Rhodes v. Robbins

Decision Date13 March 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 3:18-cv-673-J-34JBT
PartiesDR. STEVEN RHODES, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE PAUL ROBBINS, in his individual capacity, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Paul Robbins' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 23, Motion), filed August 20, 2018. In the Motion, Robbins requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff, Steven Rhodes' Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. See Doc. 22 (Third Amended Complaint). In his Third Amended Complaint, Rhodes asserts that Robbins violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures when Robbins allegedly made false statements in and omitted material information from his application for a warrant for Rhodes' arrest. Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 34. Robbins seeks dismissal of Rhodes' Third Amended Complaint arguing that Rhodes has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Motion at 1. Rhodes opposes Robbins' Motion. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 26, Response), filed September 4, 2018. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply "are notentitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

II. Background1

Rhodes is a chiropractic physician licensed by the state of Florida. Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 4. Robbins, a "law enforcement detective with the Florida Department of Insurance Services, Division of Insurance Fraud," initiated an investigation against Rhodes, which culminated in his arrest of Rhodes for insurance fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 11. "Ultimately . . . [however,] the State of Florida declined to prosecute" Rhodes. Id. at ¶ 32.

More specifically, "[a]cting on tips from a disgruntled former patient and a man jealous of [Rhodes] because [Rhodes] dated the man's former girlfriend, [Robbins] began to investigate [Rhodes] in February of 2014." Id. at ¶ 7. After about a two-month investigation, Robbins "presented an affidavit for arrest warrant to Duval County Judge John Moran." Id. at ¶ 9. The Judge issued the arrest warrant, and Robbins subsequently arrested Rhodes for "seven counts of making false and fraudulent insurance claims in violation of [Florida Statutes] § 817.234(1)(a)1, and one count of schemes to defraud in violation of [Florida Statutes] § 817.034(4)(a)3." Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.2 However, "the warrantaffidavit presented to Judge Moran . . . was full of false statements and material omissions which would have vitiated any probable cause to arrest Dr. Rhodes for the crimes alleged." Id. at ¶ 12.

In particular, Robbins stated in his affidavit (Affidavit for Arrest Warrant) that he interviewed seven of Rhodes' patients regarding the doctor's potential practice of overbilling them for insurance fraud purposes. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14. However, four of these patients "have flatly denied what [Robbins] alleges he was told by them during their interviews. Therefore, [Robbins'] inclusion of any alleged fraud by [Rhodes] relating to these patients was knowingly false." Id. at ¶ 13. As to the three other interviewed patients, Robbins omitted allegedly relevant information from the Affidavit for Arrest Warrant.

For instance, the Affidavit for Arrest Warrant, which was dated April 3, 2014, reported that one patient, "D.B.," "indicated she had been pregnant since May of 2013, so her insurance company should not have been billed for a particular treatment which would have ceased being administered upon her advising [Rhodes] of her pregnancy." Id. at ¶ 15. However, D.B.'s "medical records, of which [Robbins] had copies, reflect that she did not advise [Rhodes] of her pregnancy until August of 2013." Id. Moreover, D.B.'s child was born in April of 2014. Id. Thus, Robbins' report in the Affidavit for Arrest Warrant that D.B. had been pregnant in May of 2013, and up through the date of the Affidavit forArrest Warrant, suggested that D.B. had been pregnant for eleven months. Id. Likewise, Rhodes alleges that patient "O.V."

claimed that she was billed for certain services that she claims were not performed. However, . . . O.V. had an independent medical examination . . . done by another doctor in November of 2013 and during that evaluation (a copy of which Defendant possessed), she stated to that doctor that she was receiving the treatments at issue on a regular basis.

Id. at ¶ 16. Finally, patient "B.L." "allegedly informed [Robbins] she had not received certain treatments . . . . Yet, she signed paperwork at [Rhodes'] office (a copy of which [Robbins] possessed) attesting the services 'were actually rendered,' which in fact they were." Id. at ¶ 17. Robbins intentionally omitted all of this information regarding patients D.B., O.V., and B.L. from the Affidavit for Arrest Warrant in support of Rhodes' arrest. Id. at ¶¶15-17.

In his Third Amended Complaint, Rhodes further alleges that Robbins "conducted his investigation with a total disregard and misunderstanding of the law." Id. at ¶ 18. First, Robbins' Affidavit for Arrest Warrant claimed that Rhodes billed insurance companies for certain forms of manual therapy, coded for billing purpose as CPT 97140, but did so unlawfully because unlicensed massage therapists performed those services. Id. at ¶ 19.3 However, Robbins allegedly overlooked Florida law which permits a chiropractic physician to "bill for such manual physical therapy when it is performed by medical assistants incidental to the practice of the physician." Id. at ¶ 22. Therefore, Rhodes alleges that Robbins was simply wrong to claim that Rhodes "violated the law by billing for manual therapy." Id. at ¶ 23.

In his Affidavit for Arrest Warrant, Robbins also asserted that Rhodes violated the law by overbilling "for units of manual therapy," id. at ¶ 24, in that Rhodes would "bill for two units of manual therapy when only one was provided." Id. at ¶ 25. Robbins apparently reached this conclusion based on reports from Rhodes' patients as well as a therapist who worked for Rhodes. Id. at ¶ 28. However, Rhodes alleges that Robbins and the therapist employee, "operated under the incorrect belief," id., that Rhodes' billing practices were unlawful, where in fact his billing practices were fully compliant with insurance practices. Id. at ¶ 27. Robbins' Affidavit for Arrest Warrant did not include any information about appropriate billing practices in accordance with insurance norms. Id. at ¶ 29. Ultimately, while Robbins arrested Rhodes pursuant to a warrant obtained based upon the statements in the Affidavit for Arrest Warrant, the state decided not to prosecute Rhodes. Id. at ¶ 32.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Rhodes filed the instant action against Robbins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting Robbins violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Id. at 6. Rhodes alleges that Robbins "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard of the truth, made false statements or material omissions in his application for the warrant for [Rhodes'] arrest, and such statements or omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause to issue said warrant." Id. at ¶ 34. Rhodes further alleges that

[w]ithout [Robbins'] false statements and/or material omissions there was not probable cause or arguable probable cause for issuance of a warrant for [Rhodes'] arrest. As a result of the warrant procured by [Robbins], [Rhodes] was arrested without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Therefore, [Robbins] instituted, commenced, and/or continued prosecution against [Rhodes]. [Robbins] did so with malice and without probable cause. The prosecution commenced, continued, and/or instituted by [Robbins] against [Rhodes] with malice and without probable
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