Ricci v. R.I. Commerce Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. WC-2020-0502 |
| Parties | HELEN RICCI, Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND COMMERCE CORPORATION, RHODE ISLAND AIRPORT CORPORATION, RHODE ISLAND AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT, DENNIS GRECO, and IFTIKHAR AHMAD, Defendants. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Plaintiff Helen Ricci (Plaintiff or Ms. Ricci) is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as a "law enforcement officer" pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-1 et seq. Defendants Rhode Island Commerce Corporation, Rhode Island Airport Corporation, Rhode Island Airport Police Department, Dennis Greco, and Iftikhar Ahmad (collectively, Defendants) seek summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff was not a "law enforcement officer" under the statute at the time of her termination. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13 and 9-30-1.
Plaintiff filed this instant action on December 1, 2020. Ms. Ricci is the former Deputy Chief of the Rhode Island Airport Police Department (RIAPD), hired by the Rhode Island Airport Corporation (RIAC) on December 16, 2019 to serve in that position. (V. Compl. ¶ 7.) She was not sworn in as Deputy Chief until March 2, 2020. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Ricci alleges in her Verified Complaint that during the period preceding her swearing in, she performed all duties of a Deputy Chief, though she did not wear a uniform, have a badge, or carry a gun, and was unable to make arrests. Id. ¶ 9; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 9 (denying). Ms. Ricci also claims that it was only when she was sworn in on March 2, 2020 that she was provided with the uniform, badge, gun, and authority to arrest. V. Compl. ¶ 10; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 10 (denying).
The Chief of the RIAPD at the time of Ms. Ricci's hiring, and thus her immediate supervisor, was Leo Messier (Messier), who later retired on July 7, 2020. (V. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12.) Ms. Ricci claims that at all times she was employed with the RIAPD, Dennis Greco (Greco) was her supervisor. Id. ¶ 5; see Pl.'s Ex. 3 (Greco's Performance Evaluation of Ricci), at 2 (); but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 5 (denying). Greco, Acting Senior Vice President of Operations and Maintenance at the RIAC, states that he is not a sworn officer of the RIAPD. See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Defs.' Mem.) ¶ II.2; Greco Aff. ¶ 3. At no time during her tenure of employment with the RIAPD was Ms. Ricci promoted to Chief. (V. Compl. ¶ 13; Defs.' Answer ¶ 13.) An August 7, 2020 performance evaluation by Greco stated that the title of Acting Chief "was never bestowed upon [Ms. Ricci] by competent authority." (Tr. 11:6-7, 13:4-8 (Jan. 5, 2021)1; Pl.'s Ex. 3, at 5.) Ms. Ricci also testified that she was not able to hire or fire anyone on her own. (Tr. 13:18-21, 14:25-15:2.) However, Greco's performance review of Ms. Ricci indicates that she did answer Step 1 grievances generated by the union and assist with Step 2 and 3 responses. (Pl.'s Ex. 3, at 5.) RIAC did not employ a new Chief until at least November 10, 2020. (Defs.' Mem. ¶ II.9; Greco Aff. ¶ 9.)
On November 10, 2020, Ms. Ricci was terminated as a member of the RIAPD and employee of RIAC based on her purported insubordination, among other things. (V. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17; Defs.' Answer ¶¶ 15-17.) Ms. Ricci claims that she had not been disciplined before November 10, 2020. V. Compl. ¶ 14; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 14 (denying). Ms. Ricci states that around 4:30 pm on November 10, 2020, she was told to report to the Grant Conference Room to meet with the Human Resources Director. V. Compl. ¶ 15; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 15 (denying). Ms. Ricci then claims Greco told her that she was "being terminated effective immediately," reading from a typewritten statement that set forth the bases for her termination, including "concerns" about retaliatory charges filed against her by her previous employer, the Boston Police Department (BPD), during the period from 2009 to 2012. Tr. 15:8-11; V. Compl. ¶¶ 17-19; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 17 (), ¶¶ 18-19 (). Ms. Ricci also claims she requested a copy of the prepared statement from Greco at that time, which he refused to provide. V. Compl. ¶ 20; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 20 (denying).
