Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank v. Varadian
Decision Date | 05 April 1995 |
Citation | 419 Mass. 841,647 N.E.2d 1174 |
Parties | RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST NATIONAL BANK v. Paul N. VARADIAN & another, 1 trustees, 2 & others. 3 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Paul S. Samson (Isaac H. Peres, with him), for plaintiff.
Cathy P. Brooks (Peter S. Brooks, with her), for defendants.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
This is the plaintiff bank's appeal. We granted direct appellate review, following requests for direct appellate review by all parties. The appeal relates to counts III, IV and V of the bank's complaint and to count I of the defendants' counterclaim. In count III of its complaint, the bank alleges that the defendants Varadian and Nebelkopf, as trustees of Harborside Landing Realty Trust, owe the bank $2,900,000 pursuant to a promissory note. Count IV alleges that Varadian and Nebelkopf are individually liable as guarantors of that note. Count V asserts that Varadian and Nebelkopf are individually liable on a $1,000,000 promissory note (line of credit). The defendants filed an answer denying the bank's claims. Subsequently, Varadian and Nebelkopf filed amended answers and counterclaims asserting in count I that the bank had breached an oral contract to lend $43,500,000 for the construction of a multi-unit condominium complex in Lynn called the "Harborside Project" with the asserted result that there was no liability on the aforesaid notes and guarantees and, instead, the bank was liable to Varadian and Nebelkopf for breach of contract.
The liability issues were tried to a jury. The parties stipulated to the execution and delivery of the relevant notes and to the unpaid balances. The trial focused on the alleged oral promise by the bank to provide a construction loan of $43,500,000 and on the circumstances relevant to the question whether Varadian and Nebelkopf's engagement in a costly course of action was a result of their reasonable reliance on the bank's alleged promise. The judge instructed the jury on the legal theory of promissory estoppel and submitted to the jury nine special verdict questions pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 49(a), 365 Mass. 812 (1974).
The jury answered the special questions substantially as follows: (1) Roland Lamothe or Robert Britton, bank personnel, had "apparent authority to make the construction loan;" (2) the bank intended to be bound only by an agreement in writing for the construction loan; (3) Varadian and Nebelkopf understood that the bank intended only to be bound by an agreement in writing for the construction loan; (4) the bank, Varadian, and Nebelkopf did not "have a binding agreement that [the bank] would provide the construction financing for the proposed Harborside Landing Project"; (5) the bank did "promise to provide the construction financing for the proposed Harborside Landing Project to Mr. Varadian and Mr. Nebelkopf"; (6) the bank "reasonably intend[ed] the promise to make the construction loan for the Harborside Landing Project to induce Varadian and Nebelkopf to act or forbear from taking certain actions"; (7) Varadian and Nebelkopf reasonably relied on the bank's promise to provide the construction financing for the Harborside Landing project; (8) the bank "induce[d] Mr. Varadian and Mr. Nebelkopf to execute the note and guarantee for the Harborside Land Acquisition and the line of credit by a promise to provide the construction financing for the Project"; (9) the failure to provide construction financing did not render impossible the performance of Varadian and Nebelkopf due the bank under the notes and guarantees.
A trial on damages, before a second jury, followed. Following the jury's assessment of damages, and in keeping therewith, the following judgment, insofar as the judgment is material to this appeal, was entered:
At the liability phase of the trial, after the defendants as plaintiffs-in-counterclaim introduced their evidence and rested, the bank moved for a directed verdict as to the counterclaims, setting forth specific grounds therefor including those on which the bank now relies. Mass.R.Civ.P. 50(a), 365 Mass. 814 (1974). The motion was denied. The defendants (plaintiffs-in-counterclaim) did not request an opportunity to submit additional evidence. The bank then presented evidence and rested. The bank did not renew its motion for a directed verdict at that time. Plaintiff and defense counsel presented closing jury arguments and the judge instructed the jury. The judge called counsel to the sidebar to take objections and requests relating to the instructions. In the course of that discussion, counsel for the bank stated that he wanted to "renew [his] motion for directed verdict." The judge responded "Thank you." The defendants (plaintiffs-in-counterclaim) did not request an opportunity to present further evidence and the judge proceeded to supplement his jury instructions. The jury then retired to deliberate. After judgment entered, following the bifurcated liability and damages trials, the bank filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pertaining to counts III, IV, and V of the bank's complaint and to the counterclaim. The judge denied the motions, explaining in a memorandum of decision that, although he "did not believe that a reliance by Messrs Varadian and Nebelkopf on an oral promise by officers of the Bank to lend $43 million was reasonable as evidenced by [his] decision on the Chapter 93A claim of the defendants" which is not at issue in this appeal, the judge was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury's concluding both that the bank had made a sufficiently detailed promise to be enforceable and that the defendants reasonably relied on it.
On appeal, the bank argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a finding that Varadian and Nebelkopf could reasonably rely on the bank's oral "promise" to grant a $43,500,000 construction loan, and that therefore the bank is entitled to judgment on counts III, IV, and V of its complaint and on count I of the counterclaim notwithstanding the verdict. We must first consider whether, as the defendants argue, the bank failed to protect its right to challenge the judge's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Rule 50 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 814 (1974), provides in relevant part as follows:
The defendants (plaintiffs-in-counterclaim) correctly say that, The defendants are also correct when they say that The critical question is whether the bank's motion for a directed verdict setting forth specific grounds, made at the close of the liability evidence offered by its opponents, plus bank counsel's oral statement made to the judge at the sidebar conference relative to the jury instructions, that counsel wanted to "renew [his] motion for a directed verdict" constitutes "a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence" within the...
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