Rianto v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:12-cv-00516-DAD-SKO,1:12-cv-00516-DAD-SKO |
| Parties | NICHOLAS LEVI RIANTO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the court on respondent's motions to dismiss petitioner Nicholas Rianto's petition for a writ of coram nobis, and for reconsideration of this court's October 12, 2012 order. (Doc. No. 19.)
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
Nichols Levi Rianto ("petitioner") is a native and citizen of Indonesia who was a permanent alien resident of the United States.1 On June 4, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement,petitioner entered pleas of guilty to two counts of unauthorized use of the identification of another in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) and two counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1341. (See United States v. Nichols Rianto, Case No. 1:01-cr-05063-AWI, Doc. Nos. 11, 12.) On September 9, 2002, pursuant to his pleas of guilty, petitioner was finally sentenced to a concurrent term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day, a three year concurrent term of supervised release to follow, a $400 mandatory penalty assessment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $10,555.37. (See Doc. No. 3 at 2; see also United States v. Rianto, No. 1:01-cr-05063-AWI, Doc. Nos. 31, 32.) After his initial release from confinement, petitioner was subsequently remanded into to custody for an additional eight months on February 22, 2005 and for an additional five months on September 6, 2005, both times for having violated the terms and conditions of his supervised release, with petitioner eventually being released from federal custody for the final time before the end of May 2006. (See Doc. No. 3 at 2; see also United States v. Rianto, No. 1:01-cr-05063-AWI, Doc. Nos. 50, 60.).
Petitioner alleges that he applied for and was granted renewal of his Lawful Permanent Resident Card in 2009. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-5.) However, on October 14, 2010, he was detained for deportation.2 (Id. at 5.)
Following his 2010 detention, petitioner has attempted to collaterally attack the sentence imposed in the underlying federal criminal action, thereby seeking to remove himself from the category of persons subject to mandatory deportation. In this regard, on February 7, 2011, petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to correct, vacate or set aside his sentence. (Id.) The court denied that motion as untimely, but granted petitioner leave to file a petition for a writ of coram nobis. (Id.)
On April 4, 2012, petitioner filed the instant writ of coram nobis motion, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in the underlying federal criminal prosecution because: (i) his defense attorney erroneously advised him that a sentence of less than one year of actual time served would not have any negative consequences on his alien residence status, and(ii) his defense attorney failed to advise him that the imposition of a restitution order in excess of $10,000 would result in a classification of his conviction as an aggravated felony, thereby resulting in immigration officials finding him to be removable from the United States. (Doc. No. 1.)
On October 12, 2012, the court issued an order in this action finding that petitioner had adequately stated a claim for relief, ordering the United States to file a response to the petition, and directing attorney Jack Revvill, petitioner's defense counsel in the underlying federal criminal proceedings, to submit information pertaining to the representations made to petitioner concerning the immigration consequences of his entry of plea pursuant to the plea agreement with the government in June of 2001. (Doc. No. 3.)
In response, attorney Revvill filed a declaration with the court under seal on April 7, 2014. (Doc. No. 6.) On May 25, 2016, respondent United States responded by filing a motion to dismiss petitioner's writ of coram nobis and a motion for reconsideration of the court's October 12, 2012 order. (Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner has not replied to any of these filings. Below, the court will first address the applicable legal standards and then turn to the government's motions.
A writ of coram nobis is a remedy by which the court can correct errors in criminal convictions where other remedies are not available. While Federal Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) abolishes various common law writs, including the writ of coram nobis in civil cases, the writ is still available in criminal proceedings where other relief is wanting. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); United States v. Chan, 792 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (); see generally United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (). The source of the court's power to grant coram nobis relief lies in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see also United States v. Monreal, 301 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).
To qualify for error coram nobis relief, four requirements must be satisfied: (i) a more usual remedy is not available; (ii) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (iii) adverse consequences exist from the conviction to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, and (iv) the error is of the most fundamental character. See Chan, 792 F.3d at 1153; Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, "petitions for a writ of coram nobis should be treated in a manner similar to [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 habeas corpus petitions."3 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1412 (citing United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 573 (9th Cir. 1981)). In particular, whether an evidentiary hearing is required in resolving a claim presented by way of coram nobis petition is a determination that should be made in the same manner as in the context of a motion made under § 2255. See Taylor, 648 F.2d at 573, n. 25 (); Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1412 ( ).
In reviewing a motion brought pursuant to § 2255, a federal court shall hold an evidentiary hearing "unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). Evidentiary hearings are particularly appropriate when "claims raise facts which occurred out of the courtroom and off the record." United States v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1994). When a § 2255 movant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing unless "something in the record conclusively shows that [movant's] trial attorney was not ineffective." Burrows, 872 F.2d at 917. In deciding whether a § 2255 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the district court should determine whether, accepting the truth of movant's factual allegations, he could prevail on his claim. Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465. However, to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing the movant must provide specific factual allegations which, if true, state a claim on which relief under § 2255 could be granted. United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may deny an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion "if the petitioner's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim or are 'so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal.'" United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). These same principles then, guide the determination of whether an evidentiary hearing is necessitated in ruling upon a petition for a writ of coram nobis. See Taylor, 648 F.2d at 573; see also United States v. Andrade-Larrios, 39 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1994); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1989).
District courts "possess[] the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient." City of Los Angeles. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F. 3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration, however, "should not be granted . . . unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an interveningchange in the controlling law." 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F. 3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F. 3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy "to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F. 3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F. 2d 364 n.5 (9th...
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