Rhode Island Broth. of Officers v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. 02-50L.
| Decision Date | 28 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 02-50L. |
| Citation | 264 F.Supp.2d 87 |
| Parties | RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, Plaintiff, v. State of RHODE ISLAND; Lincoln Almond in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the State of Rhode Island; Robert L. Carl, Jr., in his capacity as Director of the Department of Administration of the State of Rhode Island; Paul J. Tavares, in his capacity as General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island; and Ashbel T. Wall, II, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Corrections of the State of Rhode Island, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Gerard Paul Cobleigh, Cobleigh, Sprague & Giacobbe, Warwick, RI, Dennis T. Grieco, II, Gidley, Sarli & Marusak, Providence, RI, for plaintiff.
Thomas A. Palombo, Assistant Attorney General, Providence, RI, Claire J.V. Richards, Office of the Governor, Providence, RI, John L.P. Breguet, Department of Administration, Office of Labor Relations, Providence, RI, for defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action against defendants for damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 (2000) as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (2000). Plaintiff alleges federal and state substantive due process and Takings Clause violations as well as state claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit.
In 1976, Rhode Island enacted a statutory educational incentive pay program for state correctional officers which permitted the officers to receive additional percentage-based compensation for attaining a specified number of educational credits. The collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between plaintiff and the State also adopted the statutory pay program and its percentage-based salary formula. The CBA expired on June 30, 1996, and on July 1, 1996, an amendment to the Incentive Pay Statute went into effect replacing the percentage-based formula with a sum certain pay increment.
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After careful consideration, defendants' motion is granted on all counts, and the complaint hereby is dismissed.
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers ("plaintiff"), the union for state correctional officers, brought this action on January 22, 2002 alleging six counts against the State of Rhode Island as well as Lincoln Almond, as Governor, Robert L. Carl, Jr., as Director of the Department of Administration, Paul J. Tavares, as General Treasurer, and Ashbel T. Wall II, as Director of the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff also invokes this Court's pendent and ancillary jurisdiction to assert state law claims.
Counts I and IV allege federal and state contract claims. Counts II and III allege a denial of substantive due process and a violation of the Takings Clause. Counts V and VI allege promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims respectively. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages plus attorneys' fees and costs in addition to a declaration that the 1996 Amendment to the Correctional Officers Pay Plan ("Incentive Pay Statute") violates the Federal and State Constitutions.
In 1976, Rhode Island enacted the Incentive Pay Statute. 1976 R.I. Pub.L. ch. 290 § 2 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56.1-1 et seq.). The Incentive Pay Statute required the State of Rhode Island to pay educational incentive funds to full time correctional officers once those officers had acquired a specified number of educational credits. Once the requisite credits had been attained, the correctional officers were required to remain employed by the Department of Corrections for varying lengths of time as stipulated by the Incentive Pay Statute. The statute also required that the individuals who accepted the additional statutory compensation forego receiving any other educational incentive payments that would otherwise be available to them as state employees. The funds which a correctional officer received under the program were calculated as a specified percentage of the officer's base salary depending upon the number of educational credits the officer had earned.
The State, through its administrative officials, entered into collective bargaining agreements with plaintiff over the years in which it agreed to pay the educational incentive funds as described by the Incentive Pay Statute. In accordance with earlier agreements, the most recent CBA adopted the percentage-based formula set forth in the statute and also required the officers to remain employed for specified periods of time after attaining the requisite number of educational credits.
In 1996, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted an Amendment to the Incentive Pay Statute, effective as of July 1, 1996. The Amendment stated that correctional officers would no longer receive educational incentive pay according to the percentage-based formula but would instead receive a specified sum in addition to base pay.
On March 22, 2002, defendants filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff objected to the motion and a hearing was scheduled on the matter.
Thereafter, on October 22, 2002, this Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took the matter under advisement. The parties have briefed the federal and state issues at length and the matter is now in order for decision.
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The only basis for federal jurisdiction is § 1983 in this case. Consequently, there is subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, a district court's original jurisdiction over federal questions enables the court to consider state law claims in conjunction with federal claims when they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" such that the entire action is but one constitutional case. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(providing that "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy."). Since the state law claims are intertwined with the federal claims asserted under § 1983, the Court will rule on all the claims being made in the six counts.
Under § 1983, it is clear that a claim for compensatory damages cannot be maintained. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a well-established common law doctrine that prohibits a party from suing a state in its own courts for alleged deprivations of civil liberties without the state's consent. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). In Will, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to bypass this doctrine upon enacting § 1983. Id. Thus, the Court specifically held that "a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." 1 Id. at 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304. This Court recognizes that § 1983 often provides a litigant with a federal forum in which the party can seek redress for deprivations of his or her civil liberties, but § 1983 does not permit a litigant to seek a remedy against a state for those same deprivations. Id. at 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304. The Eleventh Amendment bars litigants from pursuing this type of suit unless the state has waived its immunity or unless Congress has exercised its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. Id. As Congress had no desire to undermine the States' immunity by enacting § 1983, and as there is no evidence that Rhode Island has waived it, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for compensatory damages against the State of Rhode Island.
Plaintiff also brought suit under § 1983 against defendants, Lincoln Almond, Robert L. Carl, Jr., Paul J. Taveres and Ashbel T. Wall, II in their official capacities as state officials. As the Supreme Court established in Will, "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office". Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Consequently, the Court concluded that, under those circumstances, a suit against a state official is no different from one against the State itself. Id. Although this writer recognizes that state officials acting in their official capacities can be sued for prospective injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for compensatory damages against the individually named defendants in their official capacities. Id. at n. 10.
Defendants brought this motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.1998). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
This Court recognizes that consideration of documents which have neither been attached to the complaint nor expressly incorporated therein should ordinarily not be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). Normally, a court's consideration of such documents will convert a motion to...
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