Rhodes v. United States
| Decision Date | 20 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:15-CV-00432 JAR,4:15-CV-00432 JAR |
| Parties | DWIGHT RHODES, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Movant Dwight Rhodes' Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. (Doc. No. 1.) The Government has filed a Response (Doc. No. 9), and Movant filed a Reply (Doc. No. 15). The matter is, therefore, ready for disposition. Because the Court finds that Movant's claim can be conclusively determined based upon the parties' filings and the record, the Court decides this matter without an evidentiary hearing.
On October 20, 2011, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Movant, charging him with (1) possession of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count I); (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count II); (3) using and maintaining a premises for the purpose of distributing and using a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (Count III); and (4) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count IV). After a two-day jury trial on June 25 and 26, 2012, Movant was found guilty on all four counts. OnSeptember 27, 2012, Movant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 months on Count I and 94 months on Counts II and III, and a consecutive term of 60 months on Count IV, for a total term of imprisonment of 154 months.
Movant appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count III because the evidence was insufficient to prove that his purpose in using or maintaining the premises in question was to distribute a controlled substance. The Eighth Circuit rejected his argument and affirmed this Court's judgment and sentence on September 13, 2013. United States v. Rhodes, 730 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2013). His petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on March 10, 2014. Rhodes v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1525 (2014). On March 9, 2015, Movant timely filed pro se the pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On September 11, 2017, Movant filed a motion to amend his § 2255 motion on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 924 is "void for vagueness."
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may seek habeas relief "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To warrant relief under § 2255, the error of which the movant complains must amount to a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
Section 2255 does not provide a means for movants to relitigate the merits of the evidence presented at their trial. See Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1974) ().
Procedural default may limit the relief available to a § 2255 movant. First, a movant cannot raise a claim that was previously raised and decided on direct appeal. United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2005). Second, a movant cannot raise a non-constitutional or non-jurisdictional claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not. Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994). Third, a movant cannot raise a constitutional or jurisdictional claim that was not raised on direct appeal unless he "can demonstrate (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence." United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001). However, a movant may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in a § 2255 motion, regardless of whether the claim could have been raised on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
If a movant's claim is not procedurally barred, the Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to consider it, "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Thus, a movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [the movant] to relief." Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). In contrast, a court may dismiss a movant's claim without an evidentiary hearing "if the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based." Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994).
Movant seeks relief on the grounds that his counsel was ineffective. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth the two-part test a § 2255 movant must satisfy in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
A § 2255 movant seeking to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel faces "a heavy burden." Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076. Under Strickland's first prong, a court reviewing counsel's performance must be "highly deferential" and "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Under Strickland's second prong, a movant can demonstrate prejudice only by showing Id. at 694. A court may address these prongs in any order; failure to satisfy either is dispositive. Id. at 697. See also Fields v. United States, 201 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2000) () (citation omitted). In his § 2255 Motion, Movant makes six allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court will consider each of these allegations, in turn.
Movant first alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal whether or not the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) A review of the record shows that on November 25, 2011, Movant's counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements. Specifically, counsel moved to suppress Movant's admission that he possessed marijuana, as well as the marijuana found on his person, because the police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which Movant was a passenger. Counsel also moved to suppress the .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol, drugs, scale, and other evidence seized from Movant's residence and his various admissions, because the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained false information that was necessary to the finding of probable cause.
The motion to suppress was addressed in an evidentiary hearing on December 29, 2011, where Movant's counsel cross-examined the Government's witnesses, presented evidence and argued the merits of the motion. After extensive briefing, United States Magistrate Judge Baker found that based on the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to detain and arrest Movant and to search the residence, and recommended that the motion to suppress be denied in its entirety. This Court adopted the Report and Recommendation over defense counsel's objection and denied the motion to suppress.
Appellate counsel does not have a duty "to advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by the defendant." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 382 (1985). Moreover, counsel has discretion to abandon losing issues on appeal. Reese v. Delo, 94 F.3d 1177, 1185 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). To show that his attorney was deficient in failing to raise the claim on appeal, Movant must show a reasonable likelihood that, but for his attorney's error, the result onappeal would have been different. Id. (citing Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir.1987)). Absent contrary evidence, the failure to raise a claim is assumed to be an exercise of "sound appellate strategy." United States v. Brown, 528 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
Movant's counsel argued the merits of the motion to suppress at the suppression hearing and extensively briefed the legal and factual basis for the motion. The Magistrate Judge considered the evidence and recommended denial and this Court denied the motion, finding there was probable cause to detain and arrest Movant and to search the residence. For these reasons, Movant's likelihood of success on appeal on the motion to suppress issue was remote. Further, Movant has presented no evidence establishing that counsel's failure to raise this issue was anything other than an exercise of sound appellate strategy.
In his...
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