Ribera v. Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 18 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12040,12040
• Citation: 594 P.2d 742,92 N.M. 694,1979 NMSC 29
• Parties: Petra G. RIBERA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Mrs. Brian O'Neil, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 742

594 P.2d 742

92 N.M. 694

Petra G. RIBERA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Mrs. Brian O'Neil Respondents-Appellants.

No. 12040.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 18, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 1979.

[92 NM 694] Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., R. Baumgartner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Services Dept., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellants.

Bruce P. Moore, Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee.

OPINION

FEDERICI, Justice.

Ribera (appellee) was employed as a housekeeper. She terminated her employment because of pain she suffered while performing her housekeeping duties. She had been advised by her physician that the pain which resulted from her arthritis would not cease so long as she continued the housekeeping job. It is undisputed that appellee suffered from arthritis for several years during her employment and that the original arthritic condition itself was not caused by the employment.

Appellee applied for unemployment compensation after leaving her employment. The Employment Security Commission (now the Employment Services Division of the Human Services Department) disqualified appellee from receipt of unemployment benefits until she had obtained new work and earned wages equal to five times her weekly benefit amount, pursuant to § 51-1-7, N.M.S.A. 1978. Appellee filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court seeking review of the Commission's decision. The district court reversed the Commission's decision and it appeals.

As its first point the Commission argues that the district court erred in its decision that the findings and conclusions made by the Commission, after hearing, were not supported by substantial evidence. Section 51-1-7 reads:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

A. if it is determined by the commission that he left his employment voluntarily Without good cause in connection with his employment. The disqualification shall continue for the duration of his unemployment and until he has earned wages in an amount equivalent to five times his weekly benefit amount otherwise payable. (Emphasis added.)

The Commission made the following findings and conclusions after its hearing on the matter:

To establish good cause for a voluntary leaving connected with the employment, an individual must have been confronted with compelling and necessituous (sic) circumstances of such magnitude that he had no other alternative than to leave gainful employment. In addition, the reason for the leaving must be directly attributable to, or causally related to the employment. Good cause connected with the employment is not evidenced by a leaving for any non-work related personal or domestic reason.

Here, there is no doubt that the work aggravated the claimant's medical condition and that her condition had progressed to the extent that she could no longer adequately perform her job duties. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the condition was caused directly by the work performed for this particular employer or was otherwise attributable to her employment.

In the instant case, the weight of the evidence shows that the claimant left work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the employment; therefore, was subject to disqualification for benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 59-9-5(a) (now § 51-1-7, N.M.S.A.1978) of the Act. (Emphasis added.)

N.M.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(4), N.M.S.A.1978 permits the filing of a writ of certiorari to the district court to review a decision of the Employment Security Commission. On review, the rule provides that:

The district court shall try and determine such cause upon the evidence legally introduced at the hearing before said employment security commission (employment services division) presented by the parties to said court. After hearing said cause the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment therein upon the merits.

In Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963), this Court reviewed the above rule and the authorities concerning the scope of review by the trial court and said:

The parties, however, are in disagreement as to the scope of review by the district court, announced in Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Security Commission, 50 N.M. 309, 176 P.2d 190. After discussing both the statute and the rules, this court there said:

" * * * We take this (the statute and rule) to mean the district court shall make its own findings of fact, after a review of the evidence. It does not mean, necessarily, that the district court must ignore the findings of the Commission. It may give them some weight and should follow the Commission's findings in making its own, save where the evidence clearly preponderates against them * * * (citing cases). In the last analysis, however, the responsibility of making correct findings rests with the district court and it is not to be hampered or embarrassed in the performance of this duty by the findings of the Commission."

It is true that the majority of both State and Federal courts have adopted the substantial evidence rule for review of administrative agency decisions, 4 Davis, Administrative Law, § 29.01, and we have adopted that view in construing the review provisions applicable to other administrative agencies. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809. The statute, § 59-9-6(h) and (i), N.M.S.A.1953, and rule 81(c)(4) requires the district...