Rhoades v. Penfold

• Decision Date: 06 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1209,82-1209
• Parties: Margaret RHOADES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross-Appellants, v. The Honorable Craig PENFOLD, individually and in his official capacity as Judge, 304th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1043

694 F.2d 1043

Margaret RHOADES, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross-Appellants, v. The Honorable Craig PENFOLD, individually and in his

official capacity as Judge, 304th Judicial

District Court, Dallas County, Texas, et

al., Defendants-Appellants

Cross-Appellees.

No. 82-1209.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 6, 1983.

Charles J. Baldree, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee, Penfold.

Margaret S. McGloin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees Johnston and McKenzie.

John H. Wright, Jr., Brenda J. Garrett, Lawrence L. Mealer, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before RUBIN and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and VERON^*, District Judge.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

Margaret Rhoades initiated this Sec. 1983 class action in federal district court seeking relief from a Texas district court's judgment that permanently terminated her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Summer Snow. Rhoades requested injunctive and declaratory relief maintaining that the state termination proceeding deprived her, and other indigent parents similarly situated, of due process of law and equal protection in that she was not provided court-appointed counsel. ¹ The federal district court, in response to Rhoades' motion for summary judgment, certified the class, vacated the state court's judgment, and enjoined the state from attempting to enforce its judgment. While cognizant of the need for finality in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, this Court reverses the district court's judgment and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Jeffrey and Margaret Rhoades have two daughters, Sunshine and Summer Snow. During the relevant time period involved in the termination proceeding, both children occasionally lived with Margaret Rhoades' mother, Margaret Zimmerman, and Margaret Zimmerman's friend, Ann West. In May 1979, Sunshine was the subject of parental termination proceedings initiated in Austin, Texas. In that case, the parents were represented by counsel and they succeeded in maintaining custody of Sunshine.

On June 15, 1979, after a series of incidents raising concern as to Summer Snow's welfare, ² officers of the Richardson, Texas, Police Department took Summer Snow and placed her in the custody of the Dallas County Child Welfare Unit (DCCWU) of the Texas Department of Human Resources. On June 19, 1979, a petition for emergency care was filed in the state district court pursuant to Sec. 17.01 of the Texas Family Code, and, on the same day, an ex parte order was issued placing Summer Snow in the temporary custody of DCCWU. Thereafter, on June 29, 1979, a hearing was held and Cynthia McKenzie, Program Director of DCCWU, was appointed temporary managing conservator of Summer Snow. Although Margaret Rhoades appeared in person, she was not represented by counsel.

In July 1979, Margaret Rhoades applied for legal representation with the Dallas Legal Aid Society (DLAS). A DLAS lawyer filed an answer in the termination proceeding for Rhoades, and, thereafter, several DLAS attorneys represented Rhoades over the next 10 month period. However, the last attorney assigned to represent Rhoades The jury trial on the termination proceeding lasted approximately three and one-half days. Although the state district judge told Mr. and Mrs. Rhoades that they had a right to be represented by counsel, the record indicates that he did not inform them that an attorney would be appointed if they could not afford one. ³ The State of Texas called nine witnesses to testify, including: three welfare caseworkers, a deputy constable, two Richardson police officers, two private individuals, and a clinical psychologist. Mr. and Mrs. Rhoades called no witnesses but both took the stand and testified. In response to special issues, the district judge rendered a judgment permanently terminating the parental rights of Mr. and Mrs. Rhoades. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Rhoades again applied for representation by the Dallas Legal Services Foundation (DLSF) and a DLSF attorney filed a motion for new trial and an affidavit of inability to pay costs of appeal. The motion for new trial was overruled and the state court of appeals issued a certificate of refusal to file the record on appeal because the affidavit of inability to pay costs was not timely filed.

never consulted with her, did not return her telephone calls, and failed to appear at an office appointment requested by Mrs. Rhoades. Consequently, Mrs. Rhoades requested that DLAS withdraw from her case and DLAS filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted by the state district judge. Rhoades was unsuccessful in her attempts to employ other counsel prior to trial.

On October 17, 1980, Rhoades filed suit in federal district court against the district judge in the state termination proceeding, Judge Craig Penfold, the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Corrections, Marlin Johnston, and Cynthia McKenzie, Program Director, DCCWU, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and habeas corpus relief. Thereafter, an amended complaint was filed in which Rhoades was named as plaintiff and class representative for other indigent parents similarly situated. In response to a motion for summary judgment, the district court rendered judgment vacating the judgment of the state district court and ordered that, prior to a retrial of Rhoades' case, a hearing be held to determine indigency and the concomitant right to counsel. Furthermore, having certified the class, the district court's judgment concluded that indigent parents whose children "were, are, or will be" the subject of termination proceedings should be granted a hearing "to determine indigency and the need for appointed counsel ...." An appeal has been perfected to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

II.

Defendants-appellants maintain that the federal district court erred in refusing to dismiss the instant proceeding. Initially, appellants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. Additionally, appellants argue that even if the district court had jurisdiction, it erred in refusing to abstain, and, finally, appellants claim that the doctrine of res judicata bars the present litigation. This Court holds that the district court did have jurisdiction, did not err in refusing to abstain, and did not err in refusing to apply the doctrine of res judicata.

Appellants cite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 In the instant case, Rhoades sought a declaration that the state court's judgment was null and void. Consequently, this court construes the complaint to pray for an injunction, which invoked the federal district court's jurisdiction. Moreover, once the Rooker hurdle is cleared, it is apparent that this case falls squarely within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts as set forth in 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1343(3), (4).

                L.Ed. 362 (1923), for the proposition that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction to hear this Sec. 1983 case.  In Rooker, the Supreme Court held, without a full discussion, that in certain cases a federal district court has no jurisdiction to vacate or nullify a state court judgment.  However, subsequent decisions by this Court have given direction to the rule set forth in Rooker.    In Gresham Park Community Organization v. Howell, this Court held that "[w]here a party asks a federal court to declare a state court judgment null and void, we should consider this as praying for an injunction enjoining its enforcement."   Gresham Park Comm. Organ. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1236, (5th Cir.1981).  The Court went on to hold that if the action is classified as praying for an injunction, the district court does have jurisdiction.  That is to say, the court found a distinction between seeking appellate review of a state court's judgment in federal district court and seeking an injunction enjoining enforcement of a state court judgment.  In the former situation, no jurisdiction exists since the district court has no appellate jurisdiction over state judgments, whereas in the later situation, jurisdiction does exist since the district court is not required to exercise an appellate function.  Id. at 1235-36
                

Rhoades' initial Sec. 1983 complaint requests that the district court declare the state court's judgment null and void and enjoin the state from seeking to enforce its judgment. Rhoades alleged that the proceeding itself constituted a deprivation of her constitutional rights since she was not provided counsel. Significantly, Rhoades was not claiming that the district court should review the state court's rulings on the substantive issues involved in the termination proceeding. To the contrary, Rhoades simply maintained that the entire proceeding, quite apart from the substantive issues of the termination proceeding, was constitutionally defective. When Rhoades complaint is viewed in this light, it is clear that it falls within the provisions of Sec. 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3). Simply put, Rhoades seeks to obtain redress for the "... deprivation, under color of ... State law, ... of [a] right ... secured by the Constitution of the United States...." Id. Consequently, this Court holds that the district court did have jurisdiction.

Appellant also avers that the district court erred in refusing to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, commendably seeks to curtail federal interference with the state's judicial...