Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Gilleney

• Decision Date: 03 June 1938
• Docket Number: No. 1362.,1362.
• Citation: 199 A. 691
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST CO. v. GILLENEY et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

199 A. 691

RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST CO.

v. GILLENEY et al.

No. 1362.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 3, 1938.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company against Bridget Gilleney and others to determine to whom the proceeds of a joint bank account belong. From a decree awarding the account to Bridget Gilleney, the remaining respondents appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Raphael L. Daignault, of Woonsocket, for complainant. Hart, Gainer & Carr and Edward G. Carr, all of Providence, for Bridget Gilleney. William H. Edwards, Ronald B. Smith and Edwards & Angell, all of Providence, for Mary C. Clarke.

BAKER, Justice.

This is a bill of interpleader brought by the complainant to have determined to whom the proceeds of a joint bank account in its possession rightfully belong. A decree of interpleader was entered by the superior court directing the two respondents, each of whom claimed the funds in the account in question, to interplead. The respondents filed their respective answers, and after a hearing of the cause in the superior court a justice thereof entered a decree which awarded the account involved to the respondent Gilleney as her sole and absolute property. The respondent Clarke thereupon claimed an appeal to this court from the entry of such decree, which appeal is now before us.

The record herein reveals that at the conclusion of the evidence offered on behalf of the respondent Clarke the respondent Gilleney, without formally closing her case, without stating that she had no evidence to present, or that she rested on the record as then made, moved that the trial justice give a decision to the effect that she was the sole owner of the account in question. After argument, the trial justice, without requiring the respondent Gilleney to close her case, or to rest on the record, and without inquiring as to whether or not she had any evidence to submit, granted her motion, stating substantially that the respondent Clarke had not made out a prima facie case showing that the account was not a proper joint account and should not pass to the survivor.

It is clear that the trial justice viewed the motion made by the respondent Gilleney as analogous to or in the nature of a motion for a nonsuit with respect to the claim of the respondent Clarke. In this he was in error. There is no such practice in a proceeding in equity, especially when a cause is being heard finally on its merits. The parties in that instance should present all the evidence they are able or desire to present, or else definitely submit the case for final disposition on the evidence which has been introduced, in order that the record may be complete when the trial justice makes his decision and enters his decree, and when the cause comes to this court on appeal.

It was evident at the hearing in this court that the parties did not desire to rest upon the present record. The respondent Clarke was seeking a retrial of the cause. The respondent Gilleney argued that the question before us was, in the first instance, one of practice and procedure, and that if our decision should be adverse to her contention that the trial justice had proceeded properly, then she desired an opportunity to offer further evidence.

The pertinent statutory provisions regarding appeals in equity are found in G.L.1923, chap. 339, sees. 30, 32 and 33. Sec. 32 is as follows: "Upon any cause being brought by appeal to the supreme court that court shall hear and determine such appeal and affirm, reverse, or modify the decree or judgment appealed from and make such orders and decrees therein as shall be just." The nature of an appeal in equity generally and under our statutes was fully and carefully considered in Vaill v. McPhail, 34 R.I....