Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 December 1997
• Citation: 550 Pa. 254,705 A.2d 422
• Parties: Antonio N. RICCIO, Appellant, v. AMERICAN REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 422

705 A.2d 422

550 Pa. 254

Antonio N. RICCIO, Appellant, v. AMERICAN REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 18, 1997.

Decided Dec. 23, 1997.

[550 Pa. 257] Charles W. Garbett, New Castle, for Antonio N. Riccio.

Jon Hogue, Pittsburgh, for American Republic Ins. Co.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CASTILLE, Justice.

This Court granted allocatur in this matter in order to address two issues. The first issue is whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule barred a judge involved in the post-trial motion phase of the litigation sub judice from reversing the ruling of another judge of a coordinate court in the same matter. The second issue is, if the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not act as a bar, whether the term "spine", as used in the exclusion provision of the medical insurance policy issued by appellee to appellant, included the intervertebral disc injury suffered by appellant. While we find that the coordinate jurisdiction rule under the facts of this matter does not bar the post-trial judge from reversing the ruling of another judge of the same court in the same case, we agree with the Superior Court that the term "spine", which was contained in the exclusion provision of the medical insurance policy in question, encompassed the intervertebral disc injury suffered by appellant.

The relevant facts are that on October 16, 1990, appellant applied to appellee for medical insurance for his two children and himself. In the medical history section of his insurance application concerning the back/spine, appellant averred that neither he nor his two daughters had been treated or diagnosed over the last ten years with any type of back pain, curvature or disc problems. However, appellant's insurance application did indicate that he had visited Ellwood City Hospital's emergency room in June of 1986 complaining of stomach pains after eating at a fast-food restaurant.

On October 18, 1990, two days after making the application for insurance with appellee, but before appellee issued the medical insurance policy, appellant suffered a herniated disc while attempting to lift a pizza oven at the pizzeria he owned. On October 19, 1990, appellant underwent a surgical microdisectomy ¹ as a result of the injury.

Appellee subsequently received appellant's medical insurance application. In response to appellant's admission that he had visited Ellwood City Hospital's emergency room in 1986, appellee requested appellant's medical records from the hospital. Included in Ellwood City Hospital's medical records for appellant was an x-ray of appellant's spine. On November 20, 1990, appellee issued a medical insurance policy to appellant which was retroactive to the application date of October 16, 1990. The insurance policy, however, contained the following explicit exclusion because of appellant's medical records:

This policy provides all the stated benefits except for any loss incurred by or for Antonio N. Riccio which results from: hiatal or diaphragmatic hernia, arthritis, any injury to, disease, disorder of, or treatment or operative repair of the spine, or ulcer of the duodenum. (emphasis added).

Appellant accepted this medical insurance policy and made the appropriate premium payments in order to keep the policy in force.

Approximately ten months after appellant injured his back, appellant submitted medical bills to appellee totalling $10,937.70 for the treatment of his herniated disc. On July 26, 1991, appellee denied appellant benefits based on the above-referenced exclusion provision contained in the medical insurance policy.

On May 18, 1992, appellant instituted an action against appellee in which he sought to recover his medical expenses for the treatment of his intervertebral disc problem from the medical insurance policy issued by appellee. Appellee answered appellant's complaint by denying coverage on the grounds that the medical expenses submitted by appellant were explicitly excluded by the language of the policy exclusion.

On October 13, 1994, the trial judge conducted a one-day non-jury trial. On October 20, 1994, the judge entered a verdict in favor of appellee. On that same day, the trial judge assigned to this matter filed an Opinion in Support of Verdict finding that appellee had no duty to provide coverage for appellant's claim on the grounds that the policy exclusion for spinal injuries included appellant's intervertebral disc problem.

Appellant filed a timely motion for post-trial relief that raised numerous theories which appellant believed warranted the grant of a new trial. On June 15, 1995, the trial judge recused himself from the case because scheduling conflicts made him unavailable to dispose of appellant's post-trial motions. In accordance with Rule 227.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ² appellant's post-trial motions were reassigned to another judge of the same Common Pleas Court ("post-trial judge"). On November 17, 1995, the post-trial judge issued a two-paragraph order which held that the trial judge had applied at trial an incorrect definition for the term "spine" contained in the policy exclusion. Because the post-trial judge concluded that the spinal column did not include intervertebral discs, the post-trial judge held that the medical insurance policy exclusion did not apply. Therefore, the post-trial judge granted appellant's post-trial motion and awarded appellant a new trial.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the post-trial judge's ruling. The Superior Court first found that the coordinate jurisdiction rule barred the post-trial judge from overruling the trial judge's previous ruling on the definition of the word "spine." Moreover, the Superior Court found that the trial judge applied a correct definition of the word "spine" in concluding that appellee had no duty to provide coverage on appellant's claim because of the policy exclusion for spinal injuries. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the post-trial judge's award of a new trial and remanded the matter to the post-trial judge to consider the merits of the other issues raised in appellant's post-trial motions that the post-trial judge had yet to consider. This Court granted allocatur in order to determine if the Superior Court erred in it application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule to this matter, and, if so, whether the term "spine" in the medical insurance policy exclusion included the disc problems appellant suffered from his October 18, 1990 injury.

This Court has long recognized that under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other's decisions. Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 573, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995). The coordinate jurisdiction rule is premised on the sound jurisprudential policy of fostering finality in pre-trial proceedings, thereby promoting judicial economy and efficiency. Id. This rule applies equally to civil and criminal cases and it falls within the "law of the case" doctrine. As this Court recently explained, the law of the case doctrine embodies the concept that:

[A] court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of the same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter. Among the related but distinct rules which make up the law of the case doctrine are that: ... upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the transferor trial court.

Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. at 574, 664 A.2d at 1331.

When determining whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies, the court is not guided by whether an opinion was issued in support of the initial ruling. Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150, 155, 675 A.2d 264, 267 (1996). Instead, this Court looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case. As this Court has explained:

Where the motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections differ from motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ from motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later motion is not precluded from granting relief although another judge has denied an earlier motion. However, a later motion should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless intervening changes in the facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question.

Goldey, 544 Pa. at 155-56, 675 A.2d at 267; accord Commonwealth v. Starr, supra. Thus, in order to determine whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies to this case, we must look to the procedural posture where the trial judge and the post-trial judge made their respective rulings.

Here, the trial judge made his ruling on the meaning of the word spine while rendering a verdict at the conclusion of the non-jury trial. The post-trial judge, however, made his ruling that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in defining the word spine during the post-trial motion process. Under the post-trial motion process, the judge considering the post- trial motions can order a new trial pursuant to Rule 227.1(a)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure if he concludes that a factual or legal mistake was made at the trial level and that on consideration of the particular circumstances of the case, the mistake (or mistakes) formed a sufficient basis to order a new trial. Morrison v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 538 Pa. 122, 133, 646 A.2d 565, 571 (1994). Also, the fact that the trial in this case was a non-jury trial has no effect upon a party's right to seek post-trial relief in the form of a new trial since the Note to Rule 227.1 provides that a motion for post-trial relief can be filed following a trial by a judge without a jury. See...