Rhoads v. Horvat

• Citation: 270 F. Supp. 307
• Decision Date: 10 July 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 66-C-192.
• Parties: Samuel E. RHOADS, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. HORVAT, Sheriff of Pueblo County, and David Marquez, Deputy Sheriff of Pueblo County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

270 F. Supp. 307

Samuel E. RHOADS, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. HORVAT, Sheriff of Pueblo County, and David Marquez, Deputy Sheriff of Pueblo County, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 66-C-192.

United States District Court D. Colorado.

July 10, 1967.

Eugene Deikman and Harry K. Nier, Jr., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

White & Steele, Denver, Colo., for defendant, Robert J. Horvat.

Seavy & Seavy, Pueblo, Colo., for defendants, Robert J. Horvat and David Marquez.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, District Judge.

The above case is before the Court on the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The case was tried to a jury on April 20, 24, 25 and 26, 1967. The action was brought pursuant to Sections 1983, 1985, Title 42 United States Code, the complaint charging violation of plaintiff's civil rights and conspiracy.

The plaintiff was arrested without a warrant on February 11, 1966 by the defendants, Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of the County of Pueblo. The facts are somewhat complex and we need not, for our purposes, recite all of them. It is sufficient to note that the plaintiff's arrest grew out of an effort on the part of the defendants to execute a warrant against one John Dean whose parents had early in February filed a petition in the State court seeking a "Hold and Treat" Order and a psychiatric examination. Dean was at the time a student at Southern State College in Pueblo. Plaintiff was a faculty member and had Dean in class. Following a family quarrel Dean was ordered out of the family home by his parents and thereafter was received, at least temporarily, in the home of George Jones, Jr., who was also a professor at Colorado State College. The plaintiff at the time resided in a small house on the Jones property.

Prior to the arrest of plaintiff the defendants had for several days tried in vain to locate and arrest John Dean. Dean had been avoiding arrest in order to allow his lawyer to investigate the case and take action. On February 11, 1966, defendants received word that a pacifist meeting was to be held at the Jones house and that Dean would be present. They had the house under surveillance late on the afternoon of February 11 and were questioning people who came on the premises. Plaintiff was there because of the fact that he resided on the grounds. Defendants nevertheless questioned him about the whereabouts of John Dean. He refused to give them any information, and according to the defendants, interfered with their efforts to obtain information. The extent of his interference was disputed. In any event, he, together with others, were arrested and taken to jail. He was held in jail for some thirty to forty-five minutes as were the others who were picked up. They were released when John Dean was discovered inside the Jones' home and was himself brought first to the jail and then to the hospital for examination.

We have considered the several points raised by the defendants concerning the Court's charge and other alleged errors. We are of the opinion that they are all without merit. The one point to which the defendants gave particular emphasis when oral arguments were had on this motion was that it was error to fail to submit separate verdicts to cover the alleged substantive injury and the conspiracy. We note that the defendants did not object at the time to this manner of submitting the verdict. It was submitted in this form so as to avoid possible confusion with respect to double recovery, the Court having concluded that the two alleged injuries growing out of the arrest and the conspiracy merged so as to preclude separate recoveries. The "conspiracy" was to be inferred from the two defendants acting in concert or as accessories. Neither side objected to this manner of handling the submission to the jury.

The defendants also complain about the amount of the verdict. This, we believe, does have merit.

The cases furnish little in the way of guidance to a proper conclusion on this subject of excessiveness of damages. An early decision of this Circuit (which was at the time the Eighth), is Wayne, et al. v. Venable, et al., 260 F. 64. This involved a deprivation of the right to vote. The prayer was for $5,000.00 actual and $10,000.00 punitive damages. Each of the plaintiffs recovered verdicts of $2,000.00. These judgments were affirmed notwithstanding that there was no proof of actual damage, the Court noting that some damage is presumed and that it is for the jury to determine the value of the deprivation. The Court said:

"An action for damages in the proper federal court lies by a qualified elector for his wrongful deprivation of this right by a defendant or by an effective conspiracy of several defendants who deprive him thereof. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62, 63, 64, 21 Sup.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 491, 492, 22 Sup.Ct. 783, 46 L.Ed. 1005.

"In the eyes of the law this right is so valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing, and the amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, because each member of the jury has personal knowledge of the value of the right. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 78, 17 Sup. Ct. 265, 41 L.Ed. 632; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 65, 21 Sup.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84."

In Nixon v. Herndon, et al., 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, upheld a complaint describing the violation of the right to vote in the primary election in Texas. This is alleged to have arisen under the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint prayed for damages in the amount of $5,000.00. The Supreme Court held void a statute which prohibited Negroes from participating in a primary election. The Court noted "that private damages may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law. * * *"

More recently, the Third Circuit, in Basista v. Weir, et al., 340 F.2d 74 (1965), had before it a case in which an assault and battery was committed in the course of an arrest. Here the plaintiff received an award of $1,500.00 punitive, but no compensatory damages. The case was reversed on other grounds, but the Court (per Chief Judge Briggs) recognized that there can be a recovery of compensatory damages notwithstanding that the evidence fails to establish that special damages were suffered. The Court said that the federal common law of damages applies and recognized that there can be both compensatory and exemplary damages in such a case.

In the case at bar an effort was made to prove loss of earnings. It was the plaintiff's theory that he was terminated from the college as a result of the arrest. He failed, however, to establish this. In the first place, he did not have tenure and prior to the present incident he had applied for a leave of absence for the purpose of pursuing...