Rhoades v. Kinsman
| Decision Date | 19 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-558-HEH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | WILLIAM RHOADES, Plaintiff, v. COL. PATRICK KINSMAN, USACE, Defendant. |
(Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion"), filed on October 12, 2018 (ECF No. 6). The dispute in this case centers on a levee that was originally constructed in 1969, without a permit, where Curies Creek meets the James River in Henrico County, Virginia. The levee was granted a permit, after the fact, in 1983 by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps"). Later, in 2014, the Corps approved another permit that authorized an extension to the levee.
In his Complaint, William Rhoades (pro se "Plaintiff") contends that the 1983 and 2014 permits are invalid. In addition, he contends the levee obstructs navigable access between Curies Creek and the James River, allegedly restricting his liberty interest and public right of access to Curies Creek. By way of remedy, Plaintiff asks this Court to enter numerous declaratory judgments. However, it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and, in addition, because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Consequently, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
Curies Creek runs adjacent to Curies Neck Farm, near Route 5 in Henrico County, Virginia, where it converges with the James River. (Compl. Ex. A. 4, ECF No. 1-2.) A levee was built across Curies Creek in 1969.1 (Compl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 1.) In May 1981, the Corps notified Richard Watkins, the previous owner of Curies Neck Farm, that the levee was constructed without a permit, and it was therefore "in violation of Section 10 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899." (Compl. Ex. G., ECF No. 1-8.)
In June 1981, Watkins applied for an after-the-fact permit for the levee. (Compl. ¶ 39.) In February 1983, Watkins received a letter ("February 1983 Letter") from the Corps indicating that his request would be approved, and Watkins was instructed to sign an enclosed after-the-fact permit that accompanied the letter. (Compl. Ex. A.) A "Record Permit," aptly labeled because it is maintained in the Corps's records, indicates that the after-the-fact permit took effect on April 1, 1983 and was signed by another official on the District Engineer's behalf. (Compl. Ex. B., ECF No. 1-3.)
Years later, in 2012, Thomas Pruitt, the current owner of Curies Neck Farm, submitted a permit application to the Corps seeking approval for a one-half mile extension to the levee. (Compl. 2, ¶ 18.) On September 10, 2014, the Corps granted thepermit for the extension—the construction of which is now complete. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 44.)
On August 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action against Colonel Patrick Kinsman, ("Defendant") in his official capacity as Commander of the Norfolk District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.2 (Compl. 2.) Plaintiff alleges the "[Corps] wrongfully authorized the levee's extension by relying on two foundational documents," the February 1983 Letter and the Record Permit that the Corps maintains in its records. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff contends that neither document conforms with the Corps's regulations because the Corps has not produced a permit with original signatures. (Id. ¶ 33.) In addition, Plaintiff claims that these authorizations "failed to ensure an easement for public access" that he seeks to have recognized. (Id. ¶ 42.)
In his present action, Plaintiff presents three claims alleging that Defendant violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Plaintiff's Procedural Due Process Rights, and Plaintiff's Substantive Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 (Id. ¶¶ 51-71). As a remedy, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter declaratory judgments that (1) recognize a public right of access to Curies Creek; (2) find there is insufficient evidence of a valid Corps permit for the levee across Curies Creek; (3) findthe levee is not lawfully authorized and deprives Plaintiff of his rights of access to the Creek; (4) find that, even if the levee becomes authorized, Plaintiff cannot be deprived of his right of access absent a legitimate government interest; and (5) that no such government interest exists. (Id. at 15.)
A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal sufficiency. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 951 (4th Cir. 1992). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id., to a level that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570. In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes well-pleaded allegations to be true and views a complaint's facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. T.G. Slater & Son v. Donald P. & Patricia Brennan, LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). However, legal conclusions are not entitled to the same deference. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On 12(b)(6) review, the Court "generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred," however, the Court may consider an affirmative defense when there are sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to make a ruling. Goodman v. PraxAir, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.2007). "This principle only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.'" Id. ().
A litigant may also challenge the court's subject-matter jurisdiction via a Rule 12(b)(1) motion at any point in a case because jurisdiction invokes the court's power to resolve a legal dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (). Similarly, "[i]f the plaintiff does not have [Article III] standing, this Court . . . can go no further in evaluating this case, and it must be dismissed." Ryals v. Strategic Screening Sols., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514); see also White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2005) ().
A court must review pro se complaints with a liberal construction. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006). However, this requirement cannot excuse a clear failure in the pleadings to allege a federally cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Beaudett v. City of Hampton, "[t]hough [pro se] litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them." 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
Defendant challenges Plaintiff's Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant contends that Plaintiff's challenges to the 1983 and 2014 permits are barred by the applicable statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 4, 11-12.) The Court will address this issue first because, if certain claims are barred by the statute of limitations, then the Court need not address their merits.
The United States' waiver of sovereign immunity in civil actions is conditioned upon the imposition of a six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); In re Carrington Gardens Assocs., 258 B.R. 622, 630 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff'd sub nom, Carrington Gardens Assocs. v. United States, 49 F. App'x 427 (4th Cir. 2002). "Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations, § 2401(a) is a jurisdictional condition . . . and as such must be strictly construed." Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) ().
For cases involving administrative agencies, the time in which a plaintiff may file a complaint begins as soon as the agency has completed its decision making process, and the result of that decision directly affects the parties. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992); Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 56 () Pertinent to this case, § 2401(a) has previously been applied to bar a plaintiff from challenging a permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See P & VEnterprises v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 516 F.3d 1021, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ().
In the current matter, the Complaint states:
This action challenges the validity of the September 10, 2014 [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] permit for the levee extension, and is brought within the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges that on that date [the Corps] wrongfully relied on a permit for the levee that was proffered in 1983, but was never accepted and signed by the intended permittee.
(Compl. ¶ 5) Stated differently, ...
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