted detainees, they are held in undeniably harsher conditions than convicted prisoners and (3) violates the Eighth Amendment, because those conditions singly or collectively constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants' answer, as we have earlier indicated, is that it is necessary that plaintiffs be held in maximum security, and that that necessity and the given character of MHD constitutionally justify existing conditions.

We treat separately the facts raised by each issue.

(1) Excessive Lock-In.

Most cells are 4' 10" wide by 7' 11" deep (Stipulation of Facts # 2), or about 5500 square inches. The American Correctional Association Manual of Correctional Standards (1971) (ACA Manual) specifies minimum cell size of 50 square feet (7200 square inches).3 Inmates are locked in the cells 16 hours a day. This, of course, does not include the time locked in...

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