On or about November 12, 2020, the RIAPD promoted Inspector Joe Ottaviano to Chief of Police. (Tr. 19:4-8, 19:20-22; Pl.'s Ex. 7.) Ms. Ricci faxed a written request to Greco seeking a hearing under the LEOBOR on November 13, 2020. V. Compl. ¶ 21; Pl.'s Ex. 4; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 21 (denying). Ms. Ricci also provided Greco with the name of her representative on the LEOBOR Hearing Committee on November 17, 2020. V. Compl. ¶ 22; Pl.'s Ex. 5; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 22 (denying). On November 23, 2020, Ms. Ricci's counsel sent a letter to Greco notifying him that the Defendants' failure to appoint their own representative entitled her to dismissal of any charges against her with prejudice, and consequently requesting she be reinstatedwith back pay and benefits. V. Compl. ¶ 26; Pl.'s Ex. 6; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 26 (). Ms. Ricci further claims that she was subsequently advised that Defendants believed the LEOBOR did not apply to her and she was not entitled to a hearing. V. Compl. ¶ 27; but see Defs.' Answer ¶ 27 ().
In her Verified Complaint, filed on December 1, 2020, Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief from the Court, also arguing that she is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. On December 14, 2020, the Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. Defendants subsequently filed their Answer on December 30, 2020. A remote hearing on this matter was held on January 5, 2021, during which the Plaintiff made additional oral argument and submitted multiple exhibits.
Defendants request summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.' Mem. 1, 3.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not covered by LEOBOR at the time of her termination because she was not a "law enforcement officer" as defined by that statute. Id. at 4-5. Defendants contend that, as Deputy Chief for the RIAPD from July 7, 2020 through November 10, 2020, Ms. Ricci was the highest ranking sworn officer in the RIAPD during that period. Id. ¶ II.10; Greco Aff. ¶ 10. Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is excluded from the definition of "law enforcement officer" under the plain and unambiguous language of the LEOBOR. (Defs.' Mem. 5.) Defendants further argue that this conclusion is supported by a fullreading of the statute. Id. at 6-8. In particular, Defendants point to the LEOBOR definition of a "hearing committee" composed of three members, where one is appointed by the aggrieved law enforcement officer and one appointed by the chief or highest ranking officer, claiming that if the "highest ranking officer" also qualified as a "law enforcement officer" it would lead to an absurd result where that person could select two members of the three member committee. Id. at 6, 8. Defendants also claim that such an interpretation would lead to another absurd result: insulating the highest ranking officer from suspension during proceedings. Id. at 6-7. Because they claim that there are no material facts in dispute, Defendants request that Plaintiff's Verified Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. Id. at 8.
In contrast, Plaintiff argues that she is a law enforcement officer with rights under the LEOBOR. (V. Compl. 1.) Plaintiff claims that, at all times during her employment by the RIAPD, Greco was her supervisor. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff also claims that she was never promoted to Chief and was told in a performance review that she was not the Acting Chief. Id. ¶ 13; Pl.'s Ex. 3, at 5. At oral argument, Plaintiff also stated that she was never able to hire or fire anyone, citing to the job descriptions for both Deputy Chief and Chief. See Tr. 8:22-9:19, 11:6-8, 12:13-19, 13:4-25, 14:14-15:2; Pl.'s Ex. 3, at 5; Pl.'s Ex. 8, at 2; Pl.'s Ex. 9, at 1-2. Plaintiff argued that the Director of the RIAC would be the highest ranking officer under the LEOBOR, rather than Plaintiff, offering multiple exhibits as evidence of the legislative history of the LEOBOR section in dispute. See Tr. 20:7-17, 33:10-23 (), 21:12-22:4; Pl.'s Ex. 10; Pl.'s Ex. 11; Pl.'s Ex. 12.
Additionally, in response to Defendants' argument about the dangers of Plaintiff "packing" the hearing committee, Plaintiff argued that this would be impossible because a new Chief was hired immediately after Plaintiff was terminated and would have had the relevant authority toappoint under the LEOBOR. See Tr. 35:4-13. Plaintiff also argued that the LEOBOR is a remedial statute and should be interpreted liberally. See id. at 35:14-16, 36:3-9. Consequently, in her Verified Complaint, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court declare her rights, status, and benefits under LEOBOR and find that the RIAPD's failure to timely file its hearing committee selection constitutes a dismissal of all charges against Plaintiff, with prejudice. (V. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31.)
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), "'[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact is evident from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and...
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