Rhode Island Carpenters Annuity Fund v. Trevi Icos

• Decision Date: 15 February 2007
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 04-163S.
• Citation: 474 F.Supp.2d 326
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND CARPENTERS ANNUITY FUND, Rhode Island Carpenters Pension Fund, Rhode Island Carpenters Vacation Fund, Rhode Island Carpenters Health Fund, and Donald Lavin, in his official capacity as Co-Administrator of the Funds, Plaintiffs, v. TREVI ICOS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Page 326

474 F.Supp.2d 326

RHODE ISLAND CARPENTERS ANNUITY FUND, Rhode Island Carpenters Pension Fund, Rhode Island Carpenters Vacation Fund, Rhode Island Carpenters Health Fund, and Donald Lavin, in his official capacity as Co-Administrator of the Funds, Plaintiffs, v. TREVI ICOS CORPORATION, Defendant.

C.A. No. 04-163S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 15, 2007.

Elizabeth A. Wiens, Marc B. Gursky, Gursky Law Associates, North Kingstown, RI, for Plaintiffs.

R. Daniel Prentiss, R. Daniel Prentiss, P.C., Providence, RI, Robert D. City, City, Hayes & Dissette, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SMITH, District Judge.

In this action, a union, through its employee benefit funds, seeks to compel an employer to make fund contributions pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement for work the employer assigned to employees of another union who were covered under another collective bargaining agreement. Defendant, employer Trevi Icos, moves for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the benefit funds' claims for reimbursement of the alleged contributions funds. For the following reasons, the court will deny the motion.

I.

Plaintiffs are four employee benefit funds administered for the benefit of members of Rhode Island Carpenters Local 94 and the plans' administrator, Donald Lavin (collectively "plaintiffs").¹ Defendant Trevi Icos, a construction contractor based in Massachusetts that specializes in the operation of heavy excavation equipment, is a party to two collective bargaining agreements which govern its relationship with the Carpenters Union: the Associated General Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc.("AGC CBA") and the Construction Industries of Rhode Island ("CIRI CBA").² Consequently, when Trevi Icos performs work in Rhode Island that requires the employment of carpenters, it is subject to one (or possibly both) of these agreements, depending on the' nature of the work.

In 2003, Trevi Icos subcontracted for work on a large construction project at a sewage treatment facility in the city of Warwick, Rhode Island. Part of this work involved installing secant piles³ using a "double rotary" drilling rig known as the CM 120. Operation of the rig and application of the secant pile process requires a number of different trade workers, including members of the operating engineers, laborers, and carpenters.

On March 4, 2003, Trevi Icos conducted a pre-job meeting at the job site with representatives from the different unions involved in the project. A representative from Trevi Icos described the work he anticipated and stated his conclusion that no carpenters were necessary to operate the CM 120 in connection with the construction of the secant pile wall. At the meeting, William Holmes, the carpenters' union representative, objected to Trevi Icos's position that no carpenters were needed to operate the CM 120. Trevi Icos nevertheless remained steadfast and refused to employ any carpenters in connection with the operation of the CM 120, although it did employ carpenters on other parts of the job. In response, the union sent Trevi Icos a letter, reiterating their position that carpenters should be employed in the operation of the CM 120 and threatening to file a grievance if Trevi Icos did not accede. Trevi Icos did not respond to the letter and did not alter the makeup, of those it employed. The Union did not file a grievance, nor initiate any jurisdictional dispute mechanism.

By fall 2003, Trevi Icos had finished its work and paid all wages and benefits for those workers it employed. It is undisputed that Trevi Icos made all the necessary contributions to the employees' benefit funds associated with their respective labor unions, with the exception, of course, of those payments disputed here.⁴ The contributions included those made on behalf of all the carpenters Trevi Icos actually did employ on the job.

