Rhodes v. State
Decision Date | 11 July 1983 |
Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
Citation | 655 S.W.2d 421,280 Ark. 156 |
Parties | Craig RHODES, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 83-28. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Eddie Spitzer, Hot Springs, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Craig Rhodes, along with Kathy York, was charged with capital murder. The jury found both guilty of first degree murder with York sentenced to life imprisonment and Rhodes to a term of forty years. Rhodes appeals that conviction, alleging four errors for reversal.
The facts given by York and Rhodes agree in some respects and differ primarily as to the commission of the crime. Each said that on the night of the murder they had been at a bar drinking with acquaintances. They left the bar with a third person, Cecile Nelson, in a car that belonged to Liz Farrell. Because there was talk of robbery, Nelson asked to be let out of the car. York and Rhodes went to the trailer of the victim, Hubert Gibson. York knew the victim, though appellant did not, and York says she intended to borrow money from him. At this point, the two accounts differ. York testified that the appellant entered the trailer first, and she followed, finding Gibson lying in bed; that Gibson yelled and appellant began hitting him and then put a pillow over his face and asked York to bring him a knife. York said she brought a knife and that appellant pressed the dull side of the knife against Gibson's throat, that she then took the knife and stabbed the victim in the chest. According to the coroner's testimony Gibson died of knife wounds and strangulation from a blunt object. Appellant's version varies in that he testified that he only stepped into the trailer for a moment and then waited outside until York came out a few minutes later.
Appellant first charges error in the court's refusal to sever his trial from the co-defendant. He argues that under our ruling in McDaniel and Gookin, 278 Ark. 631, 648 S.W.2d 57 (1983) his motion should have been granted. We find the argument to be without merit.
We stated in McDaniel that ordinarily the question of severance is a matter of discretion with the trial court, but there are a number of elements that must be considered to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion. The issue of severance is to be determined on a case by case basis considering the totality of their circumstances. With regard to antagonistic defenses, which is the thrust of appellant's argument, we stated that:
We do not suggest that simply because defenses are antagonistic the trial court must grant severance or risk reversal, merely that where the defenses are antagonistic, particularly in capital cases, careful consideration should be given to all the factors which weigh for or against achieving substantial justice in the trial process, and where it can be seen that either defendant is unduly jeopardized by a joint trial, severance should be granted. McDaniel at 639, 648 S.W.2d 57.
Of the seven factors listed in McDaniel, at 638, 648 S.W.2d 57 there appear to be only two that give us pause for consideration: 1) where the defenses are antagonistic 2) where one defendant chooses to testify, the other is compelled to do so. Although, we did not set out any specific definition of what constituted antagonistic defenses, the facts in McDaniel present a materially different conflict than arises here. In McDaniel, and other cases cited therein, an irreconcilable situation presented itself when each defendant denied involvement in the crime and put the blame on the other. Here, the co-defendant readily admitted her participation in the murder and Rhodes did not even argue antagonistic defenses to the trial court. There was no attempt by York to absolve herself by accusing Rhodes. York's testimony against him was simply part of cumulative evidence of his participation in the crime. The jury was not put in the same predicament as it was in McDaniel of resolving mutually exclusive defenses, with the potential for putting the entire blame on the wrong individual. Nor did the findings of the jury here reflect the obvious quandary the McDaniel jury was in when it returned a verdict of life without parole for both defendants, but the verdict forms as to mitigating circumstances for each defendant indicated that "the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Echols v. State
...evidence against one defendant appears stronger than against the other. Id. at 638, 648 S.W.2d at 59. Subsequently, in Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983), we said that McDaniel does not say that in every case, even in capital cases, where antagonistic defenses are presente......
-
McGehee v. State
...Gordon, supra. But corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself as to sustain a conviction. Id. See also, Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983). In Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 440-441, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983), this court Corroboration must be evidence of a sub......
-
McGhee v. State
...Gordon, supra. But corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself as to sustain a conviction. Id. See also, Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983). In Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 440-441, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983), this court Corroboration must be evidence of a sub......
-
Parker v. State
...131, 748 S.W.2d 117. However, corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. See Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983). Thus, this court must determine if there is substantial corroborating evidence supporting Appellant's conviction. We con......