Riad v. Porsche Cars N. Am.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: MARSTON, J.
• Docket Number: Civil Action 18-5175-KSM
• Decision Date: 30 July 2024
• Citation: Riad v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Civil Action 18-5175-KSM (E.D. Pa. Jul 30, 2024)
• Parties: JOSEPH EDWARD RIAD, Plaintiff, v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
• topic: Insurance Law,Civil Procedure,Product Liability Law

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JOSEPH EDWARD RIAD, Plaintiff, v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-5175-KSM

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

July 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J.

Plaintiff Joseph Edward Riad brings product liability claims against Defendant Porsche Cars North America, Inc.^[1]for injuries caused by defective pipes in the cooling system of his 2004 Porsche Cayenne Turbo. (See Doc. No. 24.) Porsche has moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. No. 98.) Riad opposes that motion. (Doc. No. 113.) For the reasons discussed below, Porsche's motion is granted.^[2]

I. BACKGROUND^[3]

In 2011, Riad purchased a used 2004 Porsche Cayenne Turbo. (Doc No. 113-2 at ¶¶ 12.) As with all 2003-2006 Cayenne models, the engine cooling system in Riad's Cayenne included pipes made with a Nylon 66/plastic composite. (Id. at ¶ 3.)^[4] On November 30, 2016 while Riad was driving to his local Porsche dealer in Newark Delaware, the pipes in his car's cooling system cracked, causing the antifreeze within the system to leak, vaporize, and make its way into the cabin of the car. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-10.) According to Riad, “there was just smoke coming out from everywhere, like from under the car, like from the exhaust area and from the vents.” (Riad Oct. 25, 2023 Dep. Tr. at 245:14-20; see also id. at 255:15-21 (“It was-it was really uncomfortable. I could taste it. I could smell it. I was coughing. It was very uncomfortable. It was everywhere. It was like in the car. Even with the windows down, the smoke was in there.”).) Riad called the Delaware Porsche dealership and spoke to one of the service people, who told him he should continue to make his way to the dealership. (Riad Oct. 25, 2023 Dep. Tr. at 232:13-18, 240:12-14, 244:5-245:9, 249:4-7.) Riad inhaled the fumes for the remainder of the drive and arrived at the dealership feeling dizzy, nauseous, and like his lungs were “burning up.” (Riad Dec. 1, 2023 Dep. Tr. at 372:15-24; see also id. at 374:20-375:5 (testifying that when he reached the dealership, he “got out of the car, crawled out of the car . . . and I was just hacking, hacking, hacking and I threw up and I laid on the ground.”).)

The day after the accident Riad continued to experience shortness of breath. (Doc. No. 113-6 at 3.) He visited his local emergency room and was given steroids and nebulizer treatments. (Id.)^[5]In the years since the incident, Riad claims he has seen minimal improvement in his respiratory condition. (Id.) Despite having no history of respiratory problems before the accident, Riad has regularly used inhalers since that date and repeatedly sought treatment for the condition from his primary care physician and pulmonologist, who diagnosed Riad with asthma. (Id. at 3.)

On November 30, 2018, Riad filed this product liability action against Porsche, alleging that the plastic cooling pipes in his 2004 Cayenne were defective and that a crack in one of the pipes allowed toxic fumes to enter the cabin of the car, causing lasting damage to his lungs. (Doc. Nos. 1, 24.) He brings claims for strict liability design defect and negligent failure to warn under Pennsylvania law. (Doc. No. 24 at 8-10.) Porsche moves for summary judgment on both counts. (Doc. No. 98.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the “materials in the record,” show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since the complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23 (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Riad brings two product liability claims-one for strict liability design defect and one for negligent failure to warn. To prevail on either claim, Riad must prove there is “a causal connection” between the antifreeze fumes that entered the cabin of his 2004 Cayenne and his respiratory injuries. See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F.Supp.2d 434, 524 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“Proof of causation is a necessary element in a products liability action. Absent a causal relationship between the defendant's product and the plaintiff's injury the defendant cannot be held liable on a theory of negligence, strict liability, or misrepresentation.”); Thomas v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-01841, 2007 WL 2080485, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) (“The law is well established in this Commonwealth that Plaintiff must prove, as a necessary element of her products liability action, a causal connection between the injuries she claimed she sustained and her alleged exposure to a substance released or emitted from the toaster oven, regardless of whether he claim sounds in negligence, strict liability or breach o[f] warranty.”); see also Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring proof that the “defect was the proximate cause of decedent's injuries” before strict liability case could go to a jury); Mains v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 640 F.Supp.3d 373, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (noting that to prevail on negligence-based product liability claim, the plaintiff must establish, among other things, “a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury”).

“Normally a plaintiff may establish his case of causation with any evidence, direct or circumstantial, which tends to show defendant's actions as the legal cause of his harm.” Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978). “Where, however, the ultimate determinations lie beyond the knowledge or expertise of the average layperson, expert testimony is permitted (and sometimes required)” to assist the jury in deciding the causation issue. Id. at 1285; cf. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practice, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.Supp.3d 557, 569-70 (D.S.C. 2017) (“While the specific language used by courts vary to some degree, all jurisdictions require expert testimony at least where the issues are medically complex and outside common knowledge and lay experience.”) (collecting cases). Pennsylvania courts recognize that generally, “the complexities of the human body place questions as to the cause of pain or injury beyond the knowledge of the average layperson.” Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285. Accordingly, “[f]or a plaintiff to make out a cause of action in such a case . . ., the law requires that expert medical testimony be employed” to show “the injury in question did, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, stem from the negligent act alleged.” Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285; see also, e.g., Lattanze v. Silverstrini, 448 A.2d 605, 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“Generally, a plaintiff must prove causation by expert medical testimony.”); Bixler v. Lamendola, Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-1819, 2022 WL 2441567, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 5, 2022) (explaining that “Pennsylvania courts generally require expert medical testimony to prove causation in personal-injury actions” in the context of a motion for summary judgment). Porsche argues that Riad cannot satisfy that standard here because his only causation expert, Dr. Saad Ashraf, MD,^[6] issued an opinion that was not to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.^[7]The Court agrees.

“Under Pennsylvania law, experts on medical causation must testify to ‘a reasonable degree of medical certainty.'” Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., 576 F.Supp.3d 262, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Kravinsky v. Glover, 396 A.2d 1349, 1355-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (“When a party must prove causation through expert testimony the expert must testify with ‘reasonable certainty' that ‘in his professional opinion, the result in question did come from the cause alleged.'” (quoting McCrosson v Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 129 A. 568, 569 (Pa. 1925))); cf. McMahon v. Young, 276 A.2d 534, 535 (Pa. 1971) (“It is the intent of our law that if the plaintiff's medical expert cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, there is nothing on the record with which a jury can make a decision with sufficient certainty so as to make a legal judgment.”). “This is not merely an evidentiary standard; it forms part of the plaintiff's burden of proof.” Hoefling, 576 F.Supp.3d at 285; cf. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 752 (“As part of the burden of proof, then, Pennsylvania's rule is a substantive one, not in conflict with Federal Rules of Evidence, and thus governs in federal court.”). An expert fails to meet “this standard of certainty if he testifies ‘that the alleged cause possibly, or could have led to the result, that it could very properly account for the result, or even that it was very highly probable' that it caused the result.'” Kravinsky, 396 A.2d at 1356 (quoting Niggel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 A.2d 718, 719 (Pa. 1971)); see also Hoefling, 576 F.Supp.3d at 286 (“A reasonable degree of medical certainty requires more than a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Soldo, 244...