Riccitelli v. Sternfeld

• Citation: 349 Ill.App. 63,109 N.E.2d 921
• Decision Date: 30 December 1952
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 45804
• Parties: RICCITELLI v. STERNFELD et al. Appeal of RESNICK.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 921

109 N.E.2d 921

349 Ill.App. 63

RICCITELLI v. STERNFELD et al.

Appeal of RESNICK.

Gen. No. 45804.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

Dec. 30, 1952.

Crowe & Abrahamson, Chicago, Burt A. Crowe, Chicago, of counsel, for appellant.

Louis G. Davidson, Benjamin Bass and Louis P. Miller, Chicago, for appellee.

SCHWARTZ, Justice.

This is a personal injury suit in which plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for $7500 against defendant Sidney Resnick, who was lessee of an oil and gas filling station at the southeast corner of Sacramento and Harrison Streets, Chicago. On the morning of January 9, 1948, plaintiff slipped on a piece of ice on the sidewalk adjoining defendant's premises and sustained injuries, the nature and extent of which are not in dispute. There had been a heavy snowfall on January 1st, and snow fell again on the 4th. The period between January 1st and January 9th appears from the evidence to have been one of freeze and thaw. The snow melted during the day, water trickled onto the sidewalk, and as it grew colder at night, the water froze. After the heavy snowfall, defendant's employees cleaned off a portion of the driveway leading to its gas pumps on its own private property and also dug a narrow path through the snow on the sidewalk. The snow from the sidewalk was banked on either side of the walk, and some snow shoveled from the driveway was also placed upon the piles so banked. It is plaintiff's position that this created an extra hazard; that as the thaws came, lumps of snow rolled down from the snow mounds onto the narrow pathway and froze. There is, of course, no direct testimony that the lump of ice upon which plaintiff fell came from mounds of snow piled by defendant, but that was an interference drawn from the circumstances.

The law of the case is not in substantial dispute. It is conceded by both sides that a property owner is under no obligation to clear the sidewalks adjoining his premises. It is also conceded that where accumulations of snow and ice result from natural causes, there is no liability for injuries sustained by pedestrians. The only basis upon which defendant can be held liable in such a situation is in the commission of a positive negligent act which enhances the danger existing from natural causes. This is best illustrated by the case of King v. Swanson, 216 Ill.App. 294. There, plaintiff slipped on ice on a sidewalk adjoining defendant's premises. Defendant had dragged laundry baskets across a stretch of the sidewalk, packing the snow at that spot, causing ice to form, and making that portion of the sidewalk where plaintiff fell, especially slippery and dangerous. The court held that the slippery condition had not resulted from natural causes, but was artificially created by the practice of the defendant. On the other side, a case illustrative of exemption from liability is Miklaszewski v. City of Chicago, 194 Ill.App. 614. There, after a snowstorm the city piled snow on a vacant lot. The snow melted and ran over onto the sidewalk and froze. It was held that there was no liability. In Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911, affirming 260 Ill.App. 590, the city flooded a playground for skating. Some of the water overflowed onto the sidewalk and froze. Plaintiff slipped and was injured. The city was held liable. The court reviewed the various cases with respect to liability of the city, saying, 346 Ill. at page 643, 178 N.E. at page 913:

'* * * the reason which underlies the rule exempting cities from liability because of damages from slippery ice is that of necessity. It is grounded on the fact ...