Then, on May 5, 2004 plaintiffs commenced an action in this court seeking to "compel payment of contributions, interest, and penalties to employee benefit plans" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Trevi Icos failed to submit timely payroll reports, failed to make timely contributions to the funds, and failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the trust agreements to which they were bound, all in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3) and 1145.

After limited discovery defendant filed this motion for summary judgment asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that Trevi Icos had no obligation to make contributions under the terms of the CBAs, and that plaintiffs' action here was, in effect, an end-run around the jurisdiction dispute resolution procedure contained in the CBAs themselves.⁵ See AGC CBA, Art. II; CIRI CBA, Art. IV. Plaintiffs dispute each of these claims, and the court will address each in turn.

II.

Trevi Icos's first contention, styled as an attack on subject matter jurisdiction, strikes at plaintiffs' standing. Trevi Icos asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims brought under section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145⁶ because none of the named parties bringing the suit qualifies under the jurisdictional grant of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), which according to its terms contemplates that a suit may only be brought by "the Secretary [of Labor] or by a participant, beneficiary, [or] fiduciary." § 1132(e)(1). Recognizing that this jurisdictional grant is exclusive and therefore limited to the denoted parties, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983), the plaintiffs argue in response that both the plan administrator and the funds themselves are fiduciaries within the meaning of § 1132(e)(1), thereby satisfying the strict standing demands.

An ERISA fiduciary includes any person who "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [an employee benefit] plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). ERISA also provides that a fiduciary "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets." Id. § 1002(21)(A)(i). In addition:

[r]egulations promulgated by the Department of Labor interpreting ERISA make clear that the administrator and trustees of a pension plan are fiduciaries within the meaning of the statute, for a plan administrator or a trustee of a plan must, b[y] the, very nature of his position, have discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan within the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(iii)....

Bd. Of Trs. of the CWAI/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, at least according to many courts that have addressed the issue, a plan administrator is per se a fiduciary. See id.; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 436 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.2006) ("The Plan Administrator is a fiduciary charged with the duty to administer the benefit plan `in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent [with ERISA].'") (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)); Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Estate of Lebowitz, 185 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir.1999) ("By the very nature of the position, a plan administrator is a fiduciary with respect to her own policy.").

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit appears to have expressed a similar tenet, see Barrs v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F.3d 202, 206 (1st Cir.2002) ("Lockheed, as the named administrator for the plan, is a fiduciary under ERISA.") (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)); although recently, the court has characterized this as an assumption, not a holding. Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 111 n. 12 (1st Cir.2002) (noting that the court has "proceeded on the assumption that a plan administrator is a fiduciary," but declining to definitively so hold). Absent any clear authority in any circuit to the contrary, this court will also proceed on this assumption. Consequently, because the plan administrator is named as a plaintiff in this suit, and is acting in a fiduciary capacity, he therefore must be considered a fiduciary within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). See UAW v. Skinner EngineCo., 188 F.3d 130, 148 (3d Cir.1999) (noting that where a plan administrator, as here, carries out certain duties and obligations, including "explain[ing] plan benefits to its employees, it acts in a fiduciary capacity").⁷ Accordingly, because the plan administrator has standing this court has jurisdiction to hear the claims.⁸

III.

Moving to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for reimbursement of the alleged contributions,⁹ Trevi Icos first argues that it has no obligation under the CBAs to make the at-issue contributions and, therefore, that it could not have violated ERISA Section 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145 which requires contributions to be made in accordance with the terms of the employee benefit funds.¹⁰ Although both parties agree that Trevi Icos is obligated by its two CBAs with the Carpenters Union to make contributions to the funds in compliance with their terms, they disagree about the meaning and scope of the CBAs. See Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 138 (3d Cir.1993) (noting that the CBAs trigger the obligations under ERISA § 515, and consequently, that plaintiffs are "not entitled to enforce a nonexistent contractual obligation"). Plaintiffs contend that "the CBAs unambiguously require that fringe benefit contributions be made on behalf of any and all employees performing covered work, irrespective of union member status." Trevi Icos, in response,...