Rhodes v. Interstate Battery System of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-8619,82-8619
• Citation: 722 F.2d 1517
• Parties: Robert E. RHODES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERSTATE BATTERY SYSTEM OF AMERICA, INC., and Johnson Controls, Inc., formerly Globe-Union, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1517

722 F.2d 1517

Robert E. RHODES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERSTATE BATTERY SYSTEM OF AMERICA, INC., and Johnson

Controls, Inc., formerly Globe-Union, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-8619.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 16, 1984.

George B. Snelling, Jr., Augusta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

A. Rowland Dye, Augusta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before HILL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

In this Georgia diversity action plaintiff-appellant Rhodes seeks damages for personal injuries suffered in an explosion occurring when he struck a match and loosened the vent caps on an automobile battery manufactured and distributed by defendant-appellees. Rhodes appeals an order of the district court dismissing his claim on summary judgment. We reverse and remand.

The battery was manufactured by Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") for distribution by Interstate Battery System of America, Inc. ("Interstate"), which sold the product under its own name. The plastic top of the battery contained two vent caps designed to cover six cell holes leading to the acid below. Permanently embossed into the vent caps is the following warning:

DANGER-EXPLOSIVE GASES

BATTERIES PRODUCE EXPLOSIVE GASES. KEEP SPARKS FLAME, CIGARETTES AWAY. VENTILATE WHEN CHARGING OR USING IN ENCLOSED SPACE. ALWAYS SHIELD EYES WHEN WORKING NEAR BATTERIES.

POISON-CAUSES SEVERE BURNS

CONTAINS SULFURIC ACID. AVOID CONTACT WITH SKIN, EYES OR CLOTHING. ANTEDOTE EXTERNAL-FLUSH WITH WATER. EYES-FLUSH WITH WATER FOR 15 MINUTES AND GET PROMPT MEDICAL ATTENTION. INTERNAL-DRINK LARGE AMOUNTS OF WATER OR MILK, FOLLOW WITH MILK OF MAGNESIA, BEATEN EGG OR VEG. OIL. CALL PHYSICIAN IMMEDIATELY. KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN.

The first line in each paragraph of the warning appears in letters approximately twice as large as the remaining text.

Fifteen months prior to the date of Rhodes' injury, his wife purchased the battery and had it installed at a local service station. On the night of the accident, Rhodes stopped after work for two to three hours at a tavern, and when he emerged he discovered the battery was dead. To ascertain whether the battery was low on water, he struck a match to check the fluid level. When the flame was about twelve to fifteen inches from the battery, the battery exploded, covering Rhodes' face and eyes with sulfuric acid.

In his deposition, Rhodes admitted he had not read the warning label. In fact, although he had owned several cars over the years, he stated that he had never seen or read a warning label on an automobile battery.

Rhodes sought recovery in negligence and strict liability against both Johnson and Interstate for their failure to provide an adequate warning of the dangers associated with their product. The defendants maintained Rhodes was precluded from recovery as a matter of law because he failed to read the warning label, which fully and adequately described the inherent dangers of the battery. The district court agreed with the defendants and granted summary judgment on both the negligence and strict liability claims. Concluding that Rhodes' claims present genuine issues of fact as to the adequacy of the warning, we reverse the order of the district court.

I. Negligence

Rhodes' negligence theory is predicated on the principle that a manufacturer or supplier is under a duty to inform potential users of the product of any facts making it dangerous. Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 740 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980); ¹ Reddick v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 243, 245 (S.D.Ga.1969). This duty may be breached in either of two ways: (1) failure to take adequate measures to communicate the warning to the ultimate user, or (2) failure to provide a warning that, if communicated, was adequate to apprise the user of the product's potential risks. Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573 (1979), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 905 (5th Cir.1980). Both of these issues are uniformly held to be questions for the jury. Id. Nevertheless, the district court ordered summary judgment because under Georgia law Rhodes' failure to read the warning label constituted contributory negligence, thus barring plaintiff's recovery as a matter of law.

The district court relied upon three decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals holding that any insufficiency in the adequacy of the warning label of a product cannot be the proximate cause of the injury when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent by failing to read the warning. See Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron Chemical Co., 139 Ga.App. 803, 229 S.E.2d 681 (1976); Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 129 Ga.App. 868, 201 S.E.2d 808 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 127 Ga.App. 178, 193 S.E.2d 16 (1972). Although these cases do stand for the general proposition that failure to read a warning is contributory negligence, they do not necessarily preclude recovery in this case. The plaintiffs in Cobb, Parzini and McCleskey did not assert, as Rhodes does here, that the warning was not adequately communicated to the user. Rhodes does not maintain that the warning itself, if communicated, was inadequate to apprise him of the danger. He claims his failure to read the label resulted from the defendants' negligence in communicating the warning, i.e., that other, more effective ways of communicating the battery's dangers were available and should have been employed. ² If the defendants did not take reasonable steps to communicate the warning to Rhodes, his failure to read it would not constitute contributory negligence. See Stapleton, 608 F.2d at 573.

Failure to read a warning does not bar recovery when the plaintiff is challenging the adequacy of the efforts of the manufacturer or seller to communicate the dangers of the product to the buyer or user. Id. In Cobb, after a janitor attempted to liquefy a can of flammable floor sealer by heating it on a stove, the can exploded and started a fire causing severe damage to the plaintiff's property. A large label affixed to the outside of the metal container cautioned against placing the mixture near fire or flame. Although the janitor had used the product for several years and handled the can in a lighted room, he admitted that he had never read the warning label. The plaintiff maintained the label was ineffective to give warning and was deficient in giving instructions as to the sealer's safe usage. The court upheld summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that "any insufficiency of the warning on the label of a product may not be the proximate cause of the fire when the user fails to read the label." 229 S.E.2d at 682. There was no claim, however, that the manufacturer had taken insufficient steps to communicate the warning to the purchaser.

The plaintiff in Parzini, together with two other restaurant employees, was injured when, as he tried to force open a plastic bottle of drain cleaner, the bottle ruptured and squirted sulfuric acid into his face. The court rejected Parzini's contention that the labeling on the bottle was inadequate to warn him of its dangers, holding that his failure to read the warning precluded recovery. 201 S.E.2d at 809. As in Cobb, the case involved a plaintiff who was familiar with the product causing the injury and who handled the product in an area where the label was easily visible. There was no assertion of the manufacturer's inadequate communication of the warning to the ultimate user of the product.

In McCleskey, a fire was triggered when the plaintiff's employee poured some HTH, a powerful oxidant chemical, into a bucket containing soap residue and other foreign matter. Elaborate and explicit instructions on the HTH drum warned that contact with cleansers, soap products or other contaminants would cause intense fire and that the chemical should be handled only in clean, dry containers. The plaintiff's employees had used HTH for a number of years, but this employee poured the chemical without reading the instructions. The court upheld a directed verdict for the defendants, concluding that the proximate cause of the injury was the employee's use of the product inconsistent with the warnings. 193 S.E.2d at 18. Again, there was no allegation that the manufacturer failed to ensure that the warnings would be communicated effectively to potential users.

Cobb, Parzini and McCleskey thus hold only that an injured party cannot claim inadequacy of the contents of a warning if he never bothered to read the warning. They do not bar a claim, such as Rhodes', that an injury was caused by the manufacturer's failure to take appropriate measures to communicate the potential risks to the ultimate user. Unlike the plaintiffs in those three cases, Rhodes alleges he was not accustomed to handling this product and did not have the opportunity to view the battery and its accompanying warning under sufficient lighting. His claim is that an embossed warning on the top of the battery is not likely to warn a consumer in his position of the potential dangers and that the defendants were negligent in not attempting to convey the risks in a more effective manner.

Summary judgment is not appropriate unless the moving party demonstrates that there was no genuine issue of any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Since we have determined that Rhodes is not prevented from asserting a claim based upon the defendants' negligent failure to provide a warning reasonably likely to apprise him of a battery's dangerous qualities, he should be allowed to attempt to persuade a jury to so find. A factual issue exists as to the adequacy of the defendants' adopted means of conveying the warning....