Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GARY, A. J. WOODS, J.
• Citation: Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, 87 S.C. 18, 68 S.E. 824 (S.C. 1910)
• Decision Date: 01 September 1910
• Parties: RHODES v. GRANBY COTTON MILLS.

68 S.E. 824

87 S.C. 18

RHODES v. GRANBY COTTON MILLS.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 1, 1910

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; R. W Memminger, Judge.

Action by Olin M. Rhodes against the Granby Cotton Mills. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The following are the exceptions of defendant:

"(1) Because, counsel for defendant having previously objected to testimony along the line, his honor against the objection of defendant allowed the witness J. C. Kirby to testify as follows, to wit: 'Mr. Edmunds: Q. Who furnished you the list? A. Mr. Wallace, superintendent of the mill at that time (meaning the Columbia Mills). The Court: It will be relevant to show that he refused him employment on account of having received that list, if you can show the Granby Cotton Mills is connected with it. Mr Edmunds: We expect to connect it. The Court: If you do not connect it, it will be stricken out. Mr. Edmunds: Q. Was it as a result of the strike at the Granby Mill and your receiving that list that employment was refused? Mr. Shand We object to that. The Court: State whether or not. Mr. Edmunds: State whether or not the strike at the Granby Mill and his name being on that list, that employment was declined him? A. Yes, sir'--it being error to allow such witness to testify that he was refused employment in said Columbia Mills because of a strike at the Granby Mills, and because plaintiff's name was on an alleged list of strikers at the Granby Mills, when there was no testimony showing that such list of strikers had been furnished by the Granby Mills.

"(2) Because his honor, the presiding judge, did not upon motion of defendant's counsel at the close of the testimony for the plaintiff strike out the testimony of the witness J. C. Kirby, there having been up to that time no testimony showing any connection between the Granby Cotton Mills, and the list testified to by the said J. C. Kirby.

"(3) Because his Honor erred in allowing the witness C. S. Green, against the objection of the defendant, to testify to a tacit courtesy recognized by the Columbia Mills in 1900 with reference to the giving of information upon the request of the superintendents of other mills without connecting the defendant with it then and without showing that such a tacit courtesy existed in 1907.

"(4) Because his honor did not, upon the motion of the defendant's counsel at the close of plaintiff's testimony, strike out the testimony of the witness C. S. Green as to any tacit understanding or tacit courtesy practiced by the superintendent of the Columbia Mills when there had been no testimony to connect the defendant or its superintendents with such tacit courtesy or understanding, and there had been no testimony to show that such tacit courtesy or understanding existed in 1907.

"(5) Because, against the objection of the defendant, his honor allowed the witness C. S. Green to testify that the Columbia Mills or the said C. S. Green would make use of such tacit understanding or courtesy to which the said witness had testified when it had not been shown that the defendant company was in any wise a party to such tacit understanding or courtesy.

"(6) Because his honor erred in permitting the plaintiff, against the objection of defendant, to testify that he sent messages to mills in other states and received no response thereto without testimony to show that the messages so sent were ever received, or that a failure to receive a favorable response was in any wise due to any act or communication of the defendant.

"(7) Because his honor erred while the plaintiff was on the stand as a witness in ruling as follows: 'I rather think the court is satisfied that there is some evidence prima facie of conspiracy between these mills to prevent these people getting work and sending around lists, making it impossible for them to get work, that there is some prima facie evidence showing combination and conspiracy between them'--when, first, there was no prima facie evidence of agreement or combination between any mill for any purpose touching the subject-matter of this action; and, secondly, even if there was prima facie evidence of some combination or agreement between some mills, the defendant Granby Mills had not been connected with it; and, thirdly, even if there was some prima facie evidence to show a combination or agreement between certain mills to do some act in connection with the subject-matter of this suit, it was not to do any unlawful act or any lawful act by unlawful means; and, fourth, even if there was some evidence as to a combination between certain mills to do an unlawful act, the defendant, Granby Mills, had not been connected with it.

"(8) Because under the erroneous ruling complained of in exception 7 his honor erred in admitting, against the objection of the defendant, the testimony of plaintiff, and thereafter of witnesses L. E. Rhodes, Dozier Rhodes, and A. L. Knight as to declarations as to defendant's acts and statements made to them, or in their hearing, by persons in no wise connected with the defendant.

"(9) Because his honor erred in ruling: 'The combination having been testified to being established to some extent, the declaration of parties connected with and in furtherance of that combination are admissible,' when no such combination had been to any extent established or testified to, and in pursuance of such ruling in admitting as testimony the declarations of Wallace and others who were in no wise connected with the defendant, and which declarations were in no wise binding on defendant.

"(10) Because his honor erred in permitting the witness Knight to testify against the objection of the defendant as to the contents of a list seen by him at the Palmetto Cotton Mills, when there was not sufficient to show that said list was made by the defendant or authorized by it.

"(11) Because his Honor erred as matter of law in permitting the witness Knight to testify, against the objection of the defendant, as to the contents of a list alleged to have been seen by him at the Palmetto Cotton Mills, when no sufficient proof had been made of the loss of the original according to the rules of law.

"(12) Because his honor erred in holding sufficient proof to have been made of the loss of the original of the letter referred to in the preceding exception, and in admitting secondary evidence of its contents as upon sufficient proof when the last custodian, the former Superintendent Bagwell, had not been examined as to his disposition of the letter, and the facts failed to show that a bona fide and diligent search had been unsuccessfully made for the original in the place where it was most likely to be found, and thus all sources of information and means of discovery had not been exhausted in a reasonable degree.

"(13) Because the defendant, upon notice to produce served by the plaintiff, having produced in court an original list of strikers, written in ink and indelible pencil, which had never been out of the possession of the defendant or exhibited to any one else until so produced, and also having produced in court a document which consisted of a typewritten letter, a typewritten list and a printed slip, all three fastened together as one document, stating expressly the terms of the production, namely, stating that 'this is the only letter we have in our possession containing a copy of that list, with such additional names as were given to the president, etc.,' his honor erred in permitting such typewritten list to be used as a list furnished by defendant on demand, without submitting the letter and printed exhibit at the same time, when there was nothing else than such production by the defendant to show that such typewritten list had been sent out by defendant.

"(14) Because his honor erred in ruling that a part of a letter might be introduced in evidence by plaintiff with the privilege to defendant of introducing the other parts and in permitting the plaintiff so to introduce said list detached from the entire letter; whereas, the letter having been produced as a whole and the list only as a part of it, all the parts were admissible in evidence as a whole, or none of them.

"(15) Because the production having been made simply as a letter in the possession of the defendant, containing a list, etc., without any statement on the part of counsel as to the nature of the letter or the character of the reference in the letter to the list, and more particularly without any statement on the part of counsel that the said list had been sent out, his honor erred in permitting a part of the said letter to be introduced in evidence by plaintiff as a list which had been sent out by defendant, when there was no evidence that such part had been sent out by the defendant or that it had been set out as a list of strikers, or that it had come from the defendant at all, except as might be explained by the letter.

"(16) Because his honor erred in not granting, upon motion of the defendant, a nonsuit, because (a) there was no competent testimony of any conspiracy, agreement, or combination between the defendant and any other mills as to nonemployment of strikers at other mills, or as to any other unlawful act, or lawful act to be accomplished by unlawful means; (b) the communication of the names of strikers to other mills, if legally proved, was a confidential communication and gave to plaintiff no cause of action; (c) it was an entire failure to prove the material allegations of the complaint to a wrongful act by the defendant.

"(17) Because his honor erred in the opening general remarks of his charge in conveying to the jury his impression that the defendant had done wrong

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