Rialto Police Benefit Ass'n. v. Rialto

• Decision Date: 03 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. E039649.,E039649.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: RIALTO POLICE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF RIALTO, Defendant and Appellant; County of San Bernardino, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

66 Cal.Rptr.3d 714

155 Cal.App.4th 1295

RIALTO POLICE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF RIALTO, Defendant and Appellant;

County of San Bernardino, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

No. E039649.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

October 3, 2007.

Law Offices of Robert A. Owen, Robert A. Owen, Oxnard, and Kathy M. Gandara; Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai, Jeffrey Sloan and Jonathan V. Holtzman, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

Lackie & Dammeier, Michael D. Lackie, Michael A. Morguess and Dieter C. Dammeier, Upland, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson and Arthur A. Hartinger, Oakland, for Amicus Curiae League of California Cities.

OPINION

HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents an issue of first impression: Is a city's decision to enter into a contract with the county sheriff for law enforcement services, rather than continue to provide such services through the city's own police department, subject to the meet and confer requirements of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.)? We answer the question in the affirmative, and we therefore affirm the trial court's decision on the issue.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The City of Riaho (City) is a general law city, and its city council (City Council) is its elected policy-making body, responsible for policy oversight of City operations. The Rialto Police Department (RPD), headed by a police chief, serves as the law enforcement arm of the City. The Rialto Police Benefit Association (RPBA) is the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit consisting of all of the police officers and most of the civilian personnel employed by the RPD.

From January 2004 through the end of December 2005, the City and RPBA were parties to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In September 2005, the City administrator submitted a staff report to the City Council recommending that the City Council accept the proposal of, and authorize the execution of, a contract with the San Bernardino County Sheriffs Department (Sheriffs Department) to provide all law enforcement services for the City. On September 13, 2005, the day of the meeting at which the City Council would vote on how future law enforcement services would be handled for the City, the City delivered a letter to the RPBA and offered to meet and confer on the effects of the potential decision to contract with the Sheriffs Department, but not on the decision itself.

Hours later, after public comment and council discussions, the City Council voted to cede authority over law enforcement to the Sheriffs Department. The RPBA filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the City to meet and confer with regard to the decision to contract with the Sheriffs Department and sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring the City from entering into the contract.

The RPBA moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and an order to show cause regarding the preliminary injunction. The City opposed the motion. Following a hearing, the trial court granted a TRO enjoining the City from implementing a contract with the Sheriffs Department for law enforcement services.

Following a later hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction to the same effect as the TRO. On November 14, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on the merits. Thereafter, the trial court granted a writ of mandate setting aside the City Council's decision and directing the parties to meet and confer to discuss the issues.

After meeting and conferring pursuant to the judgment and writ, the City ratified and entered into a new two-year MOU with the RPBA. The City agreed not to contract out law enforcement services, at least during the term of the new MOU.¹

The City filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court in case No. E039381. We denied that petition.²

Other facts are set forth in the discussion of the issues to which they pertain.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This appeal presents a question of law— the interpretation and application of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code,³ § 3500 et seq.)—and does not turn on the resolution of disputed facts. Thus, the issues raised in this appeal are subject to de novo review by this court (see Usher v. County of Monterey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 210, 216, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 274), and we are not required to give deference to the trial court's ruling or the reasons for its ruling (see Rodriguez v. Solis (1991) 1 Cal. App.4th 495, 502, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 50).

B. Analysis

Labor relations between the City and the RPBA are governed by the MMBA, and under the MMBA, the City and the RPBA have a duty to meet and confer over matters within the scope of representation as defined in section 3504. (§ 3505.) However, "[e]ven if the parties meet and confer, they are not required to reach an agreement because the employer has `the ultimate power to refuse to agree on any particular issue.' [Citation.]" (Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 630, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 139 P.3d 532 (Claremont Police Officers ), quoting Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 665, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648 (Building Material)).

Matters within the scope of representation include, among other things, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." (§ 3504.) But the "merits, necessity or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order" are excepted from the meet and confer requirement. (§ 3504; see also Claremont Police Officers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 631, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 139 P.3d 532.)

As the court in Claremont Police Officers noted, "The definition[s] of `scope of representation' and its exceptions are `arguably vague' and `overlapping.' [Citations.] '"[W]ages, hours and working conditions," ... broadly read could encompass practically any conceivable bargaining proposal; and "merits, necessity or organization of any service" . .. expansively interpreted, could swallow the whole provision for collective negotiation and relegate determination of all labor issues to the city's discretion.' [Citation.]" (Claremont Police Officers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 631, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69,139 P.3d 532.)

Thus, in Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 663, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648, the court established a balancing test for determining whether a meet and confer requirement applies to management decisions. (See also Claremont Police Officers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 637, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 139 P.3d 532 [holding that the same test applies to the implementation of fundamental managerial and policy decisions].) The court in Claremont Police Officers set forth that test as follows: "First, we ask whether the management action has `a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees.' [Citation.] If not, there is no duty to meet and confer. [Citations.] Second, we ask whether the significant and adverse effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision. If not, then, as in Building Material, the meet-and-confer requirement applies. [Citation.] Third, if both factors are present—if an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees—we apply a balancing test. The action Is within the scope of representation only if the employer's need for unencumbered, decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.' [Citation.] In balancing the interests to determine whether parties must meet and confer over a certain matter (§ 3505), a court may also consider whether the 'transactional cost of the bargaining process outweighs its value.'" (Claremont Police Officers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69,139 P.3d 532.)

Here, without question, the City's decision to enter into a contract with the Sheriffs Department for law enforcement services affects wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the City's police officers within the meaning of the first inquiry under Building Material. In Building Material, the City and County of San Francisco unilaterally eliminated certain bargaining unit positions, reorganized and reclassified the duties of hospital truck drivers who belonged to the union, and transferred work duties to new positions not covered by the bargaining unit. (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 655-656, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.) The City and County of San Francisco then denied the union's request to meet and confer regarding the action on the ground that the matter was outside the scope of the meet-and-confer requirements of the MMBA. (Building Material, supra, at p. 656, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.) The Supreme Court held, however, that the City and County of San Francisco were required to meet and confer with the union because the transfer of duties to a nonbargaining unit had a significant and adverse effect on the bargaining unit's wages, hours, and working conditions. (Id. at p. 664, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.)

In reaching its holding, the court in Building Material cited with approval Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (Fibreboard)⁴ and Soule Glass and Glazing Co v. N.L.R.B. (1st Cir.1981) 652 F.2d 1055 (Soule), abrogated on other grounds in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson (1990) 494 U.S. 775, 786, footnote 7, 110 S.Ct. 1542, 108 L.Ed.2d 801. (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 659, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.) In Fibreboard, the Supreme Court held that "the `contracting out' of work being performed by employees in the bargaining unit" was "within the literal meaning of the...