Rhinehardt v. State, 284S46

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 284S46,284S46
• Citation: 477 N.E.2d 89
• Parties: Warren S. RHINEHARDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 89

477 N.E.2d 89

Warren S. RHINEHARDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 284S46.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 30, 1985.

Walter E. Bravard, Jr., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

The appellant's brief, the State's brief and the cover page on the transcript of record in this cause state that The Honorable John W. Tranberg, the regular judge of Criminal Division I, was the judge in this case. However, an examination of the record clearly shows that The Honorable Ann M. DeLaney was acting as judge pro tempore on the day this case was tried.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of Attempted Murder, a Class A felony, and Robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced by the court to serve concurrent terms of forty (40) years and twenty (20) years respectively.

The record indicates that at approximately 9:20 P.M. on December 9, 1982, Marlene Nolan was walking toward the American Fletcher National Bank branch located in the Washington Square mall in Indianapolis. Nolan, the manager of a shoe store in the mall, had driven across the parking lot to the bank in order to make a night deposit.

As she crossed the traffic lane and approached the bank, appellant stepped off the sidewalk and walked toward her. Appellant bumped into Nolan and grabbed her arm. Declaring that he had a gun, appellant forced Nolan to relinquish her bank deposit bag after a brief struggle.

While appellant was accosting Nolan, she began to scream. Two men in the vicinity heard the screams and responded. One of the men, Timothy Pedro, proceeded toward appellant. Appellant waved a handgun in the air, causing Pedro and Nolan to take evasive action.

Appellant then began running, followed by Pedro. When appellant saw his pursuer, he stopped, extended his arms in the direction of Pedro and discharged his weapon. Turning to resume fleeing, appellant saw an approaching mall security vehicle and surrendered. The security officers who apprehended him found the bank bag and a loaded handgun near appellant's feet.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of judge, without a hearing, and in denying him an opportunity to file a motion in compliance with Ind.R.C.P. 12. He alleges that he did not know that the presiding judge would not be present until the day of trial. Upon discovering this fact, he made an oral objection, which was overruled.

The State correctly points out that appellant did not move for a change of judge, but rather objected to the duly appointed judge pro tempore on the grounds that he would be prejudiced "by ... a new judge coming in at this time" and by not having had the opportunity to participate in the selection of the new judge. While this objection could possibly be construed to be a motion for change of judge, we nevertheless find no merit in appellant's contention.

Appellant's objection did not state any grounds for a change of judge, other than his desire to have the presiding judge hear his case. It is clearly proper to overrule such an objection. Dixon v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 1318; Bryant v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 587, 271 N.E.2d 127. On appeal appellant has not shown that he could not have subsequently filed a proper Ind.R.C.P. 12 motion for change of judge, nor has he indicated any grounds upon which such a motion could have been based.

Appellant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance, also made at the outset of his trial. In support of the motion appellant's trial counsel argued that he had represented appellant for only two weeks and needed more time to prepare a defense.

Because appellant's motion for continuance did not conform to the requirements set out in Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-7-1, the court's ruling was made within its sound discretion. Its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Carter v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 639; Drollinger v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228.

We have previously stated that continuances to allow more time for preparation are not favored and should be granted only with a showing of good cause and in the furtherance of justice. Downer v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 953; Keys v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 52, 390 N.E.2d 148. Here, appellant only made the speculative contention that additional witnesses and evidence could be found if further investigation were permitted. Although appellant did specifically allege in his motion to correct errors what the objects of the investigation would have been, he has failed to demonstrate that the absence of such evidence establishes the specific harm requisite to a showing of an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Dillon v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 21. Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of appellant's motion for continuance.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State's Exhibit No. 3, a photograph taken shortly after he was apprehended, which depicted him handcuffed to a chair in the mall security office. He argues that because he had already been identified in court the photographic evidence lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial.

The admission of photographs into evidence is made within the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal will be granted only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. McNary v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 145; Bridges v. State (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 207. While competent evidence may be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by its tendency to prejudice, this balancing is to be done in the discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 897.

Despite the prior in-court testimony, the photograph was relevant to the issue of identification. Since the jury had been informed of the circumstances in which the photograph was taken, it could not have been inferred that the photograph revealed prior criminal activity, which might have made the photograph unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., Blue v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 249, 235 N.E.2d 471 ("mug shots" generally inadmissible). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph into evidence.

Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove he committed the offense of attempted murder. He argues the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the elements of the offense.

In addressing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Lenn v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 56; Harris v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112.

The crime of attempt has two elements: 1) acting with the specific intent to commit the substantive crime, and 2) taking a substantial step toward its commission. Armstrong v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 647; Zickefoose v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 618, 388 N.E.2d 507; see Ind. Code Sec. 35-41-5-1(a). Appellant contends he lacked the specific intent to kill, based on evidence he presented that he is adept in the handling of firearms and his testimony that he aimed the gun at an angle so that the discharged bullet would not strike anyone. His intent, therefore, was to frighten his pursuer rather than to kill him.

At trial Pedro, appellant's pursuer, testified that he thought appellant fired the gun at him. Nolan testified that she perceived that the gun was fired at Pedro. One of the arresting officers testified that the handgun used by appellant was not a particularly accurate weapon, and that it was loaded with hollow point cartridges, which the officer stated are extremely dangerous and designed to cripple or kill.

Such evidence was sufficient to prove the element of intent. "The intent to commit murder, as an element of the crime of attempted murder, may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death." Spivey v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 61, 